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Abstract
How does regime change affect non-state conflicts? Within the broader literature coup
d’e´tats, riots and armed conflict is linked transitions between regimes. For non-state con-
flicts there is a lack of systemic inquire about this topic. To investigate this topic I start
by examining how states internal conditions put the contexts where violence becomes more
or less likely. I argue that states with non-representative institutions and low state capacity
put forth conditions where non-state conflicts are likely to erupt. Further, I investigate how
regime change alters this institutional set up. The interplay of a state occupied reorganizing
and the potential of a different future provide motivation and opportunity for actors dissatis-
fied with their current situation. If groups fail to display their importance and leverage in the
transition period, stakes might be lost when the emerging regime enters office and politics
start to consolidate.
Using data on non-state conflicts from 1989-2008, I apply a negative binomial regression to
test the effect of institutional set up and regime change on non-state conflicts. My analy-
ses suggest a relationship between weak state capacity and non-state conflicts. Depending
on choice of indicators, and the sample exposed, representative institutions might be an
explanation of non-state conflicts. While I fail to find a general relationship between non-
state conflicts and regime change, I find a strong relationship when allowing the indicator
of regime change to include cases of state collapse. Year to year changes between political
regimes cannot explain non-state conflicts, but long periods without a governing body does.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction and Research Questions
Why do non-state groups engage violently in some states whereas they coexist peacefully in
others? By exploring how states more or less facilitate for internal violence, I find bureaucratic
and administrative state capacity to be of importance. In addition I find a strong relationship
between regime change and conflicts, when anarchy emerges, group engage violently.
Whereas the majority of groups in the world leave peacefully, fighting between groups is
prevalent in some states. In Somalia, Afghanistan and India there have occurred a total of
77 different conflicts between groups from 1989 to 2008.1 In Nigeria, there are more people
dying in conflicts between groups than conflicts involving the government (Sundberg, Eck and
Kreutz 2012). In the Indian state of Gujarat, the conflict between Hindus and Muslims led in
1992 alone to more than 1000 people killed. It also caused 98 000 people to flee their homes
and leaving Gujarat’s economy in a devastating condition (Watch 2002). For Afghanistan,
non-state conflicts have displayed themselves as intricate patterns between groups motivated
by personal grudges, blood feuds, political leverage and regional power (UCDP 2014).
For the humans and communities involved, the devastating effects are similar regardless of
whether the warring parties are fighting the state or another group. In some regions of the
world, non-state conflicts are more deadly than civil war. In Africa alone, more than 60 000
people lost their lives in non-state conflicts between 1989 and 2008. Despite this fact, studies
of armed conflict have been state-centric in the sense that focus have been on civil wars and
1The 77 cases cover a total of 118 conflict years. One conflict year is the occurrence of a non-state conflict
on an annual basis. If two different conflicts are sustained over two years, this counts as four conflict years.
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interstate wars. Little attention have been given to non-state conflicts, consequently leaving
the field understudied (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012).
Contrasted to other types of collective violence, like war and civil war, the perhaps most im-
portant aspect of non-state conflicts is the lack of a government as one of the warring parties.
This is merely a qualified truth which needs a bit of elaboration. Although governments are
not among the warring parties in non-state conflicts, their action and policies can be seen as
the direct or indirect cause of non-state conflicts (Brosche and Elfversson 2012). Grievance
and inequality between groups are often rooted in government policies. I would argue that
non-state conflicts cannot be investigated without been seen in relation to the state they
operate within. Consequently, the state serve as the departure of my thesis as I set out to
investigate how different state attributes can account for the variation we see in non-state
conflicts across states.
As mentioned, there is a great variation in how often non-state conflicts occur within state.
Some states never see this type of violence, whereas the phenomena seem endemic in others.
What factors can explain this variation? In terms of regional share, non-state conflicts occur
most frequently in African and Asian countries. The common attribute for these two regions
is that states are recognized by the lack of democratic bodies as well as a limited ability
to govern. These two attributes, which I more specifically address to as non-representative
institutions and low state capacity constitute the institutional setup I argue is important for
the variation we see in non-state violence across states. Respectively, these two attributes
provide states with incentives and capacity to regulate violence. The distinction between
incentives and capacity is based on the fact that the ability to act does not necessarily
translate into action. However, having incentives to act is somewhat useless as action requires
the capacity to execute.
I argue that representative institutions put forth incentives for states to act in a conflict
reducing matter. The fear of the ballot box will sharpen leaders’ incentives to act in a
conflict reducing matter. Policies are more likely to be designed at benefitting the population
at whole and conflicts will be approached in a neutral matter. Thus the more democratic,
the less is the risk of non-state conflicts. Sudan serves as an example here, as al-Bashir’s
regime by no means have acted as a neutral mediator between societal groups. The regime is
characterized by being one of the world’s worst autocracies, perhaps being the country with
the worst record of human rights violations during the last decade. The pro-government
militia, the Janjaweed, share close ties with the Sudanese Government. When conflict broke
out in Darfur, the Janjaweed took side with the Sudanese government whom the government
supported with training and weapons. While the Janjaweed mostly have been involved in one
2
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sided violence against civilians, they also have fought the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A) (Brosche and Elfversson 2012). While Sudan represents the outer limit of non-
democratic regimes, it serves as example of how biased state could be in relation with their
citizens.
As already stated, the execution of conflict reducing behaviors requires the actual capacity to
do so. India is an example of state with representative institutions which also is characterized
by multiple occurrences of non-state conflicts. Scholars explain this due to India’s limited
ability to govern (Heller 2000). Low state capacity limits state’s potential to govern, making
the conflict reducing effect of representative institutions depend upon state capacity. Despite
good intensions, an underdeveloped bureaucracy will unable the implementation of policies
decided within representative institutions (Hegre and Nyg˚ard 2014). This suggests states in-
hibiting the capacity to govern, can choose to use it instrumentally to implement government
policies. Depending on whether institutions are representative or not, different incentives will
determine the likelihood of states taking the role as neutral or biased mediators.
For non-state conflicts, states’ incentives and capacity will determine how non-state groups
interpret their security situation. Groups that find themselves discriminated or marginalized
by state authorities will disqualify states as neutral mediators in conflicts. When groups
start to question the state’s incentive or capacity to protect them, groups consequently find
themselves in a situation where they have to provide their own security. If state agents are
not there to protect them, they must do so themselves. The consequence of this is a shift
in the regulation of violence from state-based to privately based, hence increasing the risk
of non-state violence. The brings the general expectation that states lacking both incentive
and capacity will per se have a higher risk of experiencing non-state conflicts.
Within the broader conflict literature, the effect of political transition has identified the reor-
ganization of state structures as a window of opportunity for actors seeking change (Mansfield
and Snyder 2005; Geddes 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010). I expect this to apply for non-
state actors that seek political change. The interplay of a state occupied reorganizing and
the potential of a different future provide motivation and opportunity for actors dissatisfied
with their current situation. If groups fail to display their importance and leverage in the
transition period, stakes might be lost when the emerging regime enters office and politics
start to consolidate. This is what we see where the sudden collapse of an unpopular regime
leads to a power vacuum. This power vacuum brings an increase in non-state conflicts as the
political leverage depends on whether groups enable to fight off rivals or not.
For non-state actors, the reorganization of state structures affects how groups interpret their
3
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security. Transitional periods creates situations where there exist insecurity related to how
and whom will regulate violence. In the wake of a major regime change, the state’s ability to
regulate violence is reduced. Conflicts and issue not related to national politics, will then be
pushed down the agenda (Kreutz and Eck 2011). Together, the reduced ability to govern and
the insecurity caused by not knowing how the future will look like alter how groups interpret
their security. The consequence for groups is that the security dilemma by no means are
solved, causing groups to provide security privately. For long lasting transitional periods
characterized by the complete disintegration of state structures, groups will seek private
solutions to security.
While regime change per se increases the risk of non-state violence by providing an oppor-
tunity window for mobilization as well as decoration of group’s security, the effect effect
of regime change is conditioned upon state capacity. States with strong state capacity are
likely to be less influenced by political changes. They are more able to govern and provide
state services, even in the middle of a transition (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Schock 1996;
DeRouen and Sobek 2004). On the regulation of violence, states with strong state capacity
will maintain their ability to regulate violence, hence having fewer occurrences of non-state
conflicts in transition periods.
By using newly available data on non-state conflicts I seek to investigate how state attributes
like representative institutions and low state capacity affect the level of non-state violence
within the wake of a regime change.
The research question guiding this thesis is:
How does regime change affect non-state violence?
1.2 Main findings
In my analysis I find support for a relationship between bureaucratic and administrative
state capacity and non-state conflicts. I also find a relationship between regime change and
non-state conflicts, but only in cases where the transition includes longer periods with lack
of central authority.
A strong bureaucratic and administrative state capacity relates to non-state conflicts by
two mechanism which jointly serve to reduce non-state conflicts. Firstly, state’s ability to
govern and provide services hinge upon bureaucratic and administrative capacity. It is a
4
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pre-condition for governance, central to prevent disorder and restore order. Secondly, bu-
reaucratic and administrative capacity is important determinants for groups’ security. Exe-
cution of policies hinge upon bureaucratic and administrative state capacity. States seeking
to prevent disorder and restore order have a better chance at fulfilling their missions when
equipped with a functioning bureaucracy. It enables states to acquire information about
their citizens. This is not only central for detection of rebel movements, but also to gives
government information about problems and grievances within the broader population. This
makes governance dependent upon bureaucratic and administrative state capacity.
For groups, bureaucratic and administrative state capacity relates to their interpretation of
security. Whereas a functioning bureaucracy has the ability to provide security, if the state
chooses to do so, a malfunctioning bureaucracy fails. A malfunctioning bureaucracy is defined
by the lack of political independence, the temporal stop of services during changes, lack of
day-to day routines and patrimonial procedures. In providing security, this type either fails
or it becomes a threat to security itself. When state agents no longer constitute a trustworthy
provider of security, security has to be provided from another source. Security provided by
group belonging is then the most relevant source. This leads to the armament of multiple
non-state actors and a shift in the regulation of violence from state-based to privately-based.
For regime change, I find support for an increase in non-state conflicts when regime includes
longer periods with lack of central authority. The mechanism related to regime change is
motivation and opportunity. Regime change tends to temporally (or completely) set aside
the state’s ability to govern. It represents a critical conjuncture for actors seeking political
leverage. When states are on the verge of collapse, rebels groups have incentive to fight each
other off in order to arrive as sole victors when a new government is constituted. For that
not seeking government office, the mechanism leading to armament is the security dilemma.
1.3 Definitions
Many of the concepts used in this thesis are in nature both abstract and elusive. They are
open to more than one interpretation. To facilitate the reading of this thesis I will start off
by defining the most important concepts and how they are used in my analysis. I have chosen
to exclude a definition of the explanatory variables. This allows for a focus on the concepts
per se without including the explanations that alter their relationships.
These concepts are: non-state conflicts, non-state actors, states, political regimes and political
5
1.3. DEFINITIONS
change.
Non-State Conflicts and Non-State Actors
Non-state conflicts is a sub-category of collective violence. Contrasted to other types of
collective violence, like war and civil war, the most important aspect of non-state conflicts is
the lack of a government as one of the warring participants. To be more precise on the type
of violence I am investigating I will adopt the widely used definition by Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) throughout my thesis. UCDP defines non-state conflict to be: ”The
use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government
of a state, which results in at least 25 battle- related deaths in a year” (Sundberg, Eck and
Kreutz 2012, pg. 353).
An important aspect about this definition is the lack of criterion for incomparability. While
civil wars are defined as incomparability over government power, there exists no incompati-
bility criterion as a prerequisite for non-state conflicts. Hence, the origins and reasons why
groups fight are diverse. It should also be noted that state absence is only a qualified truth.
While the definition exclude state as one the warring parties, the state and its policies can
be seen as the direct or indirect cause of non-state conflicts (Brosche and Elfversson 2012).
A non-state actor is one of the warring parties in a non-state conflict. Non-state actors
constitute a variety of groups based on different affiliations and organization levels. They
could be organized on the basis of ethnicity, clan, political affiliation, religion or separatist
movement.2 A broad and much used separation is done by dividing the non-state conflicts into
three categories based on the actors’ affiliation and organization level. These three are rebel
conflicts, political conflicts and communal conflicts. Rebel conflicts are between rebel groups,
military factions and other highly organized groups. Political conflicts are between parties
and candidates as well as electoral violence. Communal conflicts are between groups that
mobilize themselves among communal lines like: ethnicity, clan, religion, tribe or nationality.
There are two levels of organization: formally and informally organized groups. Formally
organized groups constitute any non-governmental group of people having announced a name
for their group and using armed force. Rebel conflicts are between formally organized groups.
An informal group is any group who does not have an announced name, but who uses
armed force and whose violent activity meets at least one of the following organizational
requirements: there must be a clear pattern of incidents which are connected, or there must
2A sample showing the variety is found in Section 4.3.2, Table 4.4.
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be evidence that violence was planned in advance. Political conflicts and communal conflicts
belong to this organization level.3
The State, Political Regimes and Political Change
The state is not present in the UCDP definition of non-state conflicts. Since the state
constitutes an important aspect of the theoretic framework I am going to build, an initial
understanding of what constitutes states is of importance.
The modern understanding of the state origins in the work of Weber ([1918]1946). Following
the Weberian definition, a state has two distinct features: monopoly on the use of violence
and an organization supporting it (usually some kind of bureaucracy or other centralized
organization). Lacking these features, the state cannot exist. Non-state conflicts are in
particular frequent in countries like Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan. According to the
Weberian definition, these countries are not states; they are stateless societies, recognized as
failed states. For my framework, the Weberian state definition is not suited. I will adopt
UCDP’ definition of state where also failed states are included. UCDP define a state as ”either
an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or an
internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is
not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling
the same territory” (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002, pg. 619).
The majority of UCDP’ states fall into the Weberian definition. The difference is that cases
included in UCDP’s definition merely could be considered to be a territory.
In UCDP’s definition, government is the actor controlling (or used to control) the state. In
my thesis, governments differ by their type of political regime. They also differ by other
attributes, but one important dimensions of governments is the type of political regime they
origin from. There are many interpretations of what constitutes a political regime. The overall
concept is broad and encompasses aspects like: traditions, norms, historical legacy, culture
and institutional characteristics. To arrive at a more precise definition of political regimes, I
will first present the broadness of the concept before I narrow it down to a definition solely
based on political institutions.
As an overall phenomenon, political regimes can be understood as a set of procedures that
determine the distribution of power. At any moment, political regimes represent the em-
3This does not exclude the potential that an group with political affiliation can be a rebel group. For
instance, Hezbollah in Lebanon is based on a religious affiliation, but due to a standing army they fall into
the rebel category.
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bodiment of authority traditions which overtime serve to constitute the political regime.
Nested within political regimes are political institutions. For political scientist, categoriza-
tion of political regimes is most commonly based political institutions. By examining political
institutions, political regimes are categorized along a dimension with two extreme points: au-
tocracy and democracy. Before presenting the scholarly debate on how to categorize political
regimes, it is somewhat important to understand the how institutions work per se. An in-
fluential definition is offered by North (1990). In his view, institutions are sets of constrains
on behavior as they form rules and regulations. They are also a set of procedures to detect
deviations from the rules and regulations. In additional institution include a set of moral,
ethical and behavioral norms. While the definition of North is rather broad, it helps to
facilitate an understanding of how political institutions both express the values and power
configurations of their respective regimes.
In their categorization of politic regimes, scholar disagrees upon the institutions of importance
and their relative leverage. For instance, Linz (1975) classify political regimes by their
degree of popular mobilization, the degree of inclusiveness and the political values expressed.
Another and much employed categorization is offered by Dahl (1971). He distinguishes
political regimes along by dimension: the degree of political competition and the degree of
political participation. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) classify political
regimes according to a set of criterions, or institutional procedures. Whether or not they
fulfill the set, they define political regimes as democracies of autocracies.
In my thesis, I will adopt the definitions used by Eckstein (1973) and Gurr (1974). They
suggest three dimensions of importance: regulation of executive recruitment, the extent of
the franchise and the constrains on the executive powers (Gates, Hegre, Jones and Strand
2006, pg. 894). The major advantage of the categorization by Eckstein and Gurr is that
political regimes are classified along a continuous scale. Depending on institutional set up,
political regimes span from autocracies, by anocracies to democracies. To summarize, I
define political regimes along a continuous scale spanning from autocracy to democracy.
The political institutions of importance are those regulation executive recruitment, executive
constraints and participation.
By defining political regimes by political institutions, the definition of political change au-
tomatically involves changes in political institutions. This means that change in political
institutions affect the set of procedures that determine the distribution of power. Regime
change will involve a fundamental realignment of the rules, altering the composition of play-
ers included in the process of decision making. A political transition has therefor direct
consequences for political actors and citizens because it alters how power is allocated and
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hence all the advantages stemming from political power.
1.4 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 I review the prior scholarly debate of non-
state conflicts. Former literature will be presented and addressees. In Chapter 3 I develop
a theoretical underpin with derived hypothesis. In particular I develop expectations about
why states differ to how many non-state conflicts they erupt. In Chapter 4 I develop the
research design enabling me to test the hypothesis. This chapter seeks to bridge the gap
between the theoretical framework and the empirical analysis. I proceed in Chapter 5 by
providing bivariate statistics and results from the analysis. Discussion and interpretation of
findings will also be offered. In 6 I test the robustness of my result by exposing the research
design to alternative operationalizations and measure of fit. Finally, concluding remarks are
offered in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Despite the fact that non state-conflicts in many regions of the world are as deadly as civil
wars, far less research have been conducted on the topic. The approach has mostly been
qualitative, focusing on high profile cases in countries like Kenya, India and Indonesia. Even
those with a comparative ambition have confined their research to investigate variation within
a country or to a restricted area (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012). The lack of cross case
comparison and the tendency for scholars to investigate the same cases leads to some selection
bias within the field. This makes systematic inquiry about non-state conflicts somewhat
restricted. The lack of systematic inquiry is not because researchers do not engage in the
topic; the reason to blame is rather the lack of cross national data. However, with the resent
availability of the comprehensive UCDP non-state conflict dataset, the scholarly debate is
making progress (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012).1
This section sets out to investigate what we know about non-state conflicts. I will start off by
presenting the scholarly literature on non-state conflicts. I find three strands in the literature
worthy reviewing.2 The first strand explains non- state conflicts by grievance between groups.
Drawing on relative deprivation theory, they predict non-state conflicts when inequality leads
to a distinction between the favored and the un-favored. While scholars within this approach
argue from the same perspective, they differ upon the origins of grievance. Some incorpo-
1Other notable data sets that to some extent touches upon the same issues are the Minorities at Risk data
set (MAR) (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) and the Ethnic Power Relations data set (EPR) (Cederman,
Min and Wimmer 2009).
2There is also a noteworthy strand using rational choice and game-theoretic model. Since game-theoretic
model in a strict sense does not explain why conflicts happen, I have omitted them from the literature review.
For those interested, works by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009), Cunningham, Bakke and Sey-
mour (2012) and Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour (2012) use game-theoretic models in their examinations
of in-fighting in civil wars.
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rate state and institutional structures as the potential source of grievance, whereas others do
not. The second strand reviewed focus on how political entrepreneurs manipulate conflicts
to entrench their own powers. Political leaders may see a utility in creating or sustaining
tension if it can help them win an election or a new period in office. The last strand re-
viewed is the literature focusing on opportunities as a pre-condition for violent mobilization.
Material resources, social resources and contextual surroundings explain the occurrence of
conflicts. Consequently will the control of natural resource become a valuable asset groups
have economic- and political incentives to keep for themselves. Thus, rivalry and fighting
between non-state actors can explained by strive to secure material and political leverage.
2.1 Grievance Based Explanations
Since Toqueville, inequality has always been a major explanation of conflict. Unequal dis-
tributions of goods are presumed to make societies more prone to civil wars, riots, demon-
strations, coups, communal conflicts and rebellions. The modern versions of Toqueville’s
proposition have been made famous in the work of Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970). These
scholars state that grievance will be generated when there is a gap between what people
have in relation to others or in relation to their expectations. When this grievance reaches a
sufficient level, people will take up arms against the perceived source of grievance.
Despite the same point of departure, scholars relying on grievance based explanations dis-
agree upon the source of grievance and its origins. In the following sections I present two
notable sources of grievance between non-state actors, namely socio-economic inequality and
environmental scarcity.
Socio-Economic Inequality
Within the field of conflict research, inequality stands as a solid explanation of armed con-
flicts. Various measures of political, social and economic inequality have been put forth by
scholars seeking to explain collective violence. Despite a mixed empirical record within the
quantitative field, scholars refuse to dismiss inequality as a source of conflicts.
Inequality can be grasped in different ways. It can occur randomly between individuals
(vertical inequality) and it can occur between people with shared identities (horizontal in-
equality). Since collective mobilization is presumed to be easier when people initially share
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a social identity, scholars studying non-state conflict have been occupied with horizontal in-
equality. They stress situations where relative fortunes starts to differ between people with
shared identities. Horizontal inequality is hypothesized to be more dangerous than vertical
inequality because it involves a group aspect. If inequalities coincide with group cleavages, it
induces more hostile sentiments against other groups. Compared to inequality between indi-
viduals, differing fortunes between groups automatically have an aspect more closely linked
to conflict. When relative fortunes differ, group belonging reinforce the impetus for violence
as well as inward cohesion facilitates violent mobilization (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Horowitz
1985; Gurr 2000; Stewart 2000; Wimmer 2002). Among the types of inequality, economic is
expected to particular salient. Since a minimum of economic goods is required to stay alive,
even the smallest decline becomes crucial when people live close to the subsistence level (Gurr
1970, pg. 131).
In the broader conflict literature, the empirical evidence linking inequality and civil conflict
is mixed. Gaining monument in the studies of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2004), inequality induced grievance was long dismissed as a source civil conflict.
The non-findings caused a huge scholarly debate and criticism were directed against the
scholars’ conceptualization and indicators of inequality.3 In other studies, both vertical and
horizontal inequality of wealth and power proves to be significant (See eg. Alesina and Perotti
1996; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Østby 2008; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011;
Buhaug, Gleditsch, Holtermann, Tollefsen and Østby 2011). Despite some inconsistency in
findings, most scholars refuse to dismiss inequality as a cause of civil conflict.
Within the non-state literature, researchers find evidence linking horizontal inequality and
marginalization of groups to conflicts. Closely linked to economic marginalization is poverty
and economic decline. While the scholars find a general relationship between horizontal
inequality in both poor and rich societies, they all stress how poverty and economic recession
reinforce the risk of conflict in societies where people already live in a vulnerable situation
(Mancini 2005; Murshed and Gates 2005; Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007; Barron, Kaiser and
Pradhan 2009; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Rudolfsen 2013; Fjelde and Østby
2014). In the majority of these findings, economic inequality is the most robust predictor of
grievance based non-state conflicts.4
3Scholars claim that these non-findings are mainly based on the use of highly aggregated proxies such
as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and ethnic fictionalization measure. Due to their high level
of aggregation, these proxies makes it hard to distinguish one explanation from another (Sambanis 2004a;
Østby 2008). See also Lichbach (1989)’s review of studies done one the link between economic inequality and
political conflict.
4Other proxies of horizontal equability are also used, but they do not prove as robust. Examples of these
are landholding, political rights, access to employment and access to public services.
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Environmental Scarcity
An out-growth of the relative deprivation theory is the environmental scarcity literature.
Founded in the work of Homer-Dixon (1991, 1999) and Kahl (2006), the environmental
scarcity literature predicts conflict when degeneration of resources interacts with an existing
condition of scarcity.5 In societies where people’s livelihood depend on access to water points,
fish stocks or cropland, a sudden shortage of these resources have a severe impact on people’s
lives. A sudden shortage is not a problem if there is a surplus, but when resources are scare
and is demand high, degeneration becomes a vital problem. Grievance is triggered when
depletion, increased demand and/or maldistribution of scare resources generates a division
where some people are fortunate and others not. There are two mechanism identified on
how scarcity of natural resources leads to grievance, namely: resource capture and ecological
marginalization.
The first one relates to predation. Faced with the potential of famine and economic ruin,
predation becomes a solution. The latter one predicts conflict when people are forced to
migration into areas less suitable for habitation. Increased population pressure leads new-
comers and existing inhabitants to clash over the distribution of scare goods. Population
growth faces some of the same issue. With an increase in people, everyone’s slice of cake
decreases. In sub-Saharan African, an area characterized by its high share of people engaged
in the rule sector, scholars find support for a relationship between environmental scarcity
and non-state conflicts (Meier, Bond and Bond 2007; Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012). In his
study of India, Urdal (2008) finds more outbreaks of violence in areas with high population
growth.
A sub- branch within the environmental-scarcity literature is the research aimed at investigat-
ing the linkage between climate change and conflict. Disasters such as droughts, floods and
windstorms influence food supplies. When faced with the potential of famine and poverty,
climate induced migration causes people to clash over the access to scare resources like wa-
ter and arable land (Homer-Dixon 1999; Reuveny 2007; Obioha 2008; Hendrix and Salehyan
2012). Kahl (2006, pp. 234-35) explains the Tuareg conflicts in northern Mali by this mech-
anism. These people live in the Sahel belt, an area known for its extremely harsh living
conditions. Stroked by severe droughts a multiple of times, the livelihood of the Tuaregs
was destroyed. Following the drought, Tuaregs migrated to Niger and Algeria. Insurgency
occurred the period following the famine and the subsequent refugee crisis.
5Gurr (1970, pg. 131) also recognized this in his work. When people live close to the subsistence margin,
almost any decline will increase the impetus for violence. Natural disaster are then particular dangerous in
peasant societies when people live on the subsistence margin.
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Tracing the Source of Grievance
Common for all scholars drawing on relative deprivation theory is how they concur on the
finding that inequality increases the risk conflict between groups, either as unequal access
to natural resources or as political and socio-economic differences. What they do not agree
upon is the causal starting point of grievance. In particular, scholars that do not incorporate
the institutional setting non-state conflicts erupt in, are accused for missing out on how
institutional structures more or less facilitates for conflicts.
A growing number of studies argue that the role of environmental scarcity has been exagger-
ated. Critics note that it over-predicts conflict and disregards the role of political institutions.
Instead, they argue that underlying mechanisms like state failure, political- and economical
marginalization and state capacity are stronger and more robust predictors (Barnett 2001;
Benjaminsen 2008; Theisen 2008; Raleigh 2010; Turner, Ayantunde, Patterson and Patterson
2011; Fjelde and Østby 2014). Based on his investigation of the Tuareg conflicts, Benjaminsen
(2008) reject the environmental scarcity theory. Contradicting the findings of Kahl (2006),
he argues Tuareg rebellions mainly have been due to failing state policies. On the topic
of climate change, scholars contend that although climate change is an insufficient cause of
conflict itself, it may aggregate current tensions and inequalities (Barnett 2000, 2001; Nord˚as
and Gleditsch 2007; Raleigh 2010).6
According to Raleigh (2010), much of environmental security literature often end up with
concluding that political and economic characteristics of the countries where the strongest
predictors of conflict. Conflicts most often erupt within the context of a hostile and weak
state. Scholars focusing on marginalization stress the importance of state institutions, argue
they are fundamental for our understanding of conflicts. A hostile and biased state creates
grievance induced conflicts when allocation of resources and provision of public goods leads
to unequally distribution among groups (Wimmer 1997; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010).
To summarize, the strand of literate drawing on relative deprivation arguments all focus on
how various aspects of inequality leads to grievance induced conflict between groups. When
there becomes a division between the favored and the non-favored, inter- group comparison
provokes group mobilization leading to a situation where conflict between groups becomes
likely (Gurr 2000; Wimmer 2002; Stewart 2008b). While scholars concur on the importance
6The same notion is upheld within the civil literature. Scholars fail to find any systematic evidence
linking drought to the onset of conflicts. Theisen, Holtermann and Buhaug (2011) fail to find a relationship
between drought and civil conflict. Miguel, Satyanath and Serengeti (2004) proxy economic growth through
rainfall. They find that recession, measured as drought, is related to conflict in economies relying on rain-fed
agriculture.
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of equal distribution of wealth and power, they disagree upon the origins of grievance. I
would argue that non-state conflicts cannot be understood without incorporating they struc-
tures they operate within. Disregarding the political and institutional context groups operate
within leads to narrow conclusions missing the overall picture. In this sense, many of the
grievance based explanations presented here are only a manifestation of malfunction institu-
tions and weak state capacity. This calls for a state-based examination of non-state conflicts.
2.2 Political Entrepreneurs and the Manipulation of
Conflicts
A second strand of literature addressing non-state conflicts has focused on how political
entrepreneurs manipulate conflicts to entrench their own power. Political leaders may see
the utility in creating or sustaining tension if it can help them win an election or a new period
in office.
Most of the empiric work of this approach is drawn from the Hindu-/ Muslim violence in India.
Brass (1997, 2003) have in his works shown how incidences of local violence fit into broader
frames of meaning, thereby becoming a tool for leaders wanting to uphold their ideology.
For an actor seeking leverage, the mobilization of people is often the key to success. Leaders
and politicians fighting for a cause understand, and maximize by this logic. Representing a
big group means more political leverage in negotiation. In addition, a big group constitutes
the potential of a big army. By appealing to various identities, leaders can increase their
support base. It also means that leaders strategically can manipulate identities when lacking
an actual support base.
Wilkinson (2004) explains India’s regional variation in ethnic violence due to town- and state-
level electoral incentives. These two factors combined predict when and where ethnic riots
rise in India. They are planned by local politicians for a clear political purpose. Chances
of victory at the ballot box creates incentives for local leaders to increase tension and po-
larization in conflicts that for most people believed to be cases of ancient ethnic grudge.
Further, Wilkinson (2004) argues that state-electoral incentives decides whether the state
will intervene and act as a mediator. If the fighting parties serve as an important base of
their electorate, the state will intervene and try to end the conflict. If not, the state will
remain as an outsider.
Among scholars, ethnical political mobilization is often viewed as a product of the strate-
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gic behavior of political entrepreneurs (Horowitz 1985; Brass 1991; Mueller 2000; Wimmer
2002).7 Wimmer (1997, 2002) argues that politicization of ethnicity is an aspect of modern
state-building. Political conflicts take an ethnic form when resources are distributed along
ethnic lines. When recruiting and committing to a cause, ethnicity proves to be a powerful
asset leaders can derive support from.
There is also a sub-branch within this approach focusing on how political transition becomes
important junctures where mobilization have occur rapidly.8 A political entrepreneur facing
a state occupied reorganizing, are in urgent need of mobilization. Since stakes may be lost
when new leaders enters office and the regime stats to consolidate, regime changes represent
critical juncture where identities are likely to politicized and mobilized (Van Klinken 2007a;
Kreutz and Eck 2011).
The objections to the scholars explaining non-state conflicts by elite manipulation have been
the lack of incorporation institutional conditions. For instance, Mueller (2000) have argued
that the term ”ethnic war” have been a misguiding concept within in the scholarly debate.
According to Mueller, the Yugoslavian- and Rwanda experience was not an ”ethnic conflict”,
despite the fact that the fighting parties belong to distinct ethnic groups. What display
itself was instead manipulating elites with a lack of constrain on their power. Wilkinson
(2004) does to some extent touch upon this topic by arguing that institutional structures
put forth the rule of the game which leaders mobilize by. Jointly, Mueller and Wilkinson
trance the explanation of non-state conflicts beyond the political entrepreneurs themselves.
Institutional structures put forth both constrains and conditions facilitating leaders’ strategic
use of conflicts. Once again, this calls for an examination of non-state conflicts with an
incorporation of institutional structures.
2.3 Opportunity Based Explanations
The last strand of literature I will address is the opportunity based explanations. Taking a
different point of view on the origins of conflict, this perspective argues that grievance and
deprivation alone will not cause conflict. Scholars like Tilly (1978) and Jenkins (1983) argues
that resources is the pre-condition for collective mobilization. Without them groups cannot
7Much scholarly debate have focused on the role of ethnicity as a determinant in the onset of civil wars.
While some focus of whether the existence of ethnic groups per se causes conflict (See. eg. Ellingsen 2000;
Fearon and Laitin 2003), others have focused on the political and economic marginalization of ethnic groups
(Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010)
8I will address the opportunity stemming from state reorganization in subsequent sections.
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mobilize for conflict, hence conflicts cannot happen.9
There are many interpretations and definitions of opportunity and resources. A broad def-
inition entails material resources and non- material resources like loyalty and allegiance.
Another way to grasp opportunities is how contextual surroundings represent opportunities,
or conjuncture, more or less feasible for conflicts (Weinstein 2007).
The role of natural resources have been thoroughly investigated within the broader conflict
literature.10 When it comes to non-state conflicts the main focus of opportunity based ex-
planation have been addressed by looking at rebel groups within the context of civil wars.
Control of natural resource becomes a valuable asset groups have economic- and political in-
centives to keep for themselves. Rivalry and fighting between rebel groups can explained by
strive to secure material and political leverage. If future political leverage hinges on defeating
both the government and a rival rebel groups, access to resources makes the goal more easily
accomplished (Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012).
When looking at conflicts between rebel groups in civil wars, Cunningham, Bakke and Sey-
mour (2012, pp. 572) note that rebel groups fighting each other is as common as rebel
groups fighting the government. Non-state conflicts in Colombia, Sudan, and Sierra Leone
are as much about government power as it is about control of resources like drugs, oil, and
gemstones. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) find the same relationship, where the presence of oil
increases the risk of in-fighting. Not completely overlooked, some attention is also given to
conflicts between non-state actors outside civil wars. In particular, greed- motivated expla-
nations are offered for cases of criminal violence. One example is Mexico, where the majority
of non-state conflicts have been clashes between drug cartels over stakes in the illegal drug
industry (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012).
Some scholars also view political changes as an opportunity. Political transition creates
opportunities for actors to mobilize and exploit the instability of state reorganization.11 Fol-
9Resource opportunity based explanations vary with their assumption’s about the motivational role of
grievance in rebellion. Whereas the opportunity perspective takes grievance for granted, the greed perspective
does not. Since both perspectives stress the presence of opportunities and resources, I will not stress the
motivational aspect. Case-based evidence also suggests that there seldom are clear cut lines between cases
of greed- and opportunity- motivated rebellion.
10The role of natural resources are well investigated within the broader conflict literature. Scholars link
the availability of natural resources both the onset and duration of conflict (See eg. de Soysa 2000, 2002;
Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Ross 2004a,b). Looking more directly at greed motivated rebellion, scholars argue
that presence of commodities like oil, minerals, gemstones and drugs fuels greed motivated rebellion (See eg
Grossman 1991; de Soysa 2000, 2002; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Ross 2004a,b).
11The effect of political transition and the reorganization of a state is within related fields viewed as
a window of opportunity for groups that seek political power. Social unrest, coup d’e´tat, onset of civil
and international war are more likely to take place during regime transitions (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and
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lowing Indonesia’s democratic transition in the 1990s was an outburst of all types of collective
violence. While scholars stress the importance of other factors than political change, the all
agree the transition spiked communal violence (Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007; Van Klinken
2007b; Tajima 2013). When incorporating the direction of change, evidence from Kreutz and
Eck (2011) and Tajima (2013) find that democratization leads to an increase in non-state
conflicts.
Compared to the grievance based explanations, opportunity based explanations do not posit
the same share of scholarly examinations. Whereas the literature focusing on inequality and
non-state conflicts is vast, the role of opportunity based explanations remains understudied.
For example, the studies on natural resources have been restricted to in-fighting in civil war.
This means that we do not know much about how resources influence non-state conflicts
outside the context of civil war. When looking at opportunities for mobilization by regime
change, the examination by Kreutz and Eck (2011) is the only large N- study available.
While there exists some studies of non-state conflicts and regime change, these tend to be
from the same high profile cases. In relation to non-state conflicts, Kenya and Indonesia are
well studied, but other transitions are not.
2.4 Summary and Remaining Research Gaps
In this section, I have reviewed the literature of non-state conflicts. Three strands in the
literature have briefly been addressed: grievance based explanations, leader manipulations
and opportunity based explanations. Since the majority of non-state conflicts are explained
by grievance induced inequality, the review this strand have been the most comprehensive.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the majority of research on non-state conflict
has been case studies. Case studies are often fruitful in the sense that they propose new
hypotheses and mechanism to test. I do by no means question their importance, but I
will argue the field is ready for comparison across time and space. Systematic inquiry is
long-desired. Cross validation calls for researchers to examine cases of non-state violence
across both time and space. This is mainly a quantitative task, but since much of case-based
evidence is drawn from Kenya, India and Indonesia, it applies to researchers using qualitative
methods as well.
After reviewing the literature of non-state conflicts, it became clear that state and institu-
Gleditsch 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Geddes 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010).
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tional structures must be incorporated in the explanations of non-state conflicts. These calls
for an approach where state attributes make up a part of the explanations. When review-
ing the literature it became clear that some explanations remain understudied compared to
others. In particular, explanations focusing on opportunities remains understudied. My con-
tribution to the field will be to address the opportunities for violence stemming from regime
changes. With a few expectations, evidence here are solely drawn from the Indonesia and
Kenya case. It is this nexus I want to investigate. In the following section I will develop a the-
oretical framework of how state attributes like representative institutions and state capacity
affect the risk of non-state violence in critical conjectures like regime change.
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Theoretical Framework
In this section I will present a theoretical framework based on how state attributes like repre-
sentative political institutions, bureaucratic and administrative state capacity are important
determinants in explaining the variation we see in non-state conflicts across states. While
representative political institutions inhibit incentives to reduce and solve grievances between
groups, the actual potential of doing so hinge upon bureaucratic and administrative state
capacity. This leads to an approach where I distinguish between the input and output side of
politics. Further, I will present how regime changes constitute a critical conjuncture where
violence is likely to increase. However, the conflict increasing effect of regime change is
expected to be mediated by strong bureaucratic and administrative state capacity.
This framework will draw on theories borrowed from the broader conflict literature. Com-
pared to the literature of civil conflict, there do not exist the same amount scholarly exami-
nations for non-state conflicts. Consequently there is a lack of specified theories for non-state
conflict. My solution to this is to apply theories from the broader conflict literature and see
if they are applicable to non-state conflicts. While the theories chosen mainly inherit from
the civil war literature, I do not find the scope of the arguments restricted to civil conflict.
I rely on a theoretical framework with the existence of two type of actors: political leaders
and multiple groups.1 Compared to each other, the political leader represent a tiny elite
and the groups represent factions within the citizens.2 Jointly, the groups represent a more
1While the existence of groups in itself is not trivial assumption, it as a plausible assumption. Scholars
like Gurr (1993), Horowitz (1985) and Stewart (2008a) recognize group membership as an intrinsic part of
social and political life.
2This resembles and is inspired by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, pg. 15) way of conceiving society
consisting of two groups: the elites and the citizens. I adopt their argument and transfer it non-state
conflicts. The main adjustment is done on the citizen part of the twofold societal conception. Whereas
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numerous portion of the citizens than the political leaders. The assumption regarding their
behaviors is that both actors seek to maximize wealth. This assumption leads to an inherently
conflictual relationship between the actors. If wealth is to be maximized for political leaders
it will be on expense of the groups’ wealth. Connected to the maximization of wealth are
the divergent preferences of political regime. The logic is simple: with only one cake, the
more people invited the less cake for each person. Since a political regime by definition is the
set of procedures determining the distribution of power, each actor will prefer the political
system that respectively benefits their wealth. Compared to a democracy, an autocracy
represents the preferences of a much smaller subset of society. Political leaders will then
prefer autocracy. For the groups, the preferred regime type is democracy as this type opts
for pro-majority policies. Since wealth is distributed to a subset of the population, autocracy
also represents inequality. On the contrary, democracy represent equality since it favors the
majority (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
In non-democracies, political leaders set the rules of the game and have de jure political
power. But since the groups represent the majority, they have de-facto power. They can
challenge the regime if they want to. Political leaders fearing their power can then make a
trade off. In exchange for political support they can share a portion of their wealth with
fractions within the greater population. From the broader conflict literature we know that,
inequality and marginalization are conflict inducing situations. When division of wealth
leads to a distinction between the favored and the un-favored, grievance is induced. In the
worst case, grievance provokes civil conflict between the groups and the state. For non-state
conflicts, the path from grievance generated by the government to the situation where groups
take up arms against each other is not so obvious. But, it is possible. From the literature
review it became clear that that state and institutional structures must be incorporated in
the explanations of non-state. Non-democratic regimes and malfunctioning state structures
are expected to be strong predictors for non-state conflicts. I will now proceed by developing
a framework where states represent the structural condition making non-state conflicts more
or less likely (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
Acemoglu and Robinson treat the citizens as one unit, I treat the citizens as multiple factions.
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3.1 Representative Institutions: Incentives to Reduce
Tension and Solve Conflicts
My theoretic approach depends on a separation of the input and output sides of politics. The
justification for doing so will be more thoroughly addressed subsequently. In this section I
will address formal democratic institutions here. A more precise definition of the concept is
given by Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014, pg.7): ”Institutions where the executive power is elected
by a majority or a plurality of the population and that there exist constrains on executive
powers by an elected legislative.” By formal I mean they are part of the input side of politics,
only related to the election of leaders. I will start by presenting arguments from the broader
conflict literature before I narrow it down to expectations regarding non-state conflicts. In
general, I concur on the grievance reducing effect of representative institutions, finding the
argument directly transferable to non-state conflicts.
The most widely held notion in the conflict literature is that democracies experience less
conflicts compared to other regimes. While the effect is biggest at the dyadic level, the effect
holds at individual state level as well (Russett and Oneal 2001). For civil conflicts, scholars
find an inverted U-relationship between regime type and civil conflict. Intermediate regimes,
or semi democracies, are more conflict prone than autocracies and democracies (Gates et al.
2006; Hegre et al. 2001; Muller 1985; Muller and Weede 1990). Scholar seeking to explain this
tendency offer grievance and relative deprivation based arguments (See eg. Davies 1962; Gurr
1968; Hegre et al. 2001). Since non-democratic regimes per se are unequal societies, they
serve to produce grievance. Governments are seen responsible for the ”expectations- ability
discrepancy.” By not being representative, or by favoring parts of the population, government
generates grievance induced conflicts. In the worst case, this is manifested through civil war.
Do the same logics apply to fighting between groups? Since non-state actors fight each
other, rather than the state, is it possible for representative institutions to reduce conflicts
between non-state actors? I would argue so. Within the literature, there are many arguments
speaking in favor of a conflict reducing effect of representative institutions for tension between
groups. Simply be being inclusive, proper functioning political institutions reduce grievance
in society at whole. They pacify society by providing non- violent channels for conflicts
resolution through political inclusion (Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Cederman,
Wimmer and Min 2010).
The mechanism behind the conflict reducing effect of representative institutions is related to
leader selection and leader removal. The effect of leader selection and leader removal put
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AND SOLVE CONFLICTS
forward incentives for leaders to reduce grievance and solve conflicts in non-partial matters,
which serves to reduce conflicts (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Cederman, Hug
and Krebs 2010; Hegre and Nyg˚ard 2014).
Following the approach of Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014), I focus on incentives, rather than real
actions. Initially this might seem a bit vague, but there reasons for doing so. Firstly, there
exist many non-representative regimes inducing policies favoring the whole population. In
order to conceptually distinguish these regimes, I focus on incentives. Autocrats might be
nice, but there exist no incentives for them to behave so. A second reason for focusing on
incentives is the tendency among scholars to juxtapose representative institutions with good
governance (See eg. Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004).
For instance, Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014) stress the importance of treating decision making and
implementation as different concepts. Whereas the first concept relates to the set of procedure
defining how power is distributed, the latter does not. This means that elected governments
may fail to govern despite the best of intension. The actual potential of fulfilling policies,
hence good governance, might hinge on other aspects than formal institutions themselves.
Jointly, this justifies a focus on incentives.
For non-state conflicts, representative political institutions serve to (1) reduce tension be-
tween groups and (2) act as neutral mediators when conflict occurs. Selection of leaders into
central positions, through general elections put forth incentive to govern in ways that reduce
the ”expectations- ability discrepancy.” This calls for less inequality between groups, a fac-
tor strongly related to the occurrence of non-state conflicts. The fear of the ballot box put
forth incentives for political leaders to promote policies reducing tension between groups. If
leaders seek a new term in office, the chance will be best if groups believe their grievance will
be addressed and taken seriously. This mechanism put forth incentives for political leaders
to induce policies reducing tension rather than policies increasing them. While the fear of
the ballot box initially serves to reduce tension, it also creates incentive for leader to act as
neutral mediators when conflict occurs. If political leader are portray as neutral mediators,
instead of biased agents, re-election becomes more likely. Jointly, the effect of leader selec-
tion and leader removal leads to the expectation about less non-state conflicts in states with
representative institutions.
For non-state conflicts, the grievance reducing effect on non-state conflicts is related to for-
mal political institutions. This relationship concurs with the expectations from the broader
conflict literature. From civil war literature, many scholars stress how inter mediate regimes
inhabit certain characteristic that make them in particular conflict prone. By their com-
bination of being somewhat open and somewhat repressive, an intermediate regime creates
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grievance due to its openness and the opportunities to display them (Muller and Weede
1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2009). For non-state conflicts, I question a
non-monotonic effect by representative political institutions. I have two objections to why
this expectation represents a case where logics diverge between non-state conflicts and state-
based conflicts. Firstly, I expect incentives for reducing tension to have a monotonic effect.
The logic behind this is simple: The less open, the less incentive to reduce and solve ten-
sion. Secondly, the argument behind the inverted U involves aspects of opportunity based
explanations. The opportunity to display violence is mostly related to the regime’s repres-
sive capabilities. I focus on formal political institutions, which is conceptually different from
repressive capabilities. Jointly, this leads me to conclude with following relationship between
representative political institutions and non-state conflicts:
H1: Representative political institutions decreases the risk of non-state conflicts.
3.2 State Capacity: Capacity to Govern and Provide
Order
The second aspect of state attributes I will address is state capacity. In the previous section,
I focused on how incentives to solve non-state conflicts between groups. The reason for doing
so was the conceptual difference between decision making and implementation of policies.
This section addresses the latter. State capacity encompasses to which extent states are
able to govern and carry out their politics, making state capacity is the pre-condition for
governance. In particular, I will argue that bureaucratic and administrative state capacity is
the most important aspect of state capacity in relation to non-state conflicts.
3.2.1 State Capacity
Despite being conceptually linked, ”state capacity” is used as a all-encompassing concept for
nearly everything enabling states to perform properly. It is an elusive concept open to many
interpretations. Since there no consensus on how to define state capacity, scholars interpret
it differently. This leads to a mixed and confusing empirical record, where the same indicator
for different concepts, consequently leading to diverging inferences (Fjelde and de Soysa 2009;
Hendrix 2010)
Most traditionally, state capacity is defined as the state ability to deter or fight back chal-
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lenges to its authority with force. The establishment of a strong coercive power imposing
order from above is the Hobbesian solution to civil peace. The more modern version of this
notion could be traced back to the Weberian state definition. Weber ([1918]1946) views the
state as a source of political order based on its monopoly over the means of violence. In the
Weberian sense, coercion is the distinct property of states.3 In civil wars, this argument have
been used to explain why rebel groups in some cases take up arms against the government
and in other not. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003) states with weak state capacity have
limit ability to counter insurgencies. The mechanism which leads to civil peace is deterrence
and counter insurgency capability. With a strong military capacity and institutions able to
penetrate into every corner of society, states deposit the means to counter insurgency. Other
scholars find the same relationship. When rebels face a strong military, calculations about
the cost of rebellion are higher when the state’s military capability is strong (Collier and
Hoeﬄer 1998; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; DeRouen and Sobek 2004)
Many scholars have used regime type to measure state capacity. By incorporate aspect of
political regimes in their interpretation of the concept, they pose a argument where interme-
diate regime have the highest risk of armed conflict. These scholars offer an argument where
consolidated democracies have institutionalized channels for addressing grievance. Autocra-
cies have the same effect on conflicts, but through different mechanism. The combination
of repressive powers and hostile leadership deter potential dissentients, making rebellion less
likely. The combination of being somewhat repressive and lack of strong state capacity makes
intermediate regimes a breeding ground for civil conflict (Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al.
2001; Reynal-Querol 2002).
While a focus on crude military power can explain why groups do not dare to challenge the
state, the argument has not the same leverage when explaining non-state conflicts. The main
objection is based on how a functioning bureaucracy is the pre-condition for military strength
to work efficiently. A simple, but illustrating example is offered by Fearon and Laitin (2003):
If states knew the location of rebels, they could simply send forces directly to the spot of
the rebels. This makes the efficiency of military state capacity pre-condition upon another
aspect, namely the source providing the information about rebel location. Hendrix (2010)
offer a solution to this. Instead of focusing on military capacity, scholar should approach
state strength by measure state ability to collect information and provide services.
3The Weberian state definition is twofold. While coercive power is one of them, an organization supporting
the coercive power is the other. This usually requires some sort of centralized organization/ bureaucracy.
This dimension of state capacity will be discussed in section 3.2.2.
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3.2.2 Bureaucratic and Administrative State Capacity
I will argue that bureaucratic and administrative capacity constitute the most relevant aspect
of state capacity when examining non-state conflicts. There are two mechanism related to
this which jointly increased the risk of non-state conflicts. Firstly, state’s ability to govern and
provide services hinge upon bureaucratic and administrative capacity. It is a pre-condition
for governance, central to prevent disorder and restore order. Secondly, bureaucratic and
administrative capacity is important determinants for groups’ security.
Bureaucratic and administrative capacity is usually defined as the government’s penetration
into all its territory, its ability to provide goods and services, its insulation from political
pressure and its regular and meritocracies recruitment. Within the broader conflict literature,
several scholars have argued states with bureaucratic and administrative capacity are better
prepared to deal with conflicts (Skocpol 1979; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Schock 1996;
Knack 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Goodwin and Skocpol (1989, pg. 500) investigates quality of bureaucracy in their study of
social revolutions. They argue that several factors linked to performing counter-revolutionary
tasks are more easily accomplished with the existence of a functional bureaucracy. Territorial
control, co-optation of elites, removal of an unpopular leader and transition to a more open
regime are more easily done in state with bureaucratic and administrative capacity. For civil
wars, scholars find the same relationship (Schock 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003; DeRouen
and Sobek 2004). Nearly identical arguments are offered. For instance, Fearon and Laitin
(2003) put emphasis on how a functioning bureaucracy enables penetration into every corner
of society. A functioning bureaucracy makes it easier to prevent disorder and restore order.
Common for the scholars examining bureaucratic and administrative capacity is how they
imply a relationship where execution of state policies depends upon bureaucratic and ad-
ministrative capacity. It is somewhat a pre-condition for governance. Firstly, states with
functioning bureaucratic and administrative capacity acquire information about their citi-
zens. This is not only central for detection of rebel movements, but also to gives government
information about problems and grievances within the broader population. Secondly, the
execution of government policies hinge upon a functioning bureaucracy. Implementation of
policies is much more easily executed through a functioning bureaucracy.
A central task for any government is to provide order for their citizens. While the incentives
to reduce conflict and provide order hinged upon type of political regime, the actual execu-
tion of order is dependent upon bureaucratic and administrative capacity. A state with a
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malfunctioning bureaucracy will lead to situations where groups cannot rely on the state for
security. Compared to functioning bureaucracies, malfunctioning bureaucracies are defined
by their lack of political independence, the temporal stop of services during changes, lack of
day-to day routines and patrimonial procedures. For groups, this means that state no longer
constitute a trustworthy source as a provider of security.
A malfunctioning bureaucracy will often lead to perverted situations. Whereas state agents
in functioning bureaucracy do not constitute a threat to people, they do so in the context
of a malfunctioning bureaucracy. Bates (2008) argues that the key to understanding why
violence become so prevalent in late century Africa lies within states and their ability to
provide order. At this time most African states lacked revenues to fund their public services,
which lead to a deterioration in states’ bureaucracy and administrative capacity. Within this
context, violence became endemic. When state officers started seeking wealth by engaging
in corruption and predation, the state became an enemy groups need protection from. It
failed at its most crucial task, namely providing security. Groups took up arms to defend
themselves. Consequently, it leads to a shift in the regulation of violence from state-based to
privately based. With an increase in the number of armed groups came also an increase in
non-state conflicts.
The mechanism which leads to non-state conflict in malfunctioning bureaucracy is through
the security dilemma generated. When context resembles anarchy, which is the consequence
of a perverted and malfunctioning bureaucracy, groups have to provide for their own security.
While this theory origin from structural realism within international relations, the theory
have been applied to context lacking a Sovereign.4 According to Posen (1993), the condition
that arise when similar groups of people suddenly find themselves responsible for their own
security resembles an emerging anarchy. To solve this situation, the will rely on group
security. With the absence of a sovereign, group cohesion becomes the basis of security.
Consequently, a malfunctioning bureaucracy leads more armed groups, hence an increase in
the risk of non-state conflicts.
To summarize, a state’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity affects (1) the state’s ability
to govern and (2) groups’ interpretation of their security status. With a malfunctioning
bureaucracy states no longer possess the capacity to govern their societies. Since even the
most non-democratic state prefer order over disorder, the lack of the instrument needed to
provide and restore order leads to an increase in non-state conflicts. For non-state actors,
a malfunctioning bureaucracy leads to deterioration their security status. When groups do
4See Jervis (1978)
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no interpret the state as an actor they rely on protection from, protection have to privately
supplied. Jointly, these two aspects of bureaucratic and administrative state capacity lead
to the following expectation:
H2: Weak bureaucratic and administrative state capacity increases the risk of
non-state conflicts.
3.3 Regime Change: Motivation and Opportunity for
Conflicts
In the previous section I have suggested how representative institutions and bureaucratic and
administrative capacity are expected to explain the variation we see in non-state conflicts
within states. I would argue regime change constitute a process where non-state conflicts are
likely to increase.5 For non-state actors, a state occupied reorganizing provides motivation
and opportunity for political entrepreneurs as well as it constitute a threat to group’s security.
I will start off by looking at general mechanism related to regime change and armed conflicts
before I more narrowly provide the expectations regarding non-state conflicts. Direction of
change will also be considerate.
3.3.1 Regime Change per se
For a regime change to occur the old regime must agree upon transition or it must be forced
to transit. According to Horowitz (1993), regime transitions are a complicated process,
characterized by conflicts of interests and social unrest. Empirically, scholars concur on this
relationship. Regime change is linked to social unrest, coup d’e´tat and onset of civil and
international war (Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Hegre and Sambanis 2006;
Geddes 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010).
Within the civil war literature, both motivation and opportunity have been used as expla-
nations for the conflict increasing nature of regime change. Non-representative institutions
provide motivation as the by nature are systems characterized by inequality. In addition, a
regime resisting political opening, will often serve to fuel grievance even more. As regime
5I will not discuss the driving force behind political change itself. I will only discuss the conflict increasing
potential caused by regime change.
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changes alter the set of procedures distributing power, leader may have strong incentives
in avoiding transition. Fighting for their wealth and power, the governing regime may be
willing to repress in order to resist a transition. The use of repressive means may serve to fuel
tension even more (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). While grievance may be directed against
an old regime, it could also be directed against a new regime. Depending on the degree of
legitimacy, political leaders enter office under more or less ideal conditions. Lacking popular
support, the process of establishing new political structures may be difficult if it simultane-
ously involves fighting actors questioning their legitimacy (Hegre et al. 2001; Gleditsch and
Ruggeri 2010)
The opportunities stemming from regime changes are generally connected to the lack ability
of to govern. Regime changes do constitute an intermediate period, where state functions
temporally are set aside and consolidation have not started. Firstly, regime change tends
to temporally (or completely) set aside the state’s ability to govern. This means that actor
previously fearing a repressive government, will have less to fear in the wake of a regime
change. Secondly, proximity to the change itself serves as an opportunity for actors seeking
political leverage. Since political consolidation occurs over time, future political leverage
depends on mobilization close to change, hence before the regime consolidates. (Hegre et al.
2001; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010)
For non-state conflicts, much of the scholarly debate on regime change is linked to fighting
between rebel groups in civil war. When a regime is on the verge of collapse, fighting between
rebel groups increase. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) explain this by rebels’ strive to maximize
political concession. If a rebel group arrives as sole conqueror, defeating both rival rebels
and the government, their political leverage will be maximized. In their study, Fjelde and
Nilsson (2012) find support for increased in-fighting in the presence of a weak government
on the verge of collapse.
While rebel groups have the goal of government overthrow, this is not true for all non-state
actors. Kreutz and Eck (2011) suggest that regime change also affect communal conflicts by
providing motivation and opportunity. Firstly, regime transition can serve as an incentive for
political entrepreneurs to provoke conflicts to display their leverage. Simply by being able
to mobilize for a conflict, groups display their magnitude and importance. If this group is
not represented in the new regime, it has the potential of becoming a worrisome opposition.
Secondly, groups that question the new regimes authority can display their disloyalty by
performing state-like services. The perhaps strongest signal of disloyalty is sent by policing
another group, hence questioning the new regime monopoly one the use of violence.
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Regime change also affects actors not seeking political leverage. According to Kreutz and
Eck (2011), regime change alters the state’s ability to provide security. Due to its chaotic
nature, state services will temporally or completely stop to function. Most importantly, this
applies to the regulation of violence and order. In the wake of a major regime change, the
state’s ability to regulate violence is reduced. A state busy occupied reorganizing will canalize
its resources to establish control at the center. Conflicts and issue not related to national
politics will then be pushed down the agenda. This leads to a general reduction in regulation
of conflicts, hence the occurrences of non-state violence increases. When transition leads
to a collapse of all state services, groups themselves have to provide for their own security.
The consequence for groups is that the security dilemma by no means are solved, causing
groups to provide security privately. For long lasting transitional periods characterized by
the complete disintegration of state structures, groups will seek private solutions to security.
This leads to a shift in regulation of violence, from state-based to privately-based.
In some cases, regime change will lead to a complete evaporation of state structures. In the
wake of a state collapse, groups’ themselves becomes the provider of security. This leads to
the same mechanism as a malfunction and perverted bureaucracy. What distinguishes them
is their origin. When anarchy emerges, individual turn their groups as providers of security
(Posen 1993; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010)
To summarize, regime change present an opportunity and motivation for dissatisfied non-
state actors to increase their future leverage. Political leverage may be increased by fighting
off rival non-state actors or displayed by policing other non-state actors. For those not
seeking political leverage, regime change leads to a deterioration of their security status.
Despite different mechanisms, they provide the same expectation regarding regime change
and non-state conflicts:
H3a: Regime change increases the risk of non-state conflicts
3.3.2 Direction of Regime Change
While I find a general expectation for a conflict increasing effect of regime change, a more
nuanced picture would incorporate the direction of change as well. Since democratization
and autocratization bring different changes regarding the set of rules, it bring brings up a
question whether the causal mechanism generating conflict are different.
The most widely held notion in the conflict literature is that democracies experience less
conflicts compared to other regimes (Russett, Layne, Spiro and Doyle 1995; Oneal and Russett
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1997; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999). These findings have led
to promotion of democracy as a strategy to build civil peace. However, the process of
democratization has often been less than peaceful. Bratton (2006, pg. 97) note that Africa’s
democratic transitions were successful in the case of South-Africa, but in other cases the
result was devastating. Nigeria ended upon in havoc, a fate shared with many other African
countries exposed the democratic experiments of the 1990s.
The dark side of democratization have lead many scholars to question the promotion of
democracy as peace inducing strategy (Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Mansfield and Snyder
2005) In a series of publications, Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b, 2005, 2009) have addressed
the conflict inducing potential of democratization. They argue that democratization often
have been induced in countries lacking the institutional starting point required for a successful
transition. As democratization brings an opening of the political landscape, thereby an arena
for actors to claim the interest, democratization becomes dangerous when institutions are
not ready to annex claims.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) the conflict inducing effect of regime change
depends upon state’s starting point. The starting point of the transition process leads to
diverging mechanism with regard to the outcome. In general, the assumption regarding pre-
ferred political alternative remains the same for political leaders and groups. In autocracies,
where the state leader only constitutes a small proportion of the citizen, democratization
will decreased their wealth significantly. To avoid this, they will resist the process. For the
groups, the preferred regime type is democracy as this type opts for pro-majority policies. By
diverging starting points, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) focus on socio-economic aspects of
countries. Whereas wealth in low developed countries is linked to land, it is linked to capital
in developed countries.
Under low levels of economic development, the tradeoff of a political opening will be high
for the political leaders. The loss by democratization is then high, leading to resistance.
This leads political opening in low developed countries to become a process characterized by
violence. Democratization happens peacefully when elites have more to loose from continuing
repression and buying concession than they have from resisting democratization. This is
often the case in high developed countries where the costs connected to resistance will have
a devastating impact on capital. Social unrest has a devastating effect on capital, affecting
leaders will to resist transition. A peaceful democratization is somewhat an admission of
failure on behalf of the elite.
For non-state conflicts, the logic by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) is almost directly transfer-
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able. For non-state conflicts, both autocratization and democratization bring opportunities
of conflicts due to destabilizing effect of regime change. The conceptual difference between de-
mocratization and autocratization is the motivation for conflict. The aggregated motivation
to resist autocratization will always be bigger than the aggregated motivation for resisting
democratization. Since autocratization leads to a narrowing of the political landscape, it po-
tential grievance generated will always exceed the grievance generated by a political opening.
This is simply due to narrow support base in an autocracy compared to a democracy. Hence,
I find a conflict decreasing potential of autocratization. Following hypotheses are suggested
H3b: Autocratization increases the risk of non-state conflicts
H3c: Democratization increases the risk of non-state conflicts
H3d: Democratization decreases the risk of non-state conflicts
3.3.3 The Mediating Effect of Regime Change by Bureaucratic
and Administrative State Capacity
Among the aspects included in the concept of bureaucratic and administrative state capacity,
is the ability to govern through regime change. While the bureaucratic and administrative
state capacity also includes many other aspects, the focus of this thesis is regime change. This
leads to some curiosity regard the effect of bureaucratic and administrative state capacity.
Could the relationship be conditional?
Since bureaucracies represent the core of governments, the role of bureaucrats is especially
crucial in the process of a transition. While governments succeed another, either through
drastic changes or by constitutional procedures, bureaucrats are expected to remain at their
post providing maintaining activities as usual. While a new administration might be eager
to establish its own identity and dissociate itself from the previous administration, replacing
the whole governmental machinery might be a bad idea. New regimes must to some degree
rely upon existing bureaucracy while new policies are being fashioned (Frank 1966).
Many scholars included the ability to govern as an aspect of bureaucratic and administrative
state capacity. While they also include other aspects, they all suggest that transition is more
easily accomplish within a well-functioning bureaucracy (Skocpol 1979; Goodwin and Skocpol
1989; Schock 1996; Knack 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). This leads to an expectation about
the mediating effect on the risk of non-state conflicts caused by regime change, leading to
the following hypothesis:
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H4: The conflict increasing effect of regime change is conditioned upon bureau-
cratic and administrative state capacity
3.4 Summary
In this chapter I have developed a theoretical framework where state structures are used to
explain the variation in non-state conflicts we see within states. I have derived expectations
regarding representative institutions and state capacity. By being inclusive, representative
institutions provide political leaders with incentives to provide order and restore order. The
ability to fulfill incentives hinges upon bureaucratic and administrative state capacity. If
political leaders want to provide order, a functioning bureaucracy enables them to do so. A
functioning bureaucracy is also crucial for how groups interpret their security. A malfunc-
tioning and perverted bureaucracy leads to situations where groups can no longer rely on
state agents for protection. This leads to the armament of non-state actors, hence increasing
the risk of non-state conflicts.
While the contextual setting alone can be seen as a necessary condition for non-state con-
flicts, it is not a sufficient explanation. I have therefore supplemented the framework with
explanations focusing on both opportunity and motive for non-state conflicts. In the wake of
a regime change, political entrepreneurs have both the motivation and opportunity needed to
impose conflicts. Regime change also relates to how groups interpret their security situation.
If regime change equals anarchy, with the evaporation of state structures, groups will seek
protection privately. This leads to both an increase in armed groups, consequently followed
by an increase in non-state conflicts.
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Research Design
The aim of my thesis is to investigate whether variation of non-state violence can be explained
by regime change and whether the effect of regime change is conditioned upon state capacity.
In general, low state capacity and non-representative institutions are hypothesized to increase
the risk of experiencing non-state violence. Regime change is hypothesized to be a window of
opportunity for actors wanting to manifest their political leverage or to signal dissatisfaction
with a governing regime. In this chapter I develop a quantitative research design aimed
at testing these expectations. This chapter will bridge the gap between the theoretical
framework and the empirical data. Firstly, I will justify why a quantitative approach is suited
to answer my research question. Secondly, I will outline how the data set covering the 1989-
2008 periods is assembled and how key variables are operationalized. Thirdly, I will present
the statistical methods used to test the hypothesises, namely the logistic regression model
and the negative binomial model. Fourthly, I will address the methodological challenges with
regarding my research design.
4.1 Justification of a Quantitative Approach
I follow the recommendations of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) contending that the goal
in social sciences is to make causal inferences based on observations of a phenomena. This
call for an approach comparing contexts and situations where violence occurs and where
violence does not occur. When reviewing the literature of non-state conflicts,I brought up
the missing quantitative application as well as the tendency for scholars to examine the same
cases. Much has been written on non-state conflicts in Kenya, India and Indonesia. Little
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have been written about non-state conflicts in Sweden, Japan and Canada. If we want to
say something more general about non-state violence we need to expand our research in
time and space. Simply the lack of cross section research alone serves as a justification of a
quantitative approach.
Compared to qualitative methods, a quantitative approach has the possibility of disclosing
general patterns of phenomena. However, there are also drawbacks to the application of
this method. Statistical estimation techniques assume the impact of covariates to be the
same across observations. To assume that the same logic can be applied to phenomena in
social sciences will often be inaccurate or incorrect. Failing to meet model assumptions and
requirements lead to biased and imprecise results. But, discarding the quantitative method
is neither an option. When precaution is taken, statistical methods can be powerful tools for
disclosing general patterns. This pitfalls imply that researcher need to find a method suited
to examine their data.
Fulfilling statistical assumptions does not automatically translate into valid inferences. While
precise estimates depend on the model and data, valid inferences hinge on operationalization
of central concepts. With regards to internal validity, the qualitative approach is superior.
Construct validity will always be the Achilles’s heel of the quantitative method. Will the
operationalized variable ever truly capture the theoretical concept? Is it plausible to believe
that the number of −0.25 reflects a low level of bureaucratic quality? And, it is plausible
to believe the impact on conflict is the same whether the value of -0.25 comes from Uganda
in 1989 or Indonesia in 2003? The number −0.25 on an index of bureaucratic quality might
have a different impact on conflict in Uganda in 1989 and Indonesia in 2003. On the other
side, there are also limitations inherited in the qualitative approach, especially with regards
to generalization. The choice between a quantitative and a qualitative approach will always
reflect the trade-off between internal and external validity (Adcock and Collier 2001). As my
goal is to reveal whether there is a general pattern between weak states, regime change and
non-state violence, a quantitative approach is preferred.
4.2 Statistical Model and Dependent Variable
There exist only one comprehensive data source on non-state conflicts, which is the UCDP
non-state conflict data set. This means that how UCDP records non-state conflicts will put
forth the conditions on how non-state conflicts could be analyzed. In my case, it follows
that a plan for examining non-state conflicts will have to start with examining which type of
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dependent variable I can construct using the UCDP data.1
Originally, the UCDP non-state conflict data set is in a dyadic format, where each observation
contains information of the dyad on a yearly basis. Besides name and year, each observations
also provide information about the actor’s organization level, name of the parties involved,
number of yearly fatalities, which state the conflict is located in and whether the conflict has
ended or not Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz (2012). While the process of non-state conflict in
reality is a continuous phenomenon, the data from UCDP record it as a discrete outcome.
This means that they are latent in the sense that they in reality is a continuous process.
There is an underlying tendency generating the observed value. We cannot directly observe
this tendency, but at some point this process results in an observable change. For UCDP,
non-state conflicts are observed when conflict between non-state actors reaches a threshold
of 25 battle related deaths a year (Long 1997).2
From the information offended by UCDP I find two possible operationalizations of a depen-
dent variable. The first one is to construct a binary variable denoting whether the phenomena
occurred or not in a given country year. Using this operationalization will lead to a logistic
regression. The second possibility is to construct a count variable counting the number of
occurrences in a country year. This operationalization would lead to a count regression. The
logistic regression model will report the probability of experience one or more occurrences of
non-state conflicts in a country year or not. The negative binomial regression will report the
number of non-state conflicts occurrences a state is likely to experience in a country year.
I have chosen a dependent variable counting the number of annual occurrences. The reason
for this is the variation in annual occurrences across countries. Mexico had in 1993 one
occurrence and India had in 1989 six occurrences. If only applying the logistic regression
model, information may have been lost by treating these two cases as similar phenomena.
The collapse of data with more than two unique values into a dichotomous variable (like
occurrence or non-occurrence) may minimize the variance across the included observations.
If collapsing categories leads to loss of information, the model will lose its statistical power.
This in return will increase the chance of accepting the null hypothesis when there potentially
exist a relationship between the dependent and the independent variables.3 It is this potential
pitfall that leads me to settle for a dependent variable that counts the number of annual
1Whether the dependent variable serve as a good indicator of the phenomena will be discussed in section
4.3.2.
2In more mathematical terms, there is an unobserved, or latent variable y∗ ranging from −∞ to ∞ that
generates the observed y’s. Those who have larger values of y∗ are observed as y = 1, while those with
smaller values of y∗ are observed as y = 0. (Long 1997, pg. 40).
3This situation is commonly referred to as type II error, which is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis.
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occurrences of non-state conflicts.
4.2.1 Count Model: the Negative Binomial Regression Model
As the name suggest, count models estimates the probability for a given number of events
to occur. While an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model could also be used for
this purpose, the assumptions for the OLS-model is not met with my data. From Figure
4.1 it becomes evident that the dependent variable by no standards is normally distributed.
The elongate tail goes to the right, suggesting that the data is highly skewed. This situation
is caused by the preponderance of zeroes, or non-occurrences of the dependent variable.
When assumptions behind the OLS- model is violated, count models are often preferable
alternatives. These models, such as the Poisson model and the negative binomial regression
model are tailored to handle count outcomes that are highly skewed (Long 1997).
The Poisson and the negative binomial regression model differs in their assumption with
regards to the conditional mean and variance structure. To arrive at the choice of count
model, the Poisson model serves as a starting point. The Poisson model assumes the con-
ditional mean and the variance to be equal. The negative binomial model does not inhabit
assumption, as the model allows the variance to exceed the conditional mean. In practice,
this is often the case within social sciences. When variance exceeds the mean in count mod-
els, the situation is called overdispersion. In a case of overdispersion, the Poisson model is
inappropriate. This will lead to a discrepancy between the observed and predicted values,
and the Poisson model will underpredict zero values (Long 1997).
To test for overdispersion, the negative binomial regression model is used as a diagnostic
tool. The potential discrepancy can be captured by estimating a dispersion parameter held
constant in the Poisson model. In the Poisson model, variation in µ is due to observed
heterogeneity. In the negative binomial model, µ is replaced by a random variable µ˜. Variation
in µ˜ is due to both variation among the units caused by the covariates, but also to unobserved
heterogeneity caused by .4 The negative binomial regression model accounts for this by
adding a parameter θ. If θ is significant, a case of overdispersion exists (Long 1997).
The poisson regression distribution is given by:
Pr(yi | xi) = e
−µiµyii
yi!
(4.1)
4For the mean of the error term it is common to assume that E(δi) = 1, giving µ˜ = µE(δ) = µ
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of non-state conflicts 1989-2008
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And the negative binomial distribution is given by:
Pr(yi | xi, δi) = e
−µ˜iµ˜yii
yi!
=
e(−µiδi)(µiδi)
yi
yi!
(4.2)
The negative binomial regression model reports the probability of counts when counts increase
by one unit. The negative binomial distribution is a discrete distribution of the number of
successes in sequence of Bernoulli trials before a specified number of failures occurs. Applying
the negative binomial distribution to my case will be the same as treating occurrence of non-
state as failure. Successes are the number of country years without conflict. The occurrence
of non-state conflicts will be fixed and the number of country years without conflict is random.
The model then calculates how many years without non-state conflict is needed to obtain
respectively one, two, three or n occurrences of non-state conflict.
Table B.1 in Appendix A reports the results from the poisson model and the negative binomial
model. In a model with just controls, the θ parameter is significant. When looking at the
distribution of counts in Figure 4.1, the case of overdispersion becomes evident. Occurrences
of non-state conflicts are rare events, manifested in the preponderance of zeros. In fact the
zeros make up 92% of the observations included. The θ parameter reflects this, indication a
situation with more observed 0’s than predicted by the Poisson distribution.
To settle for the negative binomial model just because it can handle overdispersion is not
sufficiently justified. If the cause of overdispersion and excess zeroes is due to an additional
data generating process different from the one generating the counts, other models are more
appropriate. Zero-modified models assumes that 0’s can be generated from a different pro-
cess than the positive counts. In my case zero modified models would have been worth
investigating. However, they often demand a lot from the data and tend to be instable when
requirements are not fully satisfied. As my data set is not as big as these models demand, I
will not opt for a zero-modified model. This suggest that the model I have chose potentially
will underestimate the number of zeroes. To overcome this problem I will cross validate my
analysis by estimating a Hurde Model.
4.3 Operationalization
Testing the hypothesises put forth in the previous chapter require operationalization of the-
oretical concepts. For inferences to be valid, it is required for indicators to measure actually
what they are supposed to measure, namely the theoretical concepts (Adcock and Collier
40
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN
2001). Many of the theoretical concepts derived here are complex and abstract phenomena.
The concept of state capacity serves as a good example her. Its elusiveness have led scholars
to operationalize differently, consequently leading to diverging results (Hendrix 2010). In
my case this is a challenge which I need to approach with great careful attention. For valid
inferences to be drawn, indicators must reflect the theoretical concepts at hand.
4.3.1 Unit of analysis
Data on the unit of analysis is taken from UCDP/PRIO. They define a state to be: an interna-
tionally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or a non-recognized
government whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign
government previously controlling the same territory (Gleditsch et al. 2002, pg. 612).5 Mi-
crostates with a recorded population of less than 500.000 are excluded by default. This is due
to practical matters, as my other data sources do not record data for these states. The final
data set consists of 150 states observed between 1989 and 2008, rendering 2904 observations.
4.3.2 Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Non-State Conflict
The phenomenon I am interested in occurs when a violent conflict breaks out between two
groups and takes place without the involvement of state agents as one of the warring parties.
To arrive at an operational definition on the occurrence of non-state conflict, I will address
three issues. Firstly, the death threshold and coding criterions defining the occurrence of
non-state conflicts. Secondly, the distinguishing of non-state conflicts contra other types of
conflicts. Finally I will address the variety of groups that constitute non-state actors and
how they relate to the theoretical framework put forth.
Coding Criterions and Death Threshold
Within quantitative conflict research, the concept of conflict is linked to the number of people
killed in battle. Conflict becomes a question of lethalness, as the number of deaths serves
as the criterion defining conflict.6 While scholars agree upon the lethal criterion of conflict,
5This list is a modified version of the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) list of international system membership.
6Whereas the conflict is linked to lethal actions within the conflict literature, readers should be aware
that the concept itself is multifaceted and open to more than one interpretation. Scholars within the conflict
research usually adopts what Galtung (1969) defines to be a negative understanding of peace. Whereas
negative peace is the absence of violence, positive peace is the pattern of cooperation and integration between
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there seem to be less consensus about coding rules and thresholds to serve as standards for
onset, duration and termination (Sambanis 2004b). The focus of my thesis is the occurrence,
or the presence, of non-state conflicts in states. This means that I will not emphasize the
difference between onset and duration, but treat them equally as situations where non-state
conflicts occur.
For non-state conflicts to be observed, I have to define which number of annual deaths to
apply. A common used threshold within the literature origins from UCDP’s definition of
armed conflict. In general, UCDP use the term conflict to address all sorts of disagreements
between two actors (or a dyad) that have lethal consequences.7 An armed conflict is when this
disagreement results in at least 25 battle related deaths a year. In conflicts involving states
as actors, an additional threshold is used to separate conflicts due to their level of intensity.
Minor is used to describe conflicts that reaches the annual criteria, but when this intensity
exceeds more then 1000 annual deaths, the term war becomes the label attached (Gleditsch
et al. 2002).8 In my case, the threshold need to be lowered. Since non-state conflicts do not
inflict cause the same amount of damage as state based conflicts, the death threshold for
non-state conflicts must be set with less strict criterion than state based conflicts.
While settling for coding criteria is a simple issue, the practical task of collecting this informa-
tion is harder. Missing data and unreliable reports is endemic within the conflict literature.
There are many factors that could complicate this task. The ongoing conflict in Syria serves
as an example. In this case, non-state conflicts erupted within the context of a state-based
conflict. The combination of an ongoing civil war and fractionalized rebel movements fight-
ing each other, and the government, leads to difficulties in reporting. Establishing the exact
relationship between victims and offenders will be hard, as victims could be killed in more
than one conflict. Further have the escalation in violence since 2011 caused many reporters to
evacuate the country, leading to a gap in reports and an underestimation of fatalities (UCDP
2014). These are issues researches need to be aware of as unreliable report and missing data
could introduce bias in further analysis. However, this is the true nature of conflict research.
Awareness rather than ignorance or abandonees is the solution (King, Keohane and Verba
1994).
UCDP’s coding of fatalities is based on two independent sources, whom both are experts on
humans.
7UCDP recognize three types of actors: states, non-state formally organized groups and non-state orga-
nized groups.
8Whereas the annual criteria of 1000 battle related deaths in civil war reflects the level of damage, the
damage for states experiencing non-state conflicts will be a combination of the occurrences of non-state
conflicts as well as the level of intensity in each non-state conflict.
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the area they report from. While the number of sources cross validating fatalities numbers
is low, their country expertise compensates. Figure 4.2 shows the number of yearly fatalities
in the world caused by non-state conflicts in the period from 1989 to 2008. The peak in the
early 1993 is mainly due to a high number of fatalities in isolated cases, as the number of
conflicts does not follow the same trend. High fatalities between the Hutu and the Hunde
in Congo (DCR) and between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
and Souther Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) makes up the peak in 1993 (Sundberg, Eck and
Kreutz 2012).
Distinguishing Non-State Conflicts From Other Types of Conflicts
An operational definition of non-state conflicts excludes government as one of the warring
parties. This is essential to the definition of non-state conflicts, as non-state conflicts is
defined by the lack of a government involvement. Whereas recent literature has altered our
conception of rebel groups as unitary actors (See eg. Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012;
Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012), governments are usually assumed to be unitary
actors. This is only a un-qualified truth, and such a conceptualization could be misleading
(Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013).
The conflict in Sudanese region of Darfur displays how a distinction between non-state con-
flicts and state-based conflicts in reality can be blurry. While Darfur had seen several oc-
currences of communal conflicts prior to 2003, the situation became more critical after 2003
when a large scale conflict broke out between Africans and Arabs.9 Dissatisfaction with cur-
rent situation led the two African groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), to take up arms against government. The
reaction from the Sudanese government was to carry out a campaign of ethnic cleansing
against Darfur’s non- Arabs. This task was partly done by the pro- government militia, the
Janjaweed, wich the government supported with both training and weapons. This task was
often carried out as a joint action between the Janjaweed and government forces (Brosche´
2008). The same type of joint action between governments and armed groups have also been
seen in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sudan and Syria (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013).
The Janjaweed is what Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013) define to be a pro-government militia.
Pro-government militias are armed groups that are either pro-government or sponsored by
the government. More important however, is the fact that pro-government militias do not
9The distinction between Africans and Arabs is a simplification as each party represent a variety of ethnic
groups.
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Figure 4.2: Number of fatalities in non-state conflicts, 1989-2008
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Note: Red line and left side of y-axis reports the number of fatalities.
Blue line and right side of y-axis reports the number of conflicts.
Source: UCDP Non-state conflict dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz
2012)
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constitute a legal part of the government’s security forces.10 The UCDP non-state conflict
data have no information about ties government and the non-state actors. When comparing
the data on pro-government militia (PGDM 2013) with the UCDP non-state data set it
becomes evident that certain groups overlap. How these groups affiliate with the government
will vary, but common for them all, is that the distinction between states and non-state
actors will not be clear cut.
Further, there are other issues making it hard to separate non-state conflicts from other
types of conflicts. Collective violence takes many forms, but common for them all is that
the categories are not static, as collective violence constantly transform and evolve. Neither
are they mutually exclusive (Tilly 2003).11 For the phenomenon investigated here it implies
parties involved in one non-state conflict mutually could be involved in a conflict with the
state. For nearly four decades, the FARC guerilla has fought the Colombian government.12
Simultaneously FARC has been involved in non-state conflicts with AUC and ELN.13 Whereas
some non-state conflicts give birth to civil wars, other erupt within civil conflict. The latter
one is perhaps the most common. This is what we see in Chad, Iraq and Somalia. My data
covers a total of 2904 observations, or country years. I have observation of non-state conflicts
in 265 country years, which 96 of these years have an ongoing civil war. In percentage, the
number is 35%.14
Following the chaotic setting that non-state conflicts erupt in, comes the problem of recog-
nition. If boundaries are not clear, is really non-state violence a phenomena we are able to
observe? The question to ask is; ”Would we know a non-state conflict if we saw one?”15 I
would argue that it is possible to distinguish non-state conflicts from other types of collective
violence. While 35% occur simultaneously, this number does not imply that conflicts can not
be distinguished from each other. Due to several territorial disputes, India have been in what
scholars define as a minor intra state conflict for several decades. The conflict between Hin-
dus and Muslim amount to nearly half of all non-state conflicts India has experienced since
10Often governments use pro-government militias to conduct shady actions they do not want to be held
accountable of. By strategically using pro-government militias, governments can evade responsibility of
violence away from themselves (Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014).
11On the topic of civil wars, Kalyvas (2003, pg. 475) neatly captures this complexity as he states: ”Civil
wars are not binary conflicts, but complex and ambiguous processes that foster the ”joint” action of local
and supralocal actors, civilians, armies, whose alliances results in violence that aggregates yet still reflects
their diverse goals.”
12The full name of the group is Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Eje´rcito del Pueblo
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army)
13The full names are Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) and
Eje´rcito de liberatio´n nacional (National Liberation Army).
14This estimate is based on 25 annual deaths threshold.
15This question resembles, and is inspired by, Sambanis (2004b) work on the conceptualization of civil wars.
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Table 4.1: Categories of non-state conflicts
Category Org. Level Warring parties
Rebels Formally Fighting between rebel groups, military factions and other
highly organized groups.
Political Informally Fighting between parties and candidates as well as electoral
violence.
Communal Informally Fighting between groups that mobilize themselves among
communal lines like: ethnicity, clan, religion, tribe or nationality.
Source: UCDP non-state codebook (Petterson 2012)
1989. These are conflicts that are easily distinguished from the ongoing conflicts involving
the Indian government in a far off territory. While Syria represent a case where recognition
is difficult, it does not imply that all non-state conflicts erupting in civil wars are.
The Actors Included in Non-State Conflicts
I have chosen to apply a rather broad conception of non-state conflicts. This decision brings
a very diverse sample of conflicts lacking state involvement. UCDP distinguish between non-
state conflicts based on two dimension: affiliation and organization. This leads to a threefold
categorization, displayed in Table 4.1. The two levels of organization are: formally and
informally organized groups. Formally organized groups constitute any non-governmental
group of people having announced a name for their groups and using armed force against
another similarly organized group. These groups are permanently mobilized. When it comes
to affiliation it should be noted that rebel group often share them same affiliation as com-
munal groups. For instance, Hizbollah in Lebanon are based on religion, but due to their
organization level they fall into the rebel category.
Table 4.4 is based on a sample of the non-state conflicts from the UCDP record. Simply by
reading the names of the warring sides it becomes clear that the data set represent a variety
of actors. This is also due to the lack of criterion for incomparability.They are organized
on the basis of different factors like ethnicity, clan, political affiliation, religion or separatist
movement. In South Africa, the recorded non-state conflicts are between political parties.
Since 1989 there have been multiple clashes between the African National Congress (ANC)
and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as they have disagreed upon which strategy to pursue
when trying to bring down the Apartheid regime. Criminal violence is also included as a
type of non-state conflicts. In Mexico, non-state conflicts are primarily related to rivalry
between drug cartels.
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In terms of regional dispersion, Africa has the biggest share of non-state conflicts. In the
period from 1989-2008, 71,9% of all non-state conflicts occurred in African countries. In So-
malia, Nigeria and Sudan, the number of counts are respectively 75, 54 and 52. In Somalia,
non-state conflicts was in the early 1990’s between organized rebel groups fighting for dom-
inance after the collapse of Siad Barre’s military regime. After 1999, clan oriented conflicts
constitute the majority of Somalia’s non-state conflicts, as disagreements in the former rebel
organizations led to a split into minor factions. From 2006 and onwards, Islamic militias
have also been a part of the fighting in Somalia. In the case of Nigeria, conflicts have ethnic,
political, economic, and religious components. Due to different dividing lines, various groups,
and alliances of groups are put up against each other. While the overarching Christian- Mus-
lim conflict seem like a religious conflict, it also have an ethnic dimension, as the majority
of the 200 ethno-linguistic groups in Nigeria consider themselves Muslims or Christians. In
Ethiopia, non-state conflicts have been fought between various tribes and clans. Many of
these clans are divided into smaller subclans which live in pastoral areas between Somalia
and Ethiopia. Clashes over access to water, arable land, grazing rights and cattle-rustling
have frequently occurred (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012; UCDP 2014).
Table 4.2: States with most counts of non-state conflicts, 1989-2008
State Counts Fatalities
Somalia 75 9331
Ethiopia 54 6034
Sudan 52 12832
Kenya 43 2593
Congo, Democratic Republic of 32 11652
Uganda 24 1800
Afghanistan 22 1561
India 21 4275
Note: The number of occurrences in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia
is in reality slightly smaller. Duplicated observations are found in
Appendix B, Table A.1. Source: UCDP non-state conflict data
set (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012)
My theoretical framework has not put an emphasis on the potential difference between these
three categories. The criterion that defines non-state conflict in my thesis is solely the lack
of government as one of the fighting parties. This means that the actors I include will differ
with organization level as well as how member affiliate with the group. One potential pitfall
with this approach is the lack of coherency across cases. If the included observations do not
fit the theoretical framework, inferences from models will not be valid.
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Table 4.3: Yearly fatalities by type of organization, 1989-2008
Organization Level Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max N
Communal groups 149 311 25 3051 295
Political parties 214 253 25 899 25
Rebel groups 156 304 25 2732 235
All levels 155 305 25 3051 555
Source: UCDP non-state conflict dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz
2012)
The theoretical expectations put forth here, suggest the same relationship across all UCDP’s
three categories of non-state conflicts. Since the theoretical expectations are the same across
categories, this creates coherency in the models. Although expectations take the same direc-
tion, there are also some potential disadvantages with joining the categories. The magnitude
of the different explanatory variables might differ across categories. By adding categories,
nuances will be lost when only the joint are reported. Due to this, I will run a joint model
which include all types of non-state conflicts as well as separate models for the rebel and com-
munal category. Due to the low number of observations in conflicts between political parties,
a separate model for this category is not possible to estimate. However, these observations
will be included in the joint model.
48
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN
T
ab
le
4.
4:
S
am
p
le
of
n
on
-s
ta
te
co
n
fl
ic
ts
,
19
89
-2
00
8
S
id
e
A
S
id
e
B
S
ta
te
n
a
m
e
Y
ea
r
O
rg
.
F
a
ta
li
ti
es
D
ay
ak
s
M
ad
u
re
se
,
M
a
la
y
s
In
d
o
n
es
ia
1
9
9
9
C
o
m
1
7
2
H
ez
b
ol
la
h
(P
ar
ty
of
G
o
d
)
S
L
A
(S
o
u
th
L
eb
a
n
o
n
A
rm
y
)
L
eb
a
n
o
n
1
9
9
2
R
eb
3
0
J
u
ar
ez
C
ar
te
l
S
in
a
lo
a
C
a
rt
el
M
ex
ic
o
2
0
0
8
R
eb
2
9
4
F
u
la
n
i
T
ar
o
k
N
ig
er
ia
2
0
0
4
C
o
m
1
2
2
3
J
am
’i
y
ya
t-
i
Is
la
m
i-
y
i
A
fg
h
.
M
a
h
a
z-
i
M
il
li
-y
i
Is
la
m
i-
y
i
A
fg
h
.
A
fg
h
a
n
is
ta
n
1
9
9
6
R
eb
1
0
0
A
N
C
’G
re
en
s’
fa
ct
io
n
A
N
C
’R
ed
s’
F
ra
ct
io
n
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
1
9
9
3
R
eb
3
0
A
h
lu
S
u
n
n
a
W
al
ja
m
ac
a
T
ij
u
a
n
a
C
a
rt
el
-
E
l
T
eo
fa
ct
io
n
S
o
m
a
li
a
2
0
0
8
C
o
m
3
8
K
ik
u
y
u
M
aa
sa
i
K
en
ya
1
9
9
3
C
o
m
3
9
S
u
p
p
or
te
rs
of
A
N
C
S
u
p
p
o
rt
er
s
o
f
IF
P
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
1
9
8
9
P
o
l
1
4
3
A
U
C
F
A
R
C
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
1
9
9
7
R
eb
3
5
S
L
M
/A
S
L
M
/
A
–
M
M
(M
in
n
i
M
in
aw
i
fa
ct
io
n
)
S
u
d
a
n
2
0
0
5
R
eb
5
7
S
S
D
F
(S
ou
th
er
n
S
u
d
an
D
ef
en
ce
F
or
ce
)
S
S
U
M
/
A
(S
o
u
th
S
u
d
a
n
U
n
it
ed
M
ov
em
en
t/
A
rm
y
)
S
u
d
a
n
1
9
9
8
R
eb
2
4
1
M
T
A
(M
on
g
T
ai
A
rm
y
)
U
W
S
A
(U
n
it
ed
W
a
S
ta
te
A
rm
y
)
M
ya
n
m
a
r
(B
u
rm
a
)
1
9
9
0
R
eb
3
5
7
R
ep
u
b
li
c
of
C
ro
at
ia
S
er
b
ia
n
A
u
to
n
o
m
o
u
s
O
b
la
st
o
f
K
ra
ji
n
a
S
er
b
ia
(Y
u
g
o
sl
av
ia
)
1
9
9
1
R
eb
1
8
9
S
a’
ad
su
b
cl
an
of
H
ab
ar
G
id
ir
cl
an
S
u
le
im
a
n
su
b
cl
a
n
o
f
H
a
b
a
r
G
id
ir
cl
a
n
S
o
m
a
li
a
2
0
0
4
C
o
m
1
5
6
A
n
u
ak
N
u
er
E
ti
op
h
ia
2
0
0
3
C
o
m
3
6
H
iz
b
-i
-I
sl
am
i-
y
i
A
fg
h
an
is
ta
n
A
n
d
a
n
i
A
fg
h
a
n
is
tn
1
9
9
1
R
eb
5
1
H
el
ls
A
n
ge
ls
R
o
ck
M
a
ch
in
e
C
a
n
a
d
a
1
9
9
8
R
eb
2
7
R
ep
u
b
li
c
of
A
b
k
h
a
zi
a
W
h
it
e
L
eg
io
n
(t
’e
t’
ri
le
g
io
n
i)
G
eo
rg
ia
1
9
9
7
R
eb
2
6
M
T
A
(M
on
g
T
ai
A
rm
y
)
U
W
S
A
(U
n
it
ed
W
a
S
ta
te
A
rm
y
)
M
ya
m
a
r
(B
u
rm
a
)
1
9
9
0
R
eb
3
5
7
H
in
d
u
s
(I
n
d
ia
)
M
u
sl
im
s
(I
n
d
ia
)
In
d
ia
1
9
8
9
C
o
m
1
7
2
7
K
u
rd
is
h
D
em
o
cr
at
ic
P
ar
ty
P
at
ri
o
ti
c
U
n
io
n
o
f
K
u
rd
is
ta
n
Ir
a
q
1
9
9
7
R
eb
9
9
B
u
rk
in
ab
e´
G
u
e´r
e´
Iv
o
ry
C
o
a
st
2
0
0
3
C
o
m
1
5
5
H
em
a
L
en
d
u
D
R
C
o
n
g
o
2
0
0
2
C
o
m
1
9
4
6
L
ai
m
es
Q
aq
a
ch
a
ca
s
B
o
li
v
ia
2
0
0
0
C
o
m
5
0
H
ot
iy
a
B
ag
ga
ra
N
ew
ib
a
,
M
a
h
a
ri
b
a
,
M
a
h
a
m
id
S
u
d
a
n
2
0
0
5
C
o
m
2
5
1
C
om
an
d
o
V
er
m
el
h
o
(R
ed
C
om
m
an
d
)
T
er
ce
ir
o
C
o
m
a
n
d
o
(T
h
ir
d
C
o
m
m
a
n
d
)
B
ra
si
l
2
0
0
4
R
eb
3
0
F
or
ce
s
of
A
m
an
u
ll
ah
K
h
an
F
or
ce
s
o
f
Is
m
a
il
K
h
a
n
A
fg
h
a
n
is
ta
n
2
0
0
2
R
eb
6
3
A
rm
y
of
S
al
ar
za
i
tr
ib
e
T
al
eb
a
n
M
ov
em
en
t
o
f
P
a
k
is
ta
n
P
a
k
is
ta
n
2
0
0
8
R
eb
6
9
D
o
d
ot
h
J
ie
,
M
a
th
en
ik
o
K
a
ri
m
o
jo
n
g
U
g
a
n
d
a
2
0
0
0
C
o
m
3
3
S
ou
rc
e:
U
C
D
P
n
on
-s
ta
te
co
n
fl
ic
t
d
at
as
et
(S
u
n
d
b
er
g
,
E
ck
a
n
d
K
re
u
tz
2
0
1
2
)
49
4.3. OPERATIONALIZATION
Final Operational Definition of Dependent Variable
My final operational definition of non-state conflicts is derived from UCDP’s definition of non-
state conflicts as well as UCDP’s coding criterions for the observations included in the UCDP
non-state conflict dataset. To recap, my operational definition of non-state conflict is: the
occurrence of armed conflict between two organized groups, neither which is the government
of a state, that result in at least 25 annual deaths in a year.
I use the information in UCDP Non-state conflict dataset to construct the dependent vari-
ables, namely non-state conflicts (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012). The variable counts the
total sum of occurrence of non-state conflicts per country year. Nigeria hade four occurrences
of non-state conflicts in 1992, hence the observation Nigeria in 1992 will be 4. Originally,
the data set is in a dyadic format, where each observation contains information of the dyad
on a yearly basis. Besides name and year, each observation provide information about the
conflict’s organization level, name of the parties involved, number of yearly fatalities, which
state the conflict is located in and whether it has ended or not. From this I construct a
country year data set, linking the count measure to calender years in states. The location
for some observations is set to more than one state. For these cases, I have constructed one
observation for each state included. This has led to an increase from 538 to 550, adding 12
occurrences of non-state conflicts. A list of these duplicated observations can be found in
Appendix A, Table A.1.
In the previous sections, I have problematized issues to the divergence between the theoreti-
cal concept of non-state conflict, and an operational definition of it. As there exist only one
comprehensive dataset on non-state conflicts, UCDP’s initial coding rules and conceptualiza-
tion both lead and constrains the discussion of an operational definition. While the previous
section might seem unnecessary given that my theoretical concept and operational definition
are identical, it has provided a more nuanced understanding of the pros and cons when the
phenomena is measured quantitatively.
4.3.3 State Capacity
Within the literature, state capacity is an elusive concept that by scholars have been inter-
preted in various ways. As Hendrix (2010) and Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) have noted, how
scholars conceptualize and measure state capacity have led to diverging inferences as scholars
have used the same indicators as proxies for different concepts.
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The three most common operationalizations scholars have used for state capacity are military
capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity and the coherence of political institutions
(Hendrix 2010). The theoretical framework presented here treat state capacity and political
institutions as two different aspects. While some scholars argue that state capacity is de-
fined by the quality and coherence of political institutions (See eg. Muller and Weede 1990;
Hegre et al. 2001; DeRouen and Sobek 2004), I am in the need of a measure allowing me
to differentiate between political institutions and state capacity. Hence, the final measure of
state capacity needs to exclude aspects that are related to the election of political leaders.
Further, the framework put forth suggests the ability to govern starts with bureaucratic and
administrative capacity. It is this particular aspect of state capacity capturing the essence I
seek to operationalize.
To recap, hypothesis H2 suggests a relationship between weak bureaucratic and administra-
tive capacity and an increase of non-state conflicts because it: (1) leads to a security dilemma
for non-state actors because the state is not an actor whom groups can rely upon protection
from, and (2) limits governments’ ability to regulate violence and execute conflict reducing
policies, if the they choose to do so. In addition, hypothesis H4 suggests and conditional
effect regime change by bureaucratic and administrative capacity.
The proxy I use to measure bureaucratic and administrative capacity is taken from Hegre
and Nyg˚ard (2014). Their definition of bureaucratic quality corresponds to my theoretical
construct as they define bureaucratic quality to be ” (...) the capacity of the political systems
to implement decisions through the administrative apparatus” (2014, pg. 5). Their measure
of bureaucratic quality relies on two different sources of data, respectively the International
Country Risk Guide/Political Risk Group (ICRG) measure of bureaucratic quality and the
World Governance Indicators (WGI) measure of government effectiveness (PRG 2010; Kauf-
mann, Kray and Mastruzzi 2010).
ICRG’s measure of bureaucratic quality is based three indicators; (1) regular, meritocratic
recruitment and advancement process, (2) insulation from political pressure and (3) the abil-
ity to provide services and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy (PRG 2010).
Countries scoring low on the first indicator represent cases where state officers are recruited
based on the their allegiance with the governing party, and not by profession qualifications.
One example is Zambia in the 1970s, where the government passed a law that excluded
non-members of the ruling party to hold official positions (Bates 2008, pg. 50). The second
indicator reflects to which degree the bureaucracy is immune to political pressure. If the bu-
reaucracy becomes an apparatus where goods are channeled to relevant groups in exchange
for political support, it is by no means immune to political pressure. In many African states,
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clientelism is widespread, making the bureaucracy an area where the provision of state ser-
vices translates into political support (Szeftel 2000). States scoring low on the last indicator
represent cases where the bureaucracy collapse during political transition.
WGI measures the same concepts as ICRG, as they define government effectiveness to be:
”(...) perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” WGI
uses a variety of data sources to construct their index of government effectiveness. Data from
ICRG is also included. WGI use surveys and expert assessment from respondents belonging
to public sector, private sector and the NGO sector. The index is based on data from more
than 10 different sources (Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi 2010). A full review of their
source is a heroic task, which I will not proceed upon.16 Henceforth, I will only discuss issues
regarding the ICRG collection as this source alone is the most important component of Hegre
and Nyg˚ard (2014) index of bureaucratic quality.
The ICRG measure rely on the use of country experts in their coding. This means that
each coder have in-depth knowledge about the country they report from. The lack of cross
validation is then justifiable on the basis of internal validity. Further, ICRG provides each
expert country expert with a scheme of questions to answer. This schema entails comparison
across countries possible as experts answer the same questions regardless of country and year
(PRG 2010). According to Hendrix (2010, pg. 273), survey measures of bureaucratic qual-
ity are among the most theoretical and empirically justified approaches to measuring state
capacity. However, there are some issues with this method of collecting data that needs to
be addressed. The use of expert assessments in collecting data will inherently be subjective,
as each expert must individually analyze and interpret situations (Neumayer 2004). For a
scientific ideal of objectivity, expert assessments will always score low. One additional prob-
lem with the ICRG measure, is the potential divergence between when something happens
and when it is observed. Coders often rely on public sources, leading to a potential delay in
coding if reporters can not get hold of information. There are also cases when regime resist
to give information as public display could have unwanted consequences (Linder, Santiso and
Neumann 2002).
There are many advantages with using the Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014) index of bureaucratic
quality as a proxy of state weakness. In his review and assessment of state capacity, Hendrix
(2010, pg. 283) finds the ICRG measure of bureaucratic quality as a satisfactory measure
16For more information, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
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when considering construct validity. Bureaucratic quality correlates highly with rational
legality, which Hendrix find to be one among three underlying dimension of state capacity.17
In addition, the Hegre and Nyg˚ard index of bureaucratic quality correlates with other well
know measures of related to state capacity. One example is their rule of law index which
correlates with the bureaucratic quality index by 0.874.18 From a perspective of face validity,
I would argue that measure subjectively provides a strong link to the theoretical construct
as they are nearly identical.
Using the data from Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014) I operationalize the variable, bureaucratic
quality. The variable is a normalized continuous scale ranging from a minimum of -2.44
to a maximum of 2.51. High scores are given to states where the governing body easily can
implement its decisions. This measure highly reflects the theoretical construct of bureaucratic
and administrative state capacity.
4.3.4 Representative Political Institutions
Within political science, scholars use different labels to classify political regimes. For some
scholars distinctions are clear cut, regime are either democratic or non-democratic (See eg.
Huntington 1991; Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski 1996; Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub and Limongi 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010).
Other scholars see democracy as a continuum, where political regimes to a more or less
extent are democratic (See eg. Bollen 1993; Vanhanen 1990). Once settled for either a
dichotomous or continuous definition, the chosen indicator must also be addressed. While
different measures of political regimes tend to highly correlate, it should not automatically
be taken as an evidence of validity, as choice of democracy measure could lead to different
results (Casper and Tufis 2003; Ho¨gstrom 2013). While there exist a variety of indicators
measuring democracy, the final choice should be guided by the theoretical underpinning.
My framework has put an emphasis on how formal political institutions create incentives for
leaders to (1) form policies addressed at reducing grievance and (2) act as neutral mediators
when tension rise. I would argue that a continuous measure of democracy is best suited
given my theoretic framework. A simplification of political regimes into either democracy or
autocracy would potentially dismiss variations in incentives to regulate. One dichotomous
17Hendrix review is based on a factor analysis of 15 measures of state capacity. The other two dimensions
are rentier-autocrticness and neopartimonality.
18This correlation is reported in the online appendix belonging to their study on ”Governance and Conflict
Relapse” (Hegre and Nyg˚ard 2014).
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alternative is the Alvarez et al. index of democracy and dictatorship.19 For a regime to be
categorized as a democracy, it has to pass four coding rules.20 For example is Botswana, a
country considered by many scholars as a democracy, is recorded as a dictatorship. This is
problematic, as stated in the words of Collier and Adcock (1999, pg. 549) ”(...) in our view
it remain unclear why a regime that has competitive elections for the presidency, rotation in
the presidential office, and more than one party - but lacks competition for legislative office,
is not at least partially democratic.”
To recap, my definition of political regimes focus solely on representative institutions. I have
defined the concept to be: institutions where the executive power is elected by a majority or
a plurality of the population in an open recruitment process and that there exist constrains
on executive powers by an elected legislative. This definition is based on three dimensions
related to the overarching concept of democracy: executive recruitment, executive constraints
and participation.
There exist many continuous measures of political regimes including the three aspects. One
example is the Freedom House Index (FHI) which include measure of participation (FHI
2014). While the FHI index might enjoy great face validity, as it embraces a broader specter of
meanings and understanding associated with the overarching term democracy, it is dismissed
because of its broadness. Consequently, using the FHI index would lead to a situation where
I am able to distinguish the effect of formal institutions from other aspects. A measure
that lies closer to my theoretical concept is Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010) widely used
Polity Index. It is a continuous scale that characterizing political regime among the three
dimensions I have included in my definition. There is one problem with the Polity Index.
The sub-indicator measuring participation has an explicit reference to political violence in its
coding rules (Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand 2009; Vreeland 2008). Non-state conflicts could
potential then be captured in this indicator, making the index inappropriate. However, the
Polity index is not completely dismissed, as the usefulness of the data lies in its components.
To proxy representative institutions, I use the Scalar Index of Policies (SIP) developed by
Gates et al. (2006). The index compress a three-dimensional conceptualization of democracy
to one dimension. The SIP index combines data from the Polity Index, but replaces the
measure of participation with the Vanhanen (2000) data on participation. The index is based
19This index is often referred ACLP index after the authors’ initials, or the DD index based on the
distinction between democracy and dictatorship.
20These are: (1) The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was popular
elected, (2) the legislature must be popular elected, (2) there must be more than one party competing in
elections and (4) An alteration in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent
to office must have taken place (Alvarez et al. 1996, pg. 69).
54
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN
on an average score of the three dimensions of representative institutions I have addressed. It
ranges from zero to one, where one equals perfect democracy and zero equal perfect autocracy.
The SIP index operationalize executive recruitment based on three sub-indicators from the
Polity IV dataset.21 The three sub-indicators assess structural characteristics relating to
chief recruitment. The first looks at the degree of institutionalization in the succession of
power, from one executive to another. If regulated and institutionalized, succession happens
through scheduled competitive elections. If not regulated, succession happens through violent
seizures, appointment from a tiny elite or an election where voting rights are limited. The
second indicator measures to which extent there exist equal opportunities for candidates to
challenge the governing body. For a minimum of equal opportunities to exist, succession
must happen through an election with at least two competing parties. This disqualifies one-
party systems, monarchies and designation by selection. The last sub-indicator also reflects
candidates’ opportunities, whereas this measure captures whether there in principle exists
an opportunity of attaining political leadership through a regularized process. In this case,
solely elections qualifies.
The indicator of executive constraints reflects to which degree the executive enjoys unlimited
authority or not.22 When leaders have unlimited authority, they either ignore constraining
bodies or there does not exist any constraining bodies. In the opposite case, leaders actions
are restricted by an elected legislative who have the powers to dismiss leaders. The indicator
also record intermediate categories. Such an example is Peru in 1992, where Polity record
the execute to have some restrictions on authority, but still not unlimited. In this year, Pres-
ident Fujimore dissolved Congress, reorganized the judiciary and suspended the constitution
(Strong 1992).
The last indicator, participation, is operationalized by combining two sub-indicators from
the Polyarchy dataset by Vanhanen (2000). The first one, participation, is the percentage
of the population voting in an election. The second one, competition, is the percentage of
valid votes won by all parties except the plurality winner or the winning coalition. If a
successful coup follows the election, both indicators are coded as zero. The product of these
two sub-indicators constitute Gates et al. (2006) measure of participation in the SIP index.23
21Within the Polity IV dataset, these variables carry the names: XRREG (Regulation of Chief Executive
Recruitment), XCOMP (Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment) and XROPEN (Openess of Executive
Recruitmen) (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2010)
22The name of the variable is XCONST (Executive constrains) in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr
and Jaggers 2010).
23In order to compensate for the possibility that regimes with that have high levels of competition and high
levels of participation are given to much leverage, the coding rules are adjust for state where competition
exceeds 70%. If the level of participation exceeds 70%, participation is multiplied by competition divided by
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Figure 4.3: Authority dimension and ideal polity types, 1989-2008
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I use the information in the SIP index to construct the variable, regime type. The SIP index
is taken from Strand, Hegre, Gates and Dahl (2012). The index is a continuous scale that
range from 0 to 1 where 0 represents an ideal autocracy and 1 an ideal democracy. For the
missing values on the SIP index, I used the previous regimes score. From Figure 4.3 we can
see the relationship proposed by Gates et al. (2006). Democracies and autocracies tend to
have high or low score on all the dimensions whereas anocracies vary much more.
4.3.5 Regime Change
To enable an assessment on the effects of regime change, one needs to start with how to
identify periods of change. As regime change in reality is a continuous process, identifying
it in a quantitative matter will decompose the phenomena to a latent variable. This means
30%. For two states with an identical participation of 80%, but with respectively low and a high winning
coalition (for example 30% and 70%), the first state would have appeared to much less democratic than the
latter. This corrects for to which extent an election has an decisive impact on the selection of executive
(Gates et al. 2006, pg. 898).
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Figure 4.4: Trends in political regimes: global average SIP score, 1989-2008,
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Figure 4.5: Trends in regime types: frequency share, 1989-2008,
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that the coding rules applied to operationalize regime change will determine when regime
change is a phenomena we observe. From Gates et al. (2006) we know that political changes
are more common in anocracies than democracies and autocracies. In addition, Hegre et al.
(2001) find that the consolidation of regimes affect how prone they are to change. Proximity
to change affects change. Somehow, the indicator of regime change needs to incorporate these
two issues.
Within the literature, regime change is most commonly measured as the year to year com-
parison of the Polity Index with values (Cederman, Hug and Krebs 2010, pg. 379).24 For
example, Gleditsch and Ward (2000) and Mansfield and Snyder (2005) identify change by
comparing variations along the autocracy-democracy dimension within respectively five or
ten years. Other scholars use a combination of periodical change and net change from pro-
ceeding years. These scholars measure political change as either two points divergence from
proceeding score on the Polity index or as a total change of three points in the three previ-
ous years. (See eg. Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). An additional approach is
done by identifying stable and unstable periods (the periods themselves are not fixed), where
divergencies from the stable period is operationalized as regime change (See eg. Cederman,
Hug and Krebs 2010).
I have opted for the SIP data from Strand et al. (2012) as indicator of regime changes. Since
the SIP index is based on sub-indicators from the Polity data, Polity’s initial coding rules
affects the SIP index. Table 4.5 displays a comparison of the Polity index and the SIP index
for Somalia, Afghanistan and Peru. The Polity Index spans from -10 to 10, where low values
are given to autocratic regimes and high values to democratic regimes. In Polity’s coding
rules, there are three values used to indicate situations that are somewhat special. The first
one is interruption (-66) periods where the polity is occupied by foreign powers terminating
the old regime and establishing a new one. The second is interregnum (-77) periods, identified
by a complete collapse of central political authority. In the height of civil war, this is often
the case. The third one is transition (-88) periods where new institutions are planned, legally
constituted, but not put into effect (Jaggers, Gurr and Marshall 2012, pg. 19).25 In the SIP
index, these special periods are treated as missing values.
24This means that a Regime changet is operationalized as the difference between two regimes at Regimet−1
and Regimet.
25In the time period from 1989 to 2008, the Polity Index have recorded a total of 167 of these special cases.
With a total record of 3234 polities from 1989 to 2008, these cases constitute 5.2% of the recorded data in
the period. Respectively, there are 45 cases of Interruption Period (-66), 63 cases of Interregnum Periods
(-77) and 59 cases of Transition Periods (-88). There respective shares are 1.4%, 1.9% and 1.8% (Jaggers,
Gurr and Marshall 2012).
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Table 4.5: Polity Index and SIP index: sample values from Afghanistan, Somalia and Peru,
1989-2008
Year SIP Afg. PI Afg. SIP Som. PI Som. SIP Peru PI Peru
1989 0.06 -8 0.00 -7 0.85 7
1990 0.06 -8 0.00 -7 0.85 8
1991 0.06 -8 NA -77 0.85 8
1992 NA -77 NA -77 0.48 -3
1993 NA -77 NA -77 0.48 1
1994 NA -77 NA -77 0.48 1
1995 NA -77 NA -77 0.48 1
1996 0.00 -7 NA -77 0.48 1
1997 0.00 -7 NA -77 0.48 1
1998 0.00 -7 NA -77 0.48 1
1999 0.00 -7 NA -77 0.48 1
2000 0.00 -7 NA -77 NA -88
2001 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2002 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2003 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2004 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2005 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2006 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2007 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
2008 NA -66 NA -77 0.94 9
Source: Scalar Index of Policies (Strand et al. 2012) and Polity Index (Jag-
gers, Gurr and Marshall 2012)
Note: −66 is interruption periods, −77 is interregnum periods and −88 is
transition periods. NA (Not Available) is missing values.
While the SIP index records these periods as missing observations, the phenomenon they
identify is what I will refer to as state collapse. For the interruption and transition values,
these are periods that reflect the phenomena I seek to investigate. For the interregnum values,
some elaboration is needed. They could be interpreted as transition periods or they could
be interpreted as state collapse. Plumper and Neumayer (2010) label this the ”interregnum
problem”, as scholars have to decide what to do with longer periods lacking central authority
when they operationalize regime change. Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010, pg. 47) have dealt
with this problem by replacing the interregnum values by using alternative data sources like
the Freedom House Index. They often find that the interregnum periods lie close to a score
of -10 on the Polity Index, reflecting an autocratic situation. Consequently, they assign the
value -10 to interregnum periods. Other scholars assign the neutral Polity score of 0 to the
interregnum periods.26 In their study of civil war onset, Fearon and Laitin (2003) opt for
this strategy when they measure regime change. Plumper and Neumayer (2010) criticize this
approach by drawing an example from Afghanistan. Before the civil war broke out in 1992,
26This modification is often referred to as the Polity2 Index (Jaggers, Gurr and Marshall 2012, pg. 17)
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Afghanistan was assigned values close to the bottom of the Polity Index. By replacing the
interregnum scores with neutral values, Afghanistan seems more democratic during the civil
war, than in the periods before and after the war. This is obviously wrong as Afghanistan
during the war did not portray a more democratic situation. One final way to deal with the
interregnum periods is to exclusively treat them as transitional periods.
In the previous chapter, regime change was defined to be a period between two different
polities with different institutional structures. This leads to the potential of long transition
periods if change in political structures is not immediately replaced by new political struc-
tures. The consequence of approaching regime change in this way will lead to a blurry line
between what we think of as state collapse and regime change. Somalia serve as an example
of this situation. Since the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has been without a
governing body. One could argue that Somalia changed in 1991 and the situation afterwards
is a period of state collapse. This way of arguing leads to a stable ”unstable” situation since
1991. Given my theoretic framework, I will treat these long periods with lack of central
authority as transition periods.
In the theoretical framework, one of the mechanisms connected to hypothesis H3a is how
reorganization of state structures, leads to a lack of state-based security. In the case of long
transitional periods, either due to lack or the evaporation of state structure, the security
dilemma is by no means solved by state agents. These long situations capture the essence
of the theoretical expectations regarding regulation of violence and non-state conflicts. In
the anarchial setting of a state collapse, groups have to rely on privately supplied protection
instead of state-based. This leads me to interpret the lack of central authority as transitional
periods. Hence, the case of Somalia from 1991 and onwards, is a transitional period.
Given the theoretic underpinning, I will argue that all missing values on the SIP index,
caused by the special values in the Polity Index, represent a type of transition period. Or
in the words of Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2010, pg. 47) ”(...) they respectively represent
conditions of anarchy, foreign interruption or regime change, they all reflect conditions where
the political process have been severely disrupted.” Consequently, the missing values on the
SIP index are interpreted as transitional periods in my analysis. The variable, State Collapse
is a dummy variable indicating whether the SIP index has missing values. Table 4.6 shows
the relationship between the original SIP index and my measure of state collapse.
The data from Strand et al. (2012) also has an indicator denoting regime change. By regime
change, they use the definition from Gates et al. (2006, pg. 898):
”A polity change is defined as any change in indicators that results in one or more
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of the following: (1) a movement from one category to another in the Executive
dimension, (2) a change of at least two units in the Executive Constraints di-
mension, or (3) a 100% increase or 50% decrease in the Participation dimension.
Doubling the number of citizens with voting rights qualifies as a minimum change
along the Participation dimension. The creation or dissolution of states is also
defined as a polity change.”
The indicator of change takes the value of -1 or 1 depending on whether there is a transition
towards autocracy or democracy.27 Compared to the state collapse variable, this indicator
does not record the ”unstable” stable period with a lack of central authority as change.
Consequently, it has less observations than the state collapse variable. Another reason for
applying a more strict measure of regime change is that it allows me to discriminate the effect
of state collapse from regime change. This makes me able to test the expectations derived
from Hypothesis H3b, H3c and H3d. From this indicator I construct three dummy variables,
democratization, autocratization and regime change. The variable regime change is the joint
effect of autocratization and democratization, and is used to capture whether change per se
bring non-state conflicts. The other two indicators incorporate the direction of change as
well.
27In the dataset this variable is named sip2status.
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In their analysis of civil war, Hegre et al. (2001) find that the proximity to change increases the
potential of change. To account for consolidation on the potential of change, I have included
a decay function as an alternative specification to regime changes. This specification models
the effect of regime change according to how long it has been since the last recorded change.
The data on non-state conflicts start in 1989, but the SIP index record values back to the
1800s. In order to avoid the decay function to start with equal values for observations in 1989
I have left censored SIP data. To operationalize the decay functions, I start by constructing
a variable counting the number of years since last change. USA is the state included with
the longest period without regime change prior to 1989. USA enters the dataset in 1989 with
165 years since the last regime change.
Since the effect of change is biggest the closer to the observed change, I model it as an
exponential decay processes. The decay variables for each type of regime change are the
half-time functions since last recorded change. By halftime I mean how long it takes to reach
one half of the final value, where the rate of change is proportional to the difference between
the present value and the final value.28 I use the time of one year (12 months) to model the
effect of consolidation, since bigger halftime values potentially could alter estimations in the
analysis, giving the effect of regime change unrealistic leverage. Table 4.6 shows a sample of
how this function is operationalized for their indicator of state collapse and autocratization.29
Figure 4.6 provides an example of how the halftime function is operationalized for Peru. Peru
is record with change on the indicator of state collapse between 1989 and 2000. For a halftime
of one year, the effect of regime change is halved after one year. After four years, a half time
of one year, leads to the effect of 0.25. The figure also illustrates how the assumptions about
halftime leads to how much leverage I am willing to give the decay of regime change in my
analysis. When the halftime is set to four years, regime change will have a huge impact on
the estimations of conflict risk. In order to avoid an exaggeration on the effect of regime
change on conflict, I have opted for a halftime of one year.
4.3.6 Conditional Effects
Several scholars have suggested that a well functioning bureaucracy makes transition periods
more easily accomplished. Removal of an unpopular leader and transition to a more open
28The exponential rate of change is N(t) = N0e
−λt, where N(t) is the quantity at time t and N0 is the
initial quantity at time t = 0.
29The last two indicator of regime changes, regime change and democratization are operationalized by the
same procedure and are not reported in the table.
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Figure 4.6: Decay functions of regime change, Peru
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regime are more easily accomplished within the frame of a strong bureaucracy (Goodwin
and Skocpol 1989; Schock 1996; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). This suggest that the effect of
regime change on the increase of non-state conflicts is mediated, hence conditional, upon
bureaucratic and administrative state capacity. If the effect of regime change is conditioned
upon state capacity, an analysis omitting an interaction term would prevail a less nuanced
relationship or even a source of omitted variable bias.
Scholars have been criticized for scholars using interaction terms in regression models. This
is largely due to the difficulty with interpreting these terms. In particular, this applies to
logistic models, where the relationship between the covariates and the dependent is non-
linear. However, I would argue omitting an interaction term is a bad solution, especially
if the relationship could be conditional. Failing to include an interaction term is a form
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of omitted variable bias (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005). While conditional estimates
are hard to interpret simply by looking at estimates displayed in tables, scholars have the
possibility to visualize these results in graphs and plots.
4.3.7 Control Variables
Most often, models will contain some sort of error. This is inescapable as it is impossible to
include all the relevant variables in a model. Neither is a large number of controls a feasible
approach, as the more correlated the main explanatory variable is with irrelevant controls,
the less efficient is the estimate of the main causal effect (King, Keohane and Verba 1994,
pg. 182).
I base my choice on controls by weighing two considerations. These are simply stateed in
the words of Schrodt (2010, pg. 2) ”(...) models must always steer between the rock of
collinearity and the hard place of omitted variable bias (...)”.30 I seek the same approach by
avoiding the inclusion of controls that either have a minimal effect on non-state conflicts or
face collinearity with the explanatory variables put forth. Further I seek to avoid omitted
variable bias by including controls that have proved to be robust in former studies of conflict.
The controls I include are population, GDP per capita, relevant groups and peace years.
Population
Within the conflict literature, there are two explanatory factors that show consistency in
nearly all studies of conflict. The first one is population size and the second one is income
level. Countries that have large populations are often associated with all sorts of collective
violence (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Raleigh and Hegre 2009, See
eg). I use data from Penn World Table to construct the variable population. The original
values are log transformed in order to get a more normally distributed variable.
Income level
Within the broader conflict literature, the perhaps most robust finding is the one connect-
ing poverty to collective violence. Nearly all quantitative studies find a strong relationship
between low income levels and collective violence, after controlling for other explanatory
30For more contributions on the same issue, see Achen (2005).
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variables. While the causal path explaining this relationship is contested, GDP per capita
remains the most robust predictor of conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, pg. 531). There
is one problem with including GDP per capita as a control variable, and this is mainly due
to its correlation with the explanatory variables included. This issue is largely due to the
interwoven relationship between income, political institutions and state capacity. Within
the literature, there is evidence linking all these three together. Several decades ago, Lipset
(1959) argued that high levels of income lead to a higher probability for states to democratize.
Since then, the relationship have been confirmed in a number of studies since (Przeworski
et al. 2000; Welzel and Inglehart 2006, See eg.).
My choice of including income levels as a control variable is based on weighing between
two considerations. While it causes collinearity with one of the main explanatory variables,
excluding the variable could lead to biased results. It is the omitted variable bias I fear
the most, hence leading me to include GDP per capita as one of the control variables. The
variable, GDP per capita, is log transformed in order to create a distribution closer to the
normal distribution. The variable is taken from Penn World Tables (Heston and Aten 2012).
Number of Groups
When studying internal division within rebel movement, scholars find that multiple factions
increase the risk of in-fighting (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Cunningham, Bakke
and Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2013). This means that when the number of groups with
divergent interests increases, so does the fighting between them. While these studies focus
on fighting between co-ethnics and rebel movements, they suggest that the number of groups
is of importance. I have chosen to control for the number of groups within states. A high
number of groups also means an increase in the number of potential dyads fighting each other
(Rudolfsen 2013). On this basis, I included a variable, relevant groups, counting the number
of groups within states. The data on relevant groups are taken from GROWup (2014),
which his an updated version of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data (Cederman, Min
and Wimmer 2009). As defined by Cederman, Gleditsch and Weidmann (2010, pg. 99), a
political relevant group is ”(...) all ethnic groups for which at least one political organization
exists that promotes an ethnically oriented agenda in the national political arena, or ethnic
groups that are subject to political discrimination.”
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Peace Years
When dealing with cross-sectional time series data, the assumption about independence be-
tween observations are most likely to be broken. The perhaps most prominent example is
how the level of income in one particular year hardly ever differ from the value in the prior
or proceeding year. In my case, the occurrence of non-state conflicts in one year is likely to
influence the occurrence in the following years. Beck and Tucker (1998) and Carter and Sig-
norino (2010) argue that when scholars examine cross-section data with a binary dependent
variable, they need to account for the potential of temporal dependence among observations.
Failing to do so could lead to both biased results as well as imprecise results.
I use the method suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) to deal with the problem of
temporal dependency between observations. I model a cubic polynomial, based on the time
since last occurrence of non-state conflict. The variables peace years, peace yeara 2, and peace
years 3.31 Together, these three values capture the potential time dependency between the
occurrence of non-state conflicts.
4.4 Sources of Bias and Methodological Challenges
Given my framework and the data at hand, I identify four methodological challenges. In
the following sections I present these as well as my approach to handle them. The first
challenge concerns the causal relation between the explanatory variables and the dependent.
The second address how correlations between variables could lead to a situation where dif-
ferentiating between the effects becomes difficult. The third concerns omitted variable bias.
The last challenge is how to handle missing values.
4.4.1 Endogenity
One of the threats to my inference is caused by the insecurity in establishing the causal re-
lationship between the dependent variable and the covariates. According to Hendrix (2010,
pg. 278), the biggest threat when using bureaucratic quality in studies of conflict, is the
endogeneity to the conflict predicted. In my case this means that a malfunctioning bureau-
cracy could origin from conflicts between groups. However, when explaining conflict with
institutional structures, the potential of endogeneity is inescapable. Institutions could both
31For Peace years 3 I divide the value by 1000.
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be the cause and answer to conflicts. When drawing inference from the models, this means
that the relationship establish will be more a relationship is hard to establish, as institutions
both is the answer and cause of conflicts.
4.4.2 Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity becomes a problem in statistical analysis if the independent variables cor-
relates with another independent variable. When interpreting the results, inference from the
respective variables becomes difficult because the effects appear simultaneously. This makes
causal inference highly uncertain. An additional problem is how multicollinearity leads to
inflated standard errors. In the worst case, true hypothesis is discarded (King, Keohane and
Verba 1994). Since one of my hypothesis includes an interaction term, this by itself may
cause multicollinearty, hence making it difficult to discriminate the effects from one another.
The conventional procedure is to treat correlations above 0.80 as a threat to inferences. Val-
ues above this threshold tend to inflate standard errors, hence increasing the potential for
discarding a true hypothesis.
In order to investigate whether multi-collinearity will be an issue in my analysis, I inspect
the bivariate correlations and conduct a variance of inflation test. Since none of the bivariate
interaction terms have a higher correlation than 0.8 and the results from the variance of
inflation test is alright, I do not find multi-collinearity a threat to the inferences in any of my
models.32 A bivariate correlation matrix including all variables included is found in Appendix
A, Table A.4. The variance of inflation test is found in Appendix A, Table A.5.
4.4.3 Omitted variable bias
In the Section 4.3.7, about control variables, I weighted my decision based on parsimony and
the potential of omitted variable bias. While I did not justified why I chose to leave out
some variables, I will do so here. In particular I will justify why I have left out civil war as a
control since studies on non-state conflicts have included it (See eg Fjelde and von Uexkull
2012; Rudolfsen 2013; Kreutz and Eck 2011; Fjelde and Østby 2014).
There is one simple reason why I leave out civil war in my analysis, and that is the po-
tential of multicollinearity with the measures of regime changes. To recap, interregnum
32The only variable giving deviation from the variance of inflation test is the peacespell variables. However,
this these variables are a function of time same estimate
68
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN
periods, are identified with complete collapse of central political authority. Since this situ-
ation often occurs in civil wars, including civil war as a variable would lead to a potential
of multicollinearity. An example is Lebanon which between 1978 and 1986 is coded as an
interregnum period in the Polity Index, or as missing in SIP index. In the words of Jaggers,
Gurr and Marshall (2012, pg. 19) ”Lebanon between 1978 and 1986, in which factionalism,
civil war and external military inventions has at times reduced the scope of the regime’s
central authority to a few square blocks of Beirut, is a recent example of an interregnum.”
4.4.4 Missing
Missing values will always constitute a threat to researchers examining conflicts. This is of
course due to the nature of conflict research itself. States destroyed by conflicts or extremely
closed regimes neither have the capacity or will to report information. This means that key
explanatory variables like indicators of regime type and governance tend to be missing in
periods of conflict. Selection bias happens when missing is not random across units. In
conflict research this is also the case as the countries that most often experience conflicts
tend to have missing data (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Honaker and King 2010).
There is one potential problem with missing data in my analysis. When using different
coding rules as inclusion criterion for observations, there becomes a lack of coherence across
datasets. Since the data on representative institutions and regime change constitute my main
explanatory variables, I have chosen to apply their inclusion criterion. This means that states
that do not correspond to the countries found in the SIP index will be left out of the analysis.
The observed states in the data from Strand et al. (2012) is based on an updated version of
states recognized to the criterions of Gleditsch and Ward (1999). I have used data sources
that do no rely on this system, like the data from GROWup (2014) and Penn World Tables
Heston and Aten (2012). For these sources, I have corrected for the potential coding errors
arising between differences between datasets in the country codes for some countries. The
SIP index record a number of 159 states from 1989-2008.33
My data is left with a final number of 150 states.34 This leads to some selection bias since
some states are left out. When looking more closely into the states missed out, the break
up of Yugoslavia severe as an example. The data sources I have chosen differ widely on
33When identifying the number of unique number of states (gwno - code), the SIP index from Strand
et al. (2012) records 168 states. This is in reality not the exact number since 9 of these countries have no
observations. These are Bahamas, Belize, Malta, Bosnia, Cap Verde and Brunei.
34A list of all the countries included could be found in the Appendix.
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their approach to the break up of Yugoslavia in 1991. Some stop coding Yugoslavia and
start coding Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Others continue to code
Yugoslavia (Serbia) one the basis that intuitions in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia did not
change. This means that there is some selection bias due to different coding rules and these
tend to be the case where states dissolve a new ones emerge. These lack data on population
and income level.
After the merging of different data sources, I am left with a total of 3014 observations. Among
these observations, there are 110 cases of missing values. These 100 cases are due to either
missing on the GDP per capita or the population variable or due to the lagging of the regime
change.35 In total they constitute only 3.6% of 3014 observations. I consider this a threat
of minor size, hence I will not take any action upon these missing values. They will be left
out by listwise deletion. Table 4.7 displays the descriptive statistic for the data I will use in
the analysis. The dataset covers a total of 2904 observations distributed on 150 states in the
time periods from 1989-2008.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter I have developed the research design to test the hypothesis put forth in the
previous chapter. It bridges the gap between theory and analysis. From the sources and
indicators I have chosen, I construct a cross country data set spanning from 1989-2008. The
rather short time period is due to a compromise between available data from UCDP and
updated data from other sources.36 After operationalizing the theoretical constructs, I am
left with a dataset covering 2904 observations in 151 different states. Within this there is a
total count of 550 non-state conflicts distributed over 265 country years. Table 4.7 displays
the descriptive statistic for explanatory variables included.
Given the data at hand, what are the prospect for generalization? Former large N analysis
of non-state violence have limited their samples to a regional scope like Sub Saharan Africa.
I will not limit my analysis to be confined by regional. This means that the theories put
forward here are suited for a global sample. Compared to Europe, Africa is well-know for
its share of disintegrated and fractious states. Does this mean that the mechanism creating
violence between group are different in African than European states? I would are the that
the mechanisms put forth in this thesis are not restricted to a global sample. This suggest
35Statistics for missing data is reported in table A.2 in Appendix A
36UCDP record non-state conflicts from 1989-2011
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Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Representative Institutions 2904 0.58 0.35 0.00 0.98
State Collapse 2904 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Regime Change 2904 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Democratization 2904 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Autocratization 2904 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Bureaucratic Quality 2904 0.05 1.01 -2.44 2.51
Log GDP per cap 2904 8.35 1.35 4.82 10.92
Log Population total 2904 9.29 1.45 5.86 14.09
Relevant Groups 2904 4.24 5.59 0.00 49.00
Peace Years 2904 7.56 5.86 0.00 19.00
Source: Strand et al. (2012); Heston and Aten (2012); Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014);
GROWup (2014)
that the hypothetical situation of a government with strong state capacity in Africa would
have resulted in a lower risk of non-state in Africa. The same hypothetical situation applies
to Europe. If Scandinavia where to be recognized by low state capacity, Scandinavia would
be a place where we expected more non-state violence to erupt. This is plausible to believe
and it justifies a global application of the theories put forth.
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Chapter 5
Results
The expectations derived from the previous chapters are that state attributes like represen-
tative institutions and bureaucratic quality affect states’ incentives and capacity to regulate
violence. Thus, in states lacking both, we would expect non-states conflicts to occur more
frequently. Further, I have put forth a set of hypothesises regarding the relationship between
regime change and non-state conflicts as well as how the effect of changes are expected to be
conditional upon bureaucratic quality. The objective of this chapter is to test these proposi-
tion. I will start off by presenting some bivariate statistics before I proceed to the results from
the multivariate analysis. The patterns emerging give support to the expectations regarding
bureaucratic and administrative state capacity. Regime change, when incorporating state
collapse, is also a strong predictor of non-state conflicts. Based on results from the analysis
I develop scenarios where I discuss in greater detail the patterns emerging.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the results, I will start by looking at the bivariate relationship between my
dependent variable and the explanatory variables. The bivariate relations found here should
be interpreted with caution as they obviously could be due to a third factor. However,
a bivariate examination will often detect major tendencies as well as provide preliminary
evidence regarding the hypothesis.
Figure 5.1 shows the global trend in non-state conflict from 1989-2008. The upper line is
the annual sum of non-state conflicts by the count dependent variable. The lower line is the
number of observations, or country years with non-state conflicts. While there seems to be
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Figure 5.1: Trends in non-state conflicts, counts and country years, 1989-2008
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an increase in non-state conflicts from 1989 and onwards, this increase might as well be due
to the start of recording than an actual increase. As some conflicts tend to span for several
year whereas other end the same year they started, the increase from 1989 becomes rather
natural. Although it remains just a speculation, the emergence of Europe’s new democracies
after the collapse of the Soviet Union could also be part of the explanation. As regime
changes often is associated with conflicts of interest, social unrest and political violence, the
major political alterations after 1989 could be associated with this increase. To summarize,
whether non-state conflicts is a time trend remains highly insecure as the time series is quite
short and annual observations and counts tend to fluctuate.1
Representative Institutions
According to Hypothesis H1, we would expect states with representative institution to have
less non-state conflicts because democratically elected leaders should have more incentives to
reduce tension and grievance between groups.
Figure 5.2 shows how the variable representative institutions is distributed over the observa-
tions of non-state conflicts. Just by looking at this plot, non-state conflicts are apparently
1The some relationship is somewhat also portrayed in the number of annual fatalities found in Figure 4.2.
74
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
phenomena that occur in both states with representative institutions and states without.
There is no clear tendency for non-state conflicts to be associated with low levels of rep-
resentative institution. From the theoretical expectation, the majority of the dots crossing
the threshold of one annual count should have been in lower right part of the plot. Judg-
ing by this plot, the actual occurrences of non-state conflicts are just as common in states
with representative institutions than states lacking them. For instance, Nigeria in 1999 and
Somalia in 2004 had respectively nine annual occurrences of non-state conflicts each. These
are the two ”outliers” in my data as they both represent the extreme values of yearly occur-
rences. While Somalia does not have representative institutions (or any other functioning
institutional structures), Nigeria possess some. In fact, Nigeria have a SIP of 0.65 in 1999,
which is above the global mean of 0.58 in 1999. This plot might reflect the same relation-
ship between representative institutions and intra state conflicts suggested by many scholars.
Having representative institutions does not necessarily bring civil peace when controlling for
other factors (See eg. Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Vreeland 2008; Hegre and Nyg˚ard 2014).
There are some limitations with drawing conclusions from the plot in Figure 5.2. The figure
only displays how annual counts is distributed. The plot does not give a nuanced picture
of how many counts actually belonging to types of political regimes. In Table 5.1 have
I categorized the observations and summarized the number of counts based on a threefold
distinction between political regimes. Judging by the number of counts, it becomes clear that
states experiencing several annual occurrences is more common in anocracies and autocracies
compared to democracies. The same relationship is displayed in Figure 5.4. By looking at
relative share, Figure 5.4 prevails a more nuanced picture of how annual counts is distrusted
among democracies, anocracies and autocracies. While having one annual occurrence of non-
state conflict is as common in democracies as autocracies, high counts are more frequent the
less open regimes.
Table 5.1: Non-state conflicts by representative institutions
Rep. Inst. N n Counts
Autocracy < 0.2 703 99 250
Anocracy ≥ 0.2 < 0.8 930 99 205
Democracy ≥ 0.8 1271 67 95
Total [0, 1] 2904 265 550
Source: Strand et al. (2012); Heston and Aten (2012);
Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014); GROWup (2014)
75
5.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Figure 5.2: Distribution of observations
by representative institutions
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of observations
by bureaucratic quality
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Bureaucratic and Administrative State Capacity
In Hypothesis H2 I put forth an expectation of low levels of bureaucratic and administrative
state capacity leads to more non-state conflicts. Figure 5.3 gives support for this proposition.
There is a clear tendency for observations with high counts to occur in states with low levels
of bureaucratic and administrative capacity. The pattern is much stronger than for repre-
sentative institutions and provides some preliminary evidence for the expectation regarding
bureaucratic capacity as precondition for governance.
In Table 5.2 I have categorized the variable bureaucratic quality by three levels based on one
standard error distance from the mean.2 The table provides some preliminary evidence with
regard to Hypothesis H2. States with high levels of bureaucratic capacity experience less
non-state conflicts compared to the other categories. States with low and medium levels of
bureaucratic quality tend to have more observations as well as higher counts. When looking
at the relative share of counts, non-state conflicts becomes phenomena of states characterized
by malfunctioning bureaucracies. The same relationship is portrayed in Figure 5.5 where high
counts occur more often within states with low or medium levels of bureaucratic quality.
2The mean for the variable is 0.05 and the standard error is 1.00
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Figure 5.4: Frequency of non-state conflicts by types of representative institutions
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For regime changes have I set forth a set of hypothesises. Hypothesis H3a expects a gen-
eral increase conflicts by regime change. I have chosen two indicators for this hypothesi,
one incorporating periods of state collapse and one not. Respectively are they named: state
collapse and regime change. Hypothesis H3b expects increase by autocratization. For de-
mocratization I have two competing hypothesises, where Hypothesis H3c expects an increase
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Table 5.2: Non-state conflicts by bureaucratic quality
Bur. Qual. N n Counts
Low < −0.953 344 81 203
Medium ≥ −0.953 < 1.056 2058 173 330
High ≥ 1.056 502 11 17
Total [−2.442, 2.5060] 2904 265 550
Source: Strand et al. (2012); Heston and Aten (2012); Hegre
and Nyg˚ard (2014); GROWup (2014)
and H3d a decrease.
In Table 5.3 I display how often non-state conflicts is observed by type of regime change. By
no surprise, the state collapse has the highest number of observations and counts of non-state
conflicts. This is largely due to the operationalization of the variable, as it is more inclusive
than the rest. However, there is also a theoretical expectation behind this. As state collapse
brings a security dilemma for groups, we would expect non-state conflicts to occur more
frequently. Thus, it gives some evidence for hypothesis H3a, but only when regime change
includes longer periods without a governing body. When regime change is operationalized
by excluding cases of ”stable” instability (state collapse), the picture is less clear whether
non-state conflicts is phenomenon associated with regime change. There is slightly tendency
for non-state conflicts to occur within the context of a regime change. By looking at the
number of counts, autocratic changes have the highest number. This could suggest that
direction of change matters as autocratization relatively tend to be more often associated
with conflict than democratization. Figures displaying the relative shares of counts over the
different indicators of are found in Appendix A.
5.2 Multivariate Regression Results
While descriptive statistics provides expectations about what to find in the analysis, the
actual explanatory of each argument will be tested in multivariate analysis. In the follow-
ing section I start off by presenting the unconditional hypothesis regarding representative
institutions, bureaucratic and administrative capacity and regime changes. Secondly I will
present the result from the conditional model where I allow bureaucratic and administrative
capacity to interact with regime changes. Results from the unconditional analysis are found
in Table 5.4 and the results from the conditional found in Table 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Occurrences of non-state violence by bureaucratic quality, histogram of
bureaucratic levels
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All result are estimated with a negative binomial regression. All models include controls for
population, income level, relevant groups and peace years. Results from a baseline model
with just the controls can be found in appendix A, table B.1. All independent variables are
lagged by one year in order strengthen causal inferences from the analysis.
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Table 5.3: Non-state conflicts by type of regime change
Type of change N n Counts
State Collapse 324 79 196
No State Collapse 2580 186 354
Total 2904 265 550
Regime Change 255 32 64
No Regime Change 2649 233 486
Total 2904 265 550
Autocratization 87 16 36
Democratization 168 16 28
No Demo. or Auto. 2649 233 486
Total 2904 265 550
Source: Strand et al. (2012); Heston and Aten (2012);
Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014); GROWup (2014)
5.2.1 Representative Institutions
In the theoretical framework I set out a hypothesis regarding how democratically elected
leaders occupy incentives that leads to (1) policies that reduce tension between groups and
(2) act in a neutral conflict reducing matter if conflicts erupted. My focus on incentives
rather than actions is based on existence of authoritarian regimes enhancing policies ben-
efitting the population at whole. In order to substantially distinguish these regimes from
each other, I have focused on how representative institutions put forth stronger incentives
for conflict and grievance reducing behaviors. The joint effect is summarized in Hypothesis
H1 : Representative institutions decrease the risk of non-state conflicts.
In my analysis, I find little support for the conflict reducing effect of representative institu-
tions. The estimate of 0.01 gives and odds ratio close to 1.00.3 This means that any increase
or decrease along the democracy- autocracy dimension leads to no change whatsoever in the
risk of non-state conflicts. This estimate is also highly insecure, manifested by large standard
errors. While the bivariate examination showed a clear tendency for non-state conflicts to
occur within less democratic states, the argument loses its power when tested against other
predictors. Figure 5.6 displays the predicted counts of non-state conflicts over representative
institutions when holding all other variables at their mean. The horizontalness of the line
and the huge confidence intervals displays the absent effect as well as the huge insecurity.
The non-importance of representative institutions in my analysis could be seen as an argu-
3Exp(0.01) = 1.01
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Table 5.4: Results, non-state conflicts 1989-2008
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −2.48∗∗ −1.91∗ −1.85∗
(0.82) (0.79) (0.81)
Rep. Inst. 0.01 0.01 0.07
(0.22) (0.07) (0.23)
Bur. Qual. −0.28∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
State Collapse 0.62∗∗∗
(0.16)
Regime Change 0.06
(0.20)
Autocratization 0.46†
(0.28)
Democratization −0.29
(0.28)
Population (ln) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.38∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Relevant groups −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peace Years −0.91∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Peace Years2 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −3.01∗∗∗ −3.07∗∗∗ −3.08∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.85) (0.85)
Theta θ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
N 2904 2904 2904
AIC 1833.40 1848.14 1846.40
BIC 2096.25 2110.99 2133.14
logL −872.70 −880.07 −875.20
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
ment in correspondence to the propositions that haunt and challenge the democratic peace
theory. By suggesting that both democracy and civil peace is the result of socio-economic
development, they reverse the causal argument about democracy and peace (Mousseau 2000,
2013; Gartzke 2007). Despite finding a bivariate tendency between representative institutions
and non-state conflicts, the variable have little explanatory power when other covariates are
included. In particular, the leverage and precision of income level indicator speaks in favors
of a socio-economic relation between non-state conflicts and absence of violence. However, it
is hard to dismiss representative institutions as an explanation of non-state conflicts. The re-
lationship between democracy, socio-economic development and collective violence are known
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to be complex. Or in the words of Hegre (2014, pg. 167): ”It would be premature to conclude
that development completely removes the importance of democratic institutions (...)” Despite
the non-importance in my analysis, I am reluctant to dismiss representative institutions as
an explanation for non-state conflicts.
Figure 5.6: Predicted counts over
representative institutions (Model 1)
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Figure 5.7: Predicted counts over
bureaucratic quality (Model 1)
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5.2.2 Bureaucratic and Administrative State Capacity
In Hypothesis H2 I expected states with low bureaucratic and administrative capacity to be
less able to govern. While representative institutions might equip states with good inten-
sions, intensions alone are not a sufficient cause for conflict reducing behaviors.. It might
be a necessary condition for good governance, but it is not sufficient one. That was why
I complemented the relationship between states and non-state conflicts with an additional
hypothesis regarding the capacity to fulfill actions. By making bureaucratic and administra-
tive capacity the pre-condition for governance, I put forth an expectation of how states with
strong bureaucratic and administrative capacity would have less non-state conflicts. Since
all state leaders ultimately prefer order over disorder, the accomplishment of order will be
easier when the administrative apparatus is functioning properly.
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In addition, low levels of bureaucratic and administrative capacity constitute a threat to
group’s security. It leads to mechanisms where state agents no longer fulfill their role as
providers of security. In the most perverted cases, state agents themselves become the source
of danger groups need protection from. Ultimately, this leads to a shift in the regulation
of violence from state-based to privately-based. Jointly, the ability to govern and groups’
interpretation of security, hinge upon the state’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity.
Hence, states with low levels bureaucratic and administrative capacity will have more non-
state conflicts.
In my analysis, this expectation is supported across all models. Increase in the indicator of
bureaucratic and administrative capacity leads to decrease in the risk of non-state conflicts.
Figure 5.7 displays this effect from model 1 when all other variables are kept at their mean.
The predicted number of non-state conflicts is 1.06 for states attaining the lowest level of
bureaucratic quality while it is 1.01 for states with the highest levels of bureaucratic quality.
This finding gives support to Hypothesis H2, where I expected a decrease in non-state conflicts
when levels of bureaucratic and administrative capacity rise.
The is some insecurity attached to the precision of this estimate. In the models including
state collapse as indicator of regime change, the respective magnitude of bureaucratic and
administrative capacity is reduced. Standard errors for bureaucratic and administrative ca-
pacity are higher in Model 1 and Model 3. I suspect the loss of precision in these two models
to be the result of co-linearity between the indicator of state collapse indicator and bureau-
cratic quality. Since the state collapse indicator include cases where ”(...) the scope of the
central authority was reduced to a few square blocks of Beirut (...)” (Jaggers, Gurr and Mar-
shall 2012, pg. 19), I suspect that it is difficult to discriminate between their relative effects.
Since a collapse of central authority consequently leads to a collapse of other institutional
structure (like the bureaucracy), I do believe that standard errors for bureaucracy quality
are slightly inflated in models including state collapse.
5.2.3 Regime Change
For regime change I have put forth a set of hypothesis. The first, Hypothesis H3a expect
regime change, independent of direction, leads to an increase in non-state conflicts. This is
because a state busy occupied reorganizing generates two mechanisms that together increase
the risk of non-state conflicts. Firstly, it provides opportunity and motivation for actors
seeking to increase their leverage. Secondly it leads to a deterioration of groups’ security
situation. A state busy occupied reorganizing will not have the means or priorities to provide
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security. To test Hypothesis H3a, whether regime change per se bring non-state conflicts, I
rely on the indicators state collapse and regime change. Whereas state collapse incorporates
longer time span without a governing body, the latter includes only actual year to year
movements along the autocracy-democracy dimension.
Regime Change per se
By no surprise, the indicator of state collapse proves to be significant across all my models.
In the unconditional models, it proves to be a strong predictor of non-state conflicts. Since
this indicator includes cases of state collapse, it confirms the theoretical expectation about
how about how anarchical settings lead to situations where groups have to rely on private
sources of security. When state structures are absent, protection has to be privately supplied.
Figure 5.8 shows the predicted probabilities from Model 1 when all other variables are kept
at their mean. It clearly shows that when regime change incorporate longer periods without
a governing body, conflicts between groups becomes more likely.
Figure 5.8: Predicted counts over of
state collapse (Model 1)
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Figure 5.9: Predicted counts over regime
change (Model 2)
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Figure 5.8 differs from Figure 5.9 with regards to its definition of regime change. While they
both put forth a relationship where change matters, the right panel does not encompass long
periods without governing bodies as a regime change. It focus solely on how a difference
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in institutional structures previous year leads to a potential increase in non-state conflicts.
When I test the effect of regime change by using this indicator, I find no relationship. Model
2 reports a highly insecure estimate with effect. Since the results in Model 1 and Model
2 differs, it displays that competing definitions and different indicators leads to situations
where regime change is a phenomenon related to non-state conflicts or not. Figure 5.9 and
Figure 5.8 display the effect of the two indicators on the risk of non-state conflicts when all
other variables are kept at their mean. The state collapse indicator has a clear effect, whereas
the less inclusive regime change has little. The two figures also tell a story about how precise
the estimates are, where there is a higher degree of uncertainty linked to the less inclusive
indicator.
Figure 5.10: Predicted counts over
autocratization (Model 3)
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Figure 5.11: Predicted counts over
democratization (Model 3)
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Direction of Regime Change
In Model 3 I have tested whether the direction of change matters when explaining non-state
conflicts. The estimate behaves like expected for the hypothesis regarding the relationship
between autocratization and non-state conflicts. Hypothesis H3b expects autocratization to
lead to an increase in non-state conflicts. This was due to the narrowing nature of autocrati-
zation as it tends to decrease policies favoring the population at whole. Since autocratization
favors the few over the many, it provides groups with motivation to resist it. This leads to two
mechanisms jointly increasing the risk of non-state conflicts. Since autocratization narrows
down the regime’s support base, it alters the proportion of the population supporting the
regime. Since this is likely to cause grievance, autocrats need to ensure that support base
is loyal. This leads to a trade where support is backed up by putting forth policies favoring
the support base. When doing so, the seeds of tension are sowed between the favored and
un-favored. Secondly, groups can signalize their disloyalty by challenging the new polity’s
monopoly of violence. By penalizing other groups, they signalize that an autocratization
will not be met by compliance. Since regime change tend to destabilize state structures, the
combination of opportunities for violence and dissatisfaction leads to an increase in non-state
conflicts.
For democratization, I put forth two hypotheses with diverging expectations. Democra-
tization could both lead to increase and decrease of non-state conflicts. As suggested by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), democratization works differently depending upon point of
departure. When this argument is applied to non-state conflicts, it gives a logic where the
governing elite repress if they have much too loose from a political opening. If not, the costs
of repression surpass the benefits. In this case, democratization becomes an admission of
failure on behalf of the elites. Hence, they will not fight against an opening. For non-state
conflicts, groups affiliated with the governing elite will either much or little too loose from
democratization. If they have much to lose, they posit incentives to fight off groups threat-
ening their position. This causes democratization to lead to an increase in non-state because
groups it increases tension between groups. However, when the favored group considers the
cost of repression higher than their disadvantage caused by democratization, the transition
process brings less violence.
I test the three hypotheses regarding direction of change in Model 3. I find some support for
the autocratization hypothesis. The estimates take the expected direction, but the estimate
is imprecise, with high standard errors. It barely crosses the 10% significance level, suggesting
high levels of insecurity. Figure 5.10 shows how autocratization leads to a decrease in non-
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state conflicts. Model 3 favors the hypotheses suggesting a decrease in non-state conflicts
by democratization. The estimate takes a negative value, but high standard errors leads to
a questioning of its certainty. Figure 5.11 reflects the decreasing effect, but also its lack of
precision as the confidence interval is broad.
5.2.4 Control Variables
The control variables all behave like expected. The only one that do not prove to be significant
was the indicator of relevant groups. Figure 5.12 shows the marginal effect as well and the
respective confidence interval for each included variable in Model 3.
The controls for population size and income behave like expected. They correspond to
the findings within the broader conflict literature. Throughout all my models, including the
conditional models, population size and income levels are the strongest predictors of non-state
conflicts. As within the broader conflict literature, non-state conflicts are also a phenomena
more frequently associated with poor and populous countries.
Peace year is also significant across all my models; suggesting states’ proximity to previous
conflict is of importance. The significance of the peace year variable large corresponds to the
proposition conflict legacy to be of importance when explanting new outbreaks.
The only control that does not have any impact is the variable counting the number of
relevant groups. This means that number of potential conflict dyad have little leverage in
explaining non-state conflicts when controlled for other factors. This control was somewhat
a ”wild card” compared to other controls. Although there were some expectations regarding
its potential leverage, I did not anticipate this control to trump other robust controls.
5.2.5 Regime Change by Bureaucratic and Administrative State
Capacity
Table 5.5 assess hypothesis H4, regarding whether regime change is conditional upon bu-
reaucratic and administrative capacity. The models included here investigate whether the
combined effect of regime changes and bureaucratic and administrative capacity mediates
the risk of non-state conflicts. All the models in Table 5.5 include a conditional term, mak-
ing the interpretation regime change on the increase of non-state conflicts dependent upon
bureaucratic quality.
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Figure 5.12: Marginal effects (Model 3)
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Figure 5.13: Marginal effects (Model 6)
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Since bureaucratic and administrative state capacity often is defined as the ability to govern
thorough political changes (See eg. Skocpol 1979; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Schock 1996;
Knack 2001) I would expect that the effect of regime change to be conditional upon this aspect
of state capacity. This proposition is not supported in any of my models. The interaction
terms fail to be significant across all models. Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 display the effect of
democratization and autocratization by bureaucratic quality. Since the confidence intervals
overlap and the estimates are very high, there do not seem to be any conditional effect of
regime change by bureaucratic and administrative state capacity.
This non-finding needs some probing. Could it be that only high levels of bureaucratic quality
enable states to avoid the conflict increasing potential of regime change? The non-finding
could also be due to the inclusiveness of the indicator. It entails more aspects than just the
ability to govern through changes. Since regime change only proved to be an explanatory
when including state collapses it causes me to bring up this question. It also raise a question
of endogenity as a non-state conflict could be the reason to states levels of bureaucratic
quality and administrative capacity.
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Table 5.5: Results conditional model, non-state conflicts 1989-2008
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Intercept) −2.46∗∗ −1.97∗ −1.92∗
(0.81) (0.80) (0.81)
Rep. Inst. 0.01 0.01 0.10
(0.17) (0.16) (0.23)
Bur. Qual −0.23∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
State Collapse 0.44†
(0.23)
Bur. Qual. * State Collapse −0.19
(0.18)
Regime Change 0.15
(0.24)
Bur. Qual. * Regime Change 0.14
(0.22)
Democratization −0.13
(0.30)
Autocratization 0.58
(0.39)
Bur. Qual. * Auto. 0.15
(0.33)
Bur. Qual. * Demo. 0.38
(0.32)
Population (ln) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.37∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Relevant Groups −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peace Years −0.90∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Peace Years2 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −2.98∗∗∗ −3.05∗∗∗ −3.05∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.85) (0.85)
Theta θ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
N 2904 2904 2904
AIC 1834.19 1849.71 1848.79
BIC 2120.93 2136.45 2183.33
logL −869.09 −876.85 −868.40
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Figure 5.14: Predicted counts over
autocratization by bureaucratic quality
(Model 6)
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Figure 5.15: Predicted counts over
democratization bureaucratic quality
(Model 6)
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5.3 Probing the Results: Quantities of Interest
In the former section I have only addressed the effect of the explanatory variable when other
variables were kept at their means. By doing so, it enabled me to isolate their respective
effect on the dependent variable. However, this approach provides a somewhat less nuanced
picture as the global means do not necessarily represent substantially interesting values. In
order to provide a nuanced picture, I follow the recommendations from King, Tomz and
Wittenberg (2000) in simulating quantities of interest. Given my research question, and
the results from the analysis, I simulate the probability of non-state conflicts when levels of
bureaucratic quality differ and regime change occurs. For each simulation I will provide a
discussion on how they relate to hypothesis put forth. I will address the effect of the estimate
and the uncertainty attached to it.
From the broader conflict literature we know that some states are constantly at higher risk
for armed conflict than others. Common for these countries are that they do not represent
the global mean. The inhabiting certain characteristic that makes armed conflicts likely.
Among the explanatory variables I have put forth, bureaucratic quality has proven to be the
most robust indicator. Based on values from this indicator I will construct three scenarios
where I examine the effect of regime for states than are in the risk zone and states that are
not. This approach allows from a more substantial interpretation of the results as it allows
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for a comparison between states that are predisposed for conflicts and states that are not.
Based on the separation between ”low” and ”high” levels on the variable of bureaucratic
quality I have constructed two imaginary states which inhabit certain characteristics that
make them at ”high” or ”low” risk for experiencing non-state conflicts. This categorization
is the same found in Section 5.1.4 Based on this separation I find the mean for each respective
explanatory variable within the two categories. These mean values are presented in Table 5.6.
By doing so, it becomes clearer that states with low levels of bureaucratic quality differ from
states with high levels. For instance, the average peacespell is 9.23 years for states with high
bureaucratic quality and 4.21 for states with low. This shows that conflicts more frequently
erupt in states with low bureaucratic levels. Further, the high risk category diverges from
the low risk category by the robust predictors from the broader conflict literature. It has a
higher population and a lower income level. Although these two states do exist in reality,
they are useful theoretical constructs. They provide substantial meaning as they inhabit
characteristics from stereotypes of states associated with high and low levels of conflict.
Table 5.6: Scenario values for states with low and high risk for non-state conflicts
Low risk High risk
Bur. Qual. [−2.44, 2.51] [−2.44, 2.51]
Rep. Inst. 0.91 0.30
GDP per cap (ln) 10.09 6.98
Population (ln) 9.58 9.15
Rel. Groups 2.60 4.15
Peace Years 9.23 4.21
Democratization 0.01 0.09
Autocratization 0.00 0.08
I apply three different scenarios where I predicted the probability of non-state conflicts within
for the two imaginary states. The use of predicted probabilities somewhat resembles an
experiment. I can isolate the effect of the explanatory variables on different groups, or set of
states. The scenarios I have chosen to expose them to are: state collapse, democratization
and autocratization. I have chosen these scenarios based on the results from the analysis.
These were the explanatory variables proving to have the most leverage. Thus, I will proceed
by examining them. In each scenario I allow the level of bureaucratic quality and regime
change vary while all other variables correspond to the means within the risk sets. For each
scenario I will provide a discussion of the explanatory variable’s leverage.
4The low and high category represent those states that either are one standard error higher or below the
mean of the bureaucratic quality variable
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5.3.1 Regime Change per se: State Collapse
In Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17 I display the effect of state collapse for the two imaginary
states.5 A general comparison of the figures tells how an increase in bureaucratic levels leads
to a decreasing risk of evolving non-state conflicts for both risk sets. This corresponds to the
robust finding of bureaucratic and administrative from the multivariate analysis.
What is interesting is how they differ when they are ”treated” (this is after all an experiment)
with state collapse. The situation immediately becomes more severe for the state inhabiting
unfavorable characteristics. For the rich and less populated state, the effect of state collapse
hardly leads to any increase in the risk of evolving non-state conflicts. This is due to the
rather unreal scenario where a state, says Sweden, should experience a state collapse. If
government structures where to disappear overnight in Sweden, it inhabits characteristics
that make the probability of evolving non-state conflicts very unlikely.
One real life example resembling the unfavorable state is Liberia. It is an intermediate regime
in the lower anocracy range, quite populous and quite poor. Since the start of the 1980s,
Liberia has been in a state of turmoil. The situation took a dramatic shift in 1989 when the
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attempted to topple Samuel Doe’s
regime and re-institute democracy. After the attempt, Liberia became a divided country
ravaged by armed conflicts. While the endeavor to overturn Doe’s regime led to a full
scale civil war, clashes between non-state actors also evolved. One example is the internal
disagreement within the NPFL leading to a splintering of the movement. As a product
of the disagreements, Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) emerged.
Consequently, NPFL and INPFL clashed (UCDP 2014). While clashes between different
rebel factions are quite common within a shattered state (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour
2012; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012), the clash between
NPFL and INPFL represents only the tip of the iceberg of non-state actors clashing in the
aftermath of the state collapse.
While the struggle between armed groups in Liberia often have been portrayed as fights over
natural resources and government power (Ross 2004b), other scholars have argued that was
the weak institutional structures that led to the fighting (Ellis 1995; Duffield 1998). By
looking more closely at Liberia’s non-state conflicts, the majority occurred within the state
collapse brought forth by the civil war. The breakdown of central authority ”(...) produced a
mosaic of militia zones of control, where civilians have some degree of protection but must pay
tribute in kind to the local warlord, and constantly shifting frontier zones in which civilians
5Based on estimates from model 1.
92
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
Figure 5.16: Scenario 1: State collapse
for a state at high risk
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Figure 5.17: Scenario 1: State collapse for a
state at low risk
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are liable to raiding from all sides” (Ellis 1995, pg. 185). This case clearly speaks in favor of
the state collapse hypothesis and the bureaucratic and administrative state capacity thesis.
When states resemble the Hobbesian ”nature condition”, violence will occur more frequently
between groups. While some groups fight over government power, others are left in security
dilemma, consequently leading them to take up arms. In the shadow of an absent state,
security has to be privately supplied, leading to the armament of groups.
One false positive case of the theory is Azerbaijan. With the dissolvent of the Soviet Union,
Azerbaijan regained its independence under less than ideal and orderly conditions. Their
internal characteristics for Azerbaijan in 1993 resembles the imaginary state predisposed for
conflicts. There is one exception, and that is the number of citizens: Azerbaijan is not so
populous. In 1993 Azerbaijan is recorded with an observation on the state collapse variable.
This was due to a overthrow of the democratic elected president Elchibey by former Soviet
military officers (Cornell 2001). Despite this, Azerbaijan did not have any non-state conflicts.
This suggests that regime change does automatically bring non-state conflicts. However, it
often brings a destabilizing situation where armed conflicts are more likely to erupt. While
it in the Liberian case resulted in both non-state conflicts and civil war, it ”only” resulted to
a state-based conflict for Azerbaijan. Findings from Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) supports
my argument about opportunities of violence emanated from political instability. While
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they investigate civil wars, the same logic is applied. Gleditsch and Ruggeri find that the
interregnum category and the transition category of the Polity Index is strongly associated
with an increase in the risk of civil conflict.
To summarize, state collapse is a situation of regime change that causes non-state conflicts
to erupt. For states with unfavorable characteristic, the effect of state collapse is likely to
bring non-state conflicts. While it did not do so in the case of Azerbaijan, the explanatory
power of the state collapse argument still stands strong. Regime change, defined to include
state collapse, is a highly unstable condition where non-state conflicts significantly evolve.
Estimates from my analysis signal that state collapse causes non-state conflicts. A state
collapse brings opportunities groups seeking government office and for those that do it leads
to a deterioration of security. For rebel groups it is a situation where future leverage hinges
on the ability to fight of other rivals. For other non-state actors it leads to security dilemma
where the solution is to privately supply security. When these two mechanisms operate
together, or separately, it leads to an increase in non-state conflicts. These findings give
support to Hypothesis H1 ; stating regime change leads to increase in non-state conflicts.
However, it is just in the cases where regime change incorporate longer periods without a
governing body that it regime change increase the risk of non-state conflicts.
5.3.2 Direction of Change: Autocratization
In Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 I display the effect of an autocratization for the two risk sets.6
Once again, higher levels of bureaucratic quality are associated with less non-state conflicts.
What makes these two figures differ are the predicted probability of conflicts during an
autocratic transition. The predicted number of yearly counts for a high risk state with low
bureaucratic levels going through an autocratization is 0.55. For a state that lack the internal
characteristics associated with conflicts, the predicted yearly occurrences is 0.07 at the same
level of bureaucratic quality. This means that over 100 occurrences of autocratization, the
high risk state will have 55 non-state conflicts and the low risk state will have 7. However,
these numbers should be interpreted with caution. Results from Model 3 suggest that the
estimate is not bomber proof, only significant at the 10% level.
I will draw on an example from the Ivory Coast’s presidential election of 2001 to explain
how autocratization directly can lead to fighting between non-state actors. The country
inhabits characteristics that make it disposed for conflicts. The lead up to the election
6Based on estimates from Model 3.
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Figure 5.18: Scenario 2: Autocratization
for a state at high risk
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Figure 5.19: Scenario 2: Autocratization for a
state at low risk
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was marked by civil unrest. A newly approved constitutional change narrowed down the
potential candidates allowed to run for office. Eligibility required that both parents of the
candidate were born within the country. The consequence was a disqualification of 70% of
the candidates. Due to his alleged Burkinabe´ nationality, the candidate representing RDR
(Rassemblement des Re´publicains de Coˆte d’Ivoire), Alassane Ouattar was disqualified. This
led supporters of RDR and Alassane Ouattar to call the election a fraud, hence claiming new
elections. Reluctant to lose his position, President Laurent Gbagbo refused the opposition’s
claims. In aftermaths, tension between supporters of Alassane Ouattar and Laurent Gbagbo
lead to bloody street battles with more than 30 persons killed (Toungara 2001; UCDP 2014).
According to predictions for countries resembling the Ivory Coast, more than half of the
cases of autocratization would bring non-state conflicts. While the non-state conflicts in the
Ivory Coast is directly traceable back to the shrinkage of the political sphere, the causal link
between autocratization and non-state conflicts is in other cases dubious.
One example casting doubts about a causal path between autocratic transition and non-
state conflicts is Cameroon. In my dataset, Cameroon is recorded with a total count of five
non-state conflicts. One of these counts occurs within the context of an autocratization. In
1998 Cameroon is recorded with a conflict between the Bafanji and Balikumbat tribes. The
95
5.3. PROBING THE RESULTS: QUANTITIES OF INTEREST
origins of this conflict go back to the 1960s, based on division of land. In 1998 the tension was
triggered by a quarrel between Balikumbat locals and a Bafanji traditional chief, in which
the car of the chief was seized. While it seems rather arbitrary that a car seizure would
lead to more than 50 persons killed, the hostility between the groups had existed for long
(UCDP 2014). However, the origins of this particular conflict bring up a discussion of causal
relations. It clearly does not speak in favor of a causal relationship between autocratization
and non-state conflicts.
Whether autocratization leads to non-state conflicts remains unclear. Based on my analysis
I am reluctant to draw this conclusion. What I find is that autocratization is strongly
associated with non-state conflicts. The reason why I emphasis on associated is by closer
examination of the particular states that have simultaneous observations of non-state conflicts
and autocratization. These states tend to already be haunted by armed conflicts. Together,
the coincidence of non-state conflicts and autocratization makes up a total of 36 counts,
distributed between 14 different states.7 Most of these observations are states that to already
have a ponderous legacy of armed conflicts. The observations include states like Somalia,
Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan and Iraq. The dyads, or warring parties, that make up the counts
for these observations are often conflicts that originated long before autocratic transition.
Some of them might have inactive for a while, but the origin of tension goes beyond the
autocratization argument.
From Hegre et al. (2001) we know that proximity to change often leads to a new change.
The road towards consolidation is long and troubled. Within the two categories of imaginary
states I have examined, the average number of years since last regime change (both democratic
and autocratic transition) is 62.77 for the low risk state and 7.87 for the high risk state.8
These two numbers gives a more nuanced picture between the probability of autocratization
and the eruption of non-state conflicts. Since change more frequently occur within the state
predisposed for conflicts, it adds more doubt to the causal argument between autocratization
and non-state conflicts.
Based on the issues put forth, I fail to find any support for Hypothesis H3b. While au-
tocratization is strongly associated with non-state conflicts, it fails as a causal argument.
By more thoroughly probing the observations of non-state conflicts within the context of an
autocratic transition, the causal argument is highly speculative. While non-state conflicts in
7These states are Russia, Niger, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, DR Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia,
South Africa, Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan
8These values are based on the more restrictive operationalization of regime change. For the regime change
indicator incorporating state collapse, the numbers are slightly altered. For the low risk state the average
number of years since change is 63.03. For the high risk state it is 6.92 years.
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some case are the results of autocratization, as with the Ivory Coast, the majority of their
origins go beyond an autocratic transition. States like Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan
and Iraq are already so fiercely stricken by other aspects associated non-state conflicts and
political instability. In these cases, adding an authorization to the context is not necessarily
the cause needed for conflicts to turn violent. Hence, a causal path between autocratization
and non-state conflicts is an argument without leverage in my analysis.
5.3.3 Direction of Change: Democratization
In Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21 I have simulated the expected number of non-state con-
flicts over various levels of bureaucratic quality when democratization occurs. The overall
picture once again tells a story about the conflict reducing effect of bureaucratic quality.
This is true for both the favorable and unfavorable state. Results from Model 3 suggest a
negative relationship between democratization and non-state conflicts. The two figures also
display this relationship as the blue line of democratization is lower than the red line of non-
democratization. For the conflict prone state, with low levels of bureaucratic quality, the
expected count of conflicts is 1.23 under democratization. For the non-conflict prone state
with similar low of bureaucratic quality, the same number is 1.02. Over a 100 occurrence
of democratization, it leads to 123 non-state conflicts for the state at risk, while it leads to
102 occurrences for the state not depositing conflict related characteristics. While this might
seem like a drastic effect, there is an also high level of uncertainty attached to it. From the
figure we see this as overlapping confidence intervals. Results from Model 3 in Table 5.4 tell
the same story; the estimate does not reach significance at the 10% level.
One country sharing characteristics with the imaginary state at risk is Mexico. While Mexico
differs from the average high risk state by its level of representative institutions, it has all
the other aspects that makes it predisposed for conflicts. I will use Mexico as an example
because the country became increasingly democratic since 1989. It is recorded with demo-
cratic transitions in 1994, 1999 and 2000.9 There is another reason for choosing Mexico as
well: it has observations of non-state conflicts outside the years of democratization.
The democratic transitions recorded for Mexico in 1995 was due to an increase in the political
participation component. In the mid-1990s, elections become increasingly free. The former
practice had favored the Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP), whom had enjoyed absolute
majority in the legislative from 1929. Their electoral victories had often involved fraudulent
9In the analysis these values occur by a one year lag structure.
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Figure 5.20: Scenario 3: Democratization
for a state at high risk
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Figure 5.21: Scenario 3: Democratization for
a state not at low risk
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practices. 1995 marked the first year where opposition parties had a fair chance of winning
when running for seats. The elections following the mid-1990s changes led to an end of
IRP’s hegemonic position. The Democratic Revolutionary Party (DRP) and the National
Action Party (NAP) won seats in the legislative and became established actors pushing
forth political openings. The recorded transition in 1999 and 2000 are due to increasing
constrains on executive powers. From being one-party state to include opposition parties
in the legislative, the Mexican Presidency had to operate under higher levels of partisan
constrains (CSR 2010).
According to the predictions in Figure 5.20 democratization should lead to a decrease in
non-state conflicts in states resembling Mexico. The country is recorded with democratic
transition in 1995, 2000 and 2001 and non-state conflicts outside the transitory years. The
majority of these clashes were between drug cartels over stakes in the illegal drug industry
(Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012). Since the non-state conflicts in Mexico erupted outside the
democratic transition, it could be a manifestation of the negative estimates of democratization
from Model 3 in Table 5.4. It could also be a pure coincidence, as the estimates have
high standard errors. When looking more thoroughly into the Mexican case, none of these
explanations seem plausible. Did democratization led to more non-state conflicts in Mexico?
After all, there is a profound discourse within the literature suggesting a conflict increasing
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effect of democratization. I would argue that the conflicts in Mexico cannot be understood
without investigating Mexico’s political opening.
For instance, O’Neil (2009) argues that Mexico’s political opening in the late 1980s and
1990s subsequently lead to clashes between the drug cartels. O’Neil finds two mechanisms
leading to this. Firstly, the democratic transition proved to be an opportunity for the drug
organizations to gain autonomy. It hampered the state’s capacity to act against the drug
cartels, tilting the balance of power from politicians to criminals. Secondly, the democratic
transition altered internal relations and dynamics between the drug cartels. With the end
of IRP’s hegemony came also the end of a state pervaded of corruption, patronage and fund
raising. So did the former the patron-client relationships between the government and the
drug traffickers. With a government not capable of stopping violence, drug cartels started
fighting each other for control over territory and previous alliances (UCDP 2014). In this
case, the reorganizing of the state structures, through a democratic transition, led to an
increase in non-state conflicts.
I would argue that Mexico represents a case where the starting point of democratization is
of importance. Mexico had a bad starting point. When looking into the countries where
democratization coincides with non-state conflicts and where it does not, the countries have
rather different characteristics. The countries going through democratization without the
occurrence of non-state conflicts do relatively inhabit characteristics less associated with
conflict. When democratization and non-state conflicts coincide, the state inhabiting unfa-
vorable characteristics have a high risk of erupting conflicts. For example, the mean SIP
value for the countries going through a peaceful democratization is 0.60. For those that did
not, the mean value is 0.47. For income level, population and proximity to previous conflict
the pattern is the same.10 This means that diverged upon point of departure for democra-
tization. Since the results report the global mean, this nuance may be lost in a sample. It
is highly speculative, but the uncertainty attached to the estimate may reflect the different
dynamics inherited from different starting points.
The findings give some support to arguments offered by scholars emphasising the importance
diverging starting points (See eg. Przeworski 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Collier
1999). With a bad starting point, democratization will bring conflicts. After scrutinizing the
observations that coincide with peaceful vs non-peaceful democratization, states diverge by
10For income, the mean GDP per capita values (log transformed) on are 7.20 and 7.79 for the peaceful
transitory states vs the non-peaceful transitory state. For peacespells the values are 2.31 years and 6.47
years. For population the values are 10.41 and 9.07 (log transformed). For the bureaucratic quality variable
the levels are -0.36 and -0.41.
99
5.4. SUMMARY
point of departure before transition. Relatively have the majority of transition have happened
in states with favorable conditions. This is reflected in the global negative effect of democra-
tization. I interpret the negative estimate as a support of the argument offered by scholars
that emphasis on different starting points for democratization. However, the uncertainty
attached to estimates is very. Based on the uncertainty, I find some support for Hypothesis
H3d, stating a negative relationship between non-state conflicts and democratization.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter I have investigated bivariate and multivariate relations between a set of
explanatory variables and non-state conflicts. In general, I find two distinct patterns across
my models. Firstly, bureaucratic and administrative state capacity is a robust indicator
of non-state conflicts. Secondly, regime change, when incorporating state collapse is also a
robust indicator.
Hypothesis H1 expected states with representative political institutions to have less non-state
conflicts because they inhabit incentives to reduce and solve grievance between groups. In
my analysis, I do not find any support for this relationship. While there is bivariate tendency
for non-state conflicts to erupt in non-democratic states, the leverage of the argument fails
when tested in the multivariate analysis. Based on this result I must reject Hypothesis
H1. However, the rejection does not come without a note of caution. Since representative
institutions are known to be an important stimuli for economic development, the might be
a democratic effect hidden in other indicators. It is highly possible that the indicators of
income and bureaucratic quality have some hidden democratic legacy.
Bureaucratic and administrative state capacity is a predictor robust across all my models.
This is in line with the theoretical framework put forth. When states lack the capacity to
govern it leads to an increase in non-state conflicts. Thus, Hypothesis H2 is supported.
State’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity affects (1) the state’s ability to govern and
(2) group’s interpretation of their security status. With a malfunctioning bureaucracy states
no longer possess the capacity to govern their societies. Since even the most non-democratic
state prefer order over disorder, the lack of the instrument needed for governance leads to
more conflicts. For non-state actors, a malfunctioning bureaucracy leads to deterioration their
security status. When groups do no interpret the state as an actor they rely on protection
from, protection have to privately supplied. Hence, a state with weak bureaucratic and
administrative state capacity will have less ability to solve conflicts as well as it leads to an
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armament of groups. Jointly, this leads to an increase in non-state conflicts.
For Hypothesis H3a I expected a general increase in non-state conflicts in transitional pe-
riods. The provision of both opportunity and motivation would lead dissatisfied actors into
conflicts for political leverage. A state occupied re-organizing provides both motivation and
opportunity for conflicts. In addition, regime change alters group’s security. In my results, I
find support for Hypothesis H3a under certain conditions. When regime change incorporates
periods without a governing body, regime change leads to an increase in non-state conflicts.
The anarchic setting of a state collapse leads to a Hobbesian ”state of nature”, where protec-
tion have to be privately supplied. When regime change does not incorporate longer periods
without a governing
I have put forth Hypothesis H3b, H3c, H3d to address whether direction of change matters
for the relationship between non-state conflicts and political transition. I find some support
for Hypothesis H3b. There is a slightly tendency for non-state conflicts to be associated with
the context of an autocratization. After scrutinizing the result I find that autocratization in
very few cases is actual reason why non-state actors fight each other. Many of the warring
parties that clash under the process of autocratic transition have a history of tension prior to
the autocratization. While autocratization is associated with non-state conflicts, the origin
of the conflicts often goes beyond the autocratization itself. There is one additional issue
weakening the autocratic argument. From our prior knowledge about conflicts we know that
proximity to change leads increases the risk of new change. For the states that experience
non-state conflicts the spatial distance to prior conflict was little. On this basis I find that
autocratization is associated with non-state conflicts due other dynamics that often go beyond
the autocratization itself.
For democratic transition, I have set out two competing hypotheses. Hypothesis H3c expect
an increase in non-state conflicts and Hypothesis H3d expect a decrease. While there is
no significant support for any of them, the negative coefficient could speak in favor of a
conflict reducing effect of democratization. In my data set I have a preponderance of peaceful
democratic transition compared to non-peaceful transitions. Consequently, this leads to a
negative relation between democratization and conflict. However, this correlation does not
sufficiently explain why I find a negative relationship between democratization and non-state
conflicts. An aspect I find of importance is how states diverge when they enter democratic
transitions. After scrutinizing the cases where transition coincide with non-state conflicts this
argument about diverging starting point gains leverage. The peaceful transitory countries
had an initial staring point with the mechanisms speaking in favor of a peaceful transition.
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Hypothesis H4 suggested a conditional relationship between regime change and non-state
conflicts. I fail to find such a relationship in my analysis.
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Chapter 6
Model Diagnostics and Robustness
To ensure that my results are not driven by the choice of indicators and estimation techniques,
I will address some issues that potentially could alter the inferences made in the previous
chapter. This chapter is somewhat a trial of strength as I test the robustness of my result.
I will start off by looking more closely into the model I have chosen for my analysis. While I
in the previous chapter cared about magnitude and precision of the estimates, I will in this
chapter address how well the model explains variation in the data. This is important because
inferences from a badly specified model will in consequence be dubious. Lastly, I will expose
my hypothesis to alternative specifications. If results hold when including new indicators for
the same concepts, it serves to strengthen the theoretical argument.
6.1 Measure of Fit
In order to evaluate my chosen research design, I will start off by addressing how the models
preform in describing the data. I will carry out this by investigate three issues related to the
models’ fit. Firstly, I will examine the adequacy of the model by looking at the relationship
between predicted values and observed values. Secondly, I will address how non-dependency
assumptions underlying the models are met. Lastly, I investigate whether certain observations
alter the regression coefficients.
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6.1.1 Adequacy of the Model
In order to investigate the predictive power of my models, I will apply the Aike Information
Criterion (AIC) for the non-nested models and the log-likelihood test for the nested models.
Together, these measures assess the in-sample predictive power of the models.
The AIC is an indicator whom can be used to evaluate the efficiency of models in explaining
variation. Compared to the Log-Likelihood, the AIC punish the inclusion of additional
variables.1 Since my models include hypothesis that are not nested, the indicator can be
used to find the model, or hypothesis, that explains most of the variation in the data. For
models that are nested, the difference in log-likelihood can be used to evaluate whether
inclusion of new covariates significantly make models perform better (Ward, Greenhill and
Bakke 2010)
All my models are nested in the baseline negative binomial model found in Appendix A,
Table B.1. The baseline model includes only the controls. Judging by AICs, the inclusion of
explanatory variables rise the in-sample predictive capability across all models. The model
with the lowest, or best, AIC value is Model 1 in Table 5.4. It becomes clear that the anarchic
setting of a state collapse explains most variation in the dependent variable. Model 1 has a
lower AIC than the models assessing regime change per se and direction of regime change.
For the conditional hypothesis in Table 5.5, the AIC values increases when compared to the
unconditional models. Since the conditional hypothesis was rejected, the models in Table 5.5
are accompanied with an increase in AIC.
Having established Model 1 as most efficient, the log-likelihood test can be used to evaluate
performance among the nested models. This leads to an evaluation of the Baseline Models vs
Model 1 and the Baseline Model vs Model 2 and Model 3.2 Since we already know that the
inclusion of covariates lead to an increase predictive power for all the models, the utility of
log-likelihood test lies in the comparison between Model 2 and Model 3. In these two models
I addressed whether regime change per se brings conflict or whether direction of change also
needed to be included. Since the direction of change, and in particular autocratic transition,
proved to have some leverage, the difference in log-likelihood is significant between Model 2
and Model 3. Results from the test can be found in Appendix B, B.9.
1The inclusion of additional variables always will explain more variation (but on the expense of inaccurate
estimates), making the AIC a criterion addressing efficiency
2It can also be used to assess whether the inclusion of a interaction term leads to a better model or not.
Since the conditional hypothesis have been rejected, the log-likelihood difference is also of non-significance.
The log-likelihood test for the unconditional vs conditional models can be found i Appendix B, Table B.6,
B.7, B.8.
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6.1.2 Temporal and Spatial Dependency Among Observations
One of the crucial underlying assumptions behind the negative binomial model is the indepen-
dency of observations. While I to some extent have addressed this previously by including
peacespells as dependent variables, the peacespells only adjust the estimates according to
the proximity to last conflict occurrence. When investigating the models’ fit, dependency is
linked to assumptions about the error term. An examination of the error term is important
since it relates both to inference from the model and efficiency of estimates (White 1980;
Long 1997; Kennedy 2003).
There are many potential dependency traps in my data. For instance, the increasing pro-
portion of democratic states since 1989 rise the question of time dependency.3 Another, and
perhaps more important for my analysis, is dependency within states. Since my theoretical
framework addresses state attributes as explanations for non-state conflicts, I automatically
presume some state-based dependency.
When studying non-state conflicts at the state level, there exist many conceivable dependen-
cies. Conflicts tend to re-occur among the same parties as well as within the same state,
leading to both temporal and sectional dependency for the observations. In Mexico, the
fighting between the Gulf Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel occurred in 2004, 2005 and 2008. Obvi-
ously, there exist dependencies among the dyads that make up the counts. Another potential
dependency is how clashes between two non-state actors evolve into new warring dyads. For
instance, the major fault line in Nigeria is based on religious affiliation. UCDP have recorded
a total of six clashed between Christians and Muslims from 1989-2008. When looking more
thoroughly into to the Nigerian case, it becomes clear that this is more complex than clashes
between different religious groups. Below the surface of Christian and Muslim affiliation, each
party represents a myriad of ethnic groups. When clashes between Christian and Muslims are
recorded in the UCDP system, they often coincide with fighting between other ethnic groups
whom also are recorded within the UCDP system. Certainly there exists some dependency
between these dyads and between states.
Since non-state conflicts do not evolve in a vacuum, a time section analysis like mine must
address how dependency in the error term potentially violate the models’ assumption about
a simple stochastic error process. I need to account for both heteroscedasticy and autocor-
relation in the error term. By adjusting the variance-covariance matrix I can correct for the
potential of temporal and spatial dependencies in the error term. This is often referred to as
”robust” standard errors (White 1980).
3See Figure 4.4 in Section 4.3.4.
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In Appendix B, Table B.2, B.3 and B.4 I have reported the results from Model 1, Model 2
and Model 3 with robust standard errors.4 While applying robust standard errors lead to
some loss of accuracy, the substantial interpretations remain the same. Since there is little
difference, the choice of reported error becomes rather arbitrary. Based on the examination
of the error term, I have chosen to report results in normal standard errors.
There are two additional reasons for doing so as well. Firstly, divergence between normal
standard errors and robust standard errors should rise attention as it is likely due to miss-
specification of the model (King and Roberts 2012). Secondly, falsification strictly based
on p-values is neither a good option. Since the inference from the p-values is based on the
potential of drawing a new sample, the logic does not apply to my analysis. I cannot simply
draw a new sample of non-state conflicts.5 The p-values from a model reporting 0.05 or 0.09
is of minor importance. Hence, I have reported values in normal standard errors and tried to
provide discussions based on more substantial terms like: direction, effect and uncertainty.
6.1.3 Influential Observations
When interpreting parameter estimates, observations that diverge substantially from the
overall pattern may alter the results. This could lead to an exaggerate estimates, hence bi-
ased estimates, since a few observations drive the regression slope. It then becomes necessary
to inspect whether the data inhabit influential observations. The idea is simply to separate
between systematic differences and non-systematic differences. An outlier is an example of
the latter. This is the case when an observation inhabits extreme values on the dependent
variable, the explanatory variables or both (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Since the obser-
vations I have included diverge much upon the number of counts, the question of influential
observations is inevitable.
Compared to linear and logistic regression, there are not as many established procedure for
testing influential observations for count regression. While the logistic regression have the
Cook’s distance to detect poorly predicted cases, there exist no similar test for count models.6
4More specifically: I have applied the heteroscedastic autocorrelation (HAC) specification found the R-
package sandwich to adjust the variance- covariance matrix. From the matrix returned, I have calculated new,
standard errors that account for heteroscedasticy and autocorrelation in the error term. A more detailed
review of the HAC estimator (and other variance- covariance adjustments) can be found in Zeileis (2004,
2006)
5The phenomena of focusing on p-values have been heavily criticized by scholars like Ward, Greenhill and
Bakke (2010). Instead of focusing strictly on p-values, they suggest to focus on signs of coefficients, their
effect and the uncertainty attached to the estimate.
6This is based on comparing robustness checks commonly used within the social sciences. I do by no
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When trying to find the badly predicted observations, other tools can be applied. My solu-
tion is to perform a sensitivity analysis of respective states’ influence on parameter estimates.
Compared to Cook’s distance, this way of detecting influential observations depends on di-
vergence in the explanatory variable whereas Cook’s method hinges on divergence in the
dependent variable. It is a local way of addressing influence, whereas looking at influence on
the dependent is global (Fox and Weisberg 2011; Wang, Puterman, Cockburn and Le 1996).
Since bureaucratic quality is my strongest predictive, I have chosen to perform a sensitivity
analysis on this variable. The analysis is performed by estimating the model as many times
as there is observations in the data. Each estimation is done by dropping the i -th case from
the data set. The results returned are the i -th element’s influence on the explanatory. In
my case, there are two possible approaches. Either can I perform the analysis on the total
number of 2904 observations, or I can restrict it to the 151 states included. Since non-state
conflicts have a tendency to reoccur within the same states, I will adopt for an approach
where I drop states.
Figure 6.1 shows the respective states’ influence on the bureaucratic quality parameter. From
the figure we can see that some states diverge from the overall pattern. These states are: Iraq,
Kenya, Lebanon, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda. It means that their relative
leverage on the parameter estimate of bureaucratic quality diverge non-systematically when
compared to the other states.
In order to test whether these seven specific observations drive my estimates, I have re-run
the analysis by excluding them. The estimates from these analysis are found in Appendix B,
Table B.11. When I remove the outliers from the analysis, the effect of bureaucratic quality
is weakened and its uncertainty risen. This is true for the models including state collapse and
direction of regime change. For the model that does not emphasis the direction of change,
the estimate is still significant at the 10% level.
What is interesting about the results in Table B.11, are the sudden significance of the regime
change indicator.7 Not proving any leverage in any of the other analysis, regime per se
suddenly crosses the 10% significance level. Further, the effect of autocratization is both
means reject the fact that within the field of statistics there exist such tests. However, within the sub-field
of research methods for social sciences there exist plenty of literature addressing model robustness checks for
linear and logistic regression (See eg. Maddala 1983; Long 1997; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Greene 2008).
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for count regression.
7I have also re-run the conditional models to check whether the exclusion of the seven states alter the
conditional parameters. The findings from these analysis are found in Appendix B, Table B.12. The re-
estimation of the models corresponds to the previous rejection of a conditional relationship between regime
change and bureaucratic quality.
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Figure 6.1: Sensitivity analysis of states’ impact on the parameter estimate of bureaucratic
quality
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increased and its accuracy as well. While Hypothesis H2 about bureaucratic and adminis-
trative state capacity have lost some leverage, the Hypothesis H3b about autocratization is
strengthen.
There is one issue with deleting these seven cases that is rather problematic. When sum-
marizing their total counts on the dependent variable, I get the number of 243. This means
that roughly 40% of the variation in the dependent variable is lost by excluding these seven
countries. A robustness test suggesting a deletion of a set of states known to be the stereo-
type context for non-state conflicts should make the alarm go off. The enormous deletion
of counts brings up the question to which extent these observations should be treated as
outliers. They could simply be a manifestation of normality within the phenomena. While
non-state conflicts in general is a rare phenomenon, it could be questioned whether the seven
states are not so extreme when compared to other states where non-state conflicts actually
occurs.8
8See Section 4.2, Figure 4.1.
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6.2 Alternative Specifications and Estimation Methods
While I in the previous section assessed the internal structure of my models, I will in this
section go beyond the original model itself. It is somewhat an expansion of the research
design. If results are consistent across various model specifications, the theoretical argument
will be strengthened.
6.2.1 Alternative Operationalizations
As mentioned in the start of the research design chapter, there exist only one comprehensive
data source for non-state conflicts. This makes an alternative measure of the dependent vari-
able impossible. I my framework I have two three main explanatory variables, namely: bu-
reaucratic and administrative state capacity, representative institutions, and regime change.
Half Time Function of Regime Change
In the research design I addressed how an indicator of regime change needs to account for
proximity to last change. To account for the time effect of consolidation and regime change, I
have included an exponential decay function as an alternative specification of regime change.9
When I estimate the models with the half time of one year, results correspond to my prior
findings and suggestions. When regime change incorporate periods without a governing body,
the risk of non-state conflicts increases.
In my discussion of the results I questioned a causal path between non-state conflicts and
autocratization. After looking more thoroughly into the relationship I found the slightly
significant negative coefficient to be related to other factors despite dis-satisfied actors pro-
vided with an opportunity of violent solutions. In particular I found that the states recorded
with simultaneous deflection of the dependent variable non-state and autocratization had an
average of less than 1 year since last regime change. When controlling for the time effect
since last regime change, the indicator of autocratization loses its significance. This certainly
leads to a rejection of Hypothesi H3b, giving autocratization no leverage as an explanation
of non-state conflicts. Result from the analysis with the decay function are found i Appendix
C, Table C.2.
9The operationalization of this indicator is found in Section 4.3.5.
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Regime Change of Representative Institutions
Since my conceptualization state capacity hinges on a separation from the input side of pol-
itics, many indicators of state capacity is dismissed as they include measures of political
institutions. Of course, this relates to the elusiveness of the concept and its different inter-
pretations among scholars. In some studies, the Polity Index has been used as a measure
of state capacity. This is what Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) do in their study of in-fighting in
civil wars. They use the Polity Index as a measure of disintegrated political authority, hence
an indicator of state weakness. Since my indicator of representative institutions and regime
changes origins from the Polity Index, further usage of Polity Index is dismissed. Since it is
hard to find an indicator that does not include the input side of politics, I will proceed by
focusing on an alternative specification of the representative institution and regime changes.
As an alternative indicator of representative institutions and regime change I have opted for
the dichotomous measure democracy - autocracy measure by Alvarez et al. (1996). As I earlier
have argued that I would have preferred a continuous measure of representative institutions,
I am curious to see whether the dichotomous indicator is able to explain variation in the
dependent variable. Since this measure is somewhat more restrictive, significant result will
give enormous leverage to theoretical arguments.
As an alternative indicator of representative institutions and regime change I have opted for
the dichotomous measure democracy - autocracy measure by Alvarez et al. (1996). As I earlier
have argued that I would have preferred a continuous measure of representative institutions,
I am curious to see whether the dichotomous indicator is able to explain variation in the
dependent variable. Since this measure is somewhat more restrictive, significant result will
give enormous leverage to theoretical arguments.
Named after the authors initial, I use the ACLP index to proxy representative institution and
regime change. Compared to the SIP index, this indicator provides classification of political
according to four criterions. To be record as a democracy, all four rules have to be passed.
The rules are: (1) The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that
was popular elected, (2) the legislature must be popular elected, (2) there must be more
than one party competing in elections and (4) An alteration in power under electoral rules
identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place (Alvarez
et al. 1996, pg. 69). Regime is coded as change in the ACLP index with a one year lag
structure.
Table C.1 in Appendix C shows the results from the estimations with the ACLP index as an
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alternative specification of representative institution and regime change. Compared to the
SIP-index, this measure has no way of indicating cases of state collapse. This means that I
have no indicator to comparable to the state collapse indicator.
What I find from using the ACLP index is how representative institutions suddenly becomes
a major predictive of non-state conflicts. States crossing the ACLP democratic threshold are
less at risk than autocratic regimes. The effect of this indicator is very strong, even stronger
than for indicator for income level. In interpret the divergence in findings as a manifestation
of the complex and intervened the relationship between representative institutions. For the
indicator of bureaucratic quality, the same result are the roughly the same as in former
models. It is still a strong predictor of conflicts.
When it comes to regime change, the ACLP index does not find any relationship. To some
extent, I am not surprised by this result. Since the ACLP index is more restrictive than
the SIP index, the failure to find a relationship was to some degree was expected. I have
also estimated the model using an exceptional decrease function based on halftime since
last change in the ACPP index. This slightly change in the ACLP indicator does not alter
any results. I have also estimated the model by including the interaction term between
transition and bureaucratic quality. The result from the conditional model speaks in favor
of a rejection of the conditional hypothesis. While there seem to be a negative conditional
relationship between bureaucratic quality and autocratization, this relationship is dismissed
by performing a log-likelihood test between Model 1 and Model 4. The test rejects Model 4
as significant better than Model 1.10
Civil War Revisited
Due to the fear of co-linearity I chose to leave out civil war as a control in my analysis. In
particular I feared the overlap between the SIP index’ measure of interregnum period as this
often include cases of civil wars. There are two reasons why civil war should be included
in an investigation of non-state conflicts. Firstly, in the shadow of a civil war, the security
threat becomes even more evident. State busy fighting rebels, or a state evaporated, will be a
context where protection has to be privately supplied. Secondly, when investigating non-state
conflicts, the presence of other armed conflicts will often involve non-state agents. According
to Kalyvas (2003), an intergraded understanding of conflicts has to start with approaching
the phenomena as a complex process involving multiple actors with both joint and diverse
10As many model specifications are place consuming I have chosen to not report results addressing proximity
to change or the log-likelihood test.
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goals. Until now, I have only addressed violence between non-state actors. This approach
have a rather static view of conflicts, assuming that conflict between non-state actors can be
studied without the inclusion of state based conflicts.
To control for civil war, I use a dummy variable taken from UCDP’s Armed Conflict Dataset
(Themne´r and Wallensteen 2013). The variable has the threshold of 25 annual battle related
deaths. In order to discriminate between the effect of regime change and civil war have I
lagged the civil war indicator by five years. This increases the potential of discrimination
between the effect of regime change and civil war on the dependent.
In Appendix C, Table C.7 I have included civil war as a control. Despite its effect and
significance, its inclusion does not alter the relationship between the dependent and the
explanatory variables put forth.
6.2.2 Sub-Samples by Organization Level and Region
Sub-sample From Asia and Africa
Since non-state conflicts have their biggest share in African and Asian countries, I have
estimated a model using sub-samples from these regions. Results from these models can be
found in Appendix B, Table C.3 and Table C.4.
In the African sub-sample, the results from the main analysis are confirmed. Variables
behave identically, giving leverage to the indicators of bureaucratic quality and state collapse.
Democratization has a negative impact on non-state conflicts and autocratization leads to
an increase. Once again, these estimates have a high degree of uncertainty attached to them,
making conclusions highly speculative.
I have chosen to include the Middle East countries in my Asian sub-sample. I am clearly
aware of the major difference between these regions, but both regions are alone too small to
estimate an efficient negative binomial model. I have therefor chosen to collapse them. For
bureaucratic quality and state collapse, the relationships are once again confirmed. Bureau-
cratic quality decreases the risk of non-state conflicts and state collapse increases the risk.
For two estimates, the Asian sub-sample diverges from the global estimates. GDP per capita
loses its explanatory power while representative institution becomes significant.
I interpret this finding due to the somewhat extra ordinary situation in the Middle Eastern
oil countries. Compared to other states, these states are characterized by a historic legacy
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of armed conflict combined with unusual high levels of income. Oil money feeds the national
treasury with capital.11 Compared to Western states where high levels of income are accom-
panied by high levels of representative institutions, the same is not true for the Asian case.
States like Saudi- Arabia, Oman, Yemen and Iraq have high a level of national income, but
also a lack of political openness. The same is to some extent also true for the emerging Asian
economies. States like Singapore, China, South Korea, and Taiwan had an exceptionally
high growth rate until the mid-1990s. Despite the opening of Taiwan and South Korea in
the mid-1990s, China and Singapore still remain closed. While there exist other potential
explanations for why the Asian results diverge from the global results, the divergence between
political openness and economic development strikes me as the most obvious explanation.
Sub-samples From Rebel Conflicts and Communal Conflicts
Results based on a division between rebel groups and communal groups, are found in Ap-
pendix B, table C.5 and table C.6.
The rebel sub-sample all the explanatory variables put forth behave like expected. They
serve to confirm the results from the global sample. For the communal sub-sample none of
the explanatory variables put forth are significant. While I initially argued for an approach
where conflicts between communal groups and rebel groups could be collapses, the results
from the communal sub-sample questions my choice. The results clearly tell a story of
different dynamics between conflicts involving rebel groups and conflicts involving communal
groups.
I have drawn the theoretical arguments regarding regime change and communal conflicts from
Kreutz and Eck (2011). In their study, they find support for an increased risk of fighting
between communal groups in the wake of regime changes. This diverging result requires an
explanation. Compared to their study, I have applied much stricter inclusion criteria for
communal conflicts. The indicator used by Kreutz and Eck (2011, pg. 8) include a lower
number of annual threshold (one single fatality), events where there exist a higher degree
of uncertainty about exactly which communities where included and events which can be
accounted as one-sided violence.
To some extent, my result cast doubt over the finding of Kreutz and Eck. If communal
11Within the broader literature, the link between oil and conflict is well known (See eg Grossman 1991;
de Soysa 2000, 2002; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Ross 2004a,b). While many of the Middle Eastern conflicts
are oil related, I will not approach a further examination of the link between oil and armed conflict. For my
thesis, oil will solely be addressed through its impact on states’ income levels.
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violence is conceptualized as violence between organized groups, my results indicates no
relationship between regime change and communal conflicts. There is one additional problem
with the results from Kreutz and Eck (2011). For regime change, they have used to Polity
Index. This is problematic as one of the sub-indicator measuring participation has an explicit
reference to political violence in the coding rules (Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand 2009; Vreeland
2008).
6.2.3 Alternative Estimations
In Appendix B, Table B.10 have I estimated a Hurdle model. Compared to zero inflated
models, the assumptions regarding the Hurdle model are different. Zero inflated models
assume that non-occurrences can be due to both chance (sampling) and structures in the
data. A Hurdle model assumes zero counts totally due to structures and not by chance. The
zero is then estimates separately from the positive counts.
From the Hurdel model, bureaucratic quality is significant for both the count estimates and
the zero estimates. For those observations crossing the zero- threshold, state collapse seem
no longer to be relevant. This somewhat alters the results as I have put forth a theory where
state collapse leads to several occurrences of non-state conflicts. The Hurdel model suggest
state collapse matters for states going from zero to more than one count. But, after crossing
the threshold of one count, state collapse is no longer significant.
From the Hurdle model is becomes less clear whether a count model or binary model is the
most appropriate. If the count model where to be the right choice, all variables from the
count model should be significant in the count-part of the Hurdel model. In my case, only
bureaucratic quality is.
6.3 Summary
This have somewhat been a trial of strength for my results. When using different indicators,
some expectation have been strengthen, while others have lost their explanatory power.
The only hypothesis proving to be robust is the Hypothesi H2. Bureaucratic and adminis-
trative state capacity is consistent and robust across all model.12. For the other explanatory
12The analysis with removal of outliers is not. I have discussed this result, concluding that the outliers
also represent normality within the data
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variables, this chapter gives a mixed report. The expectations regarding representative in-
stitutions have been given a renaissance. By using a more crude measure, representative
institutions become significant. For regime change, I find no results after controlling for
proximity to change.
One important lesson learned from the robustness test is the loss of nuances when collaps-
ing categories and applying theories to a global sample. Non-state conflicts have different
dynamics depending on regional context and type of actors involved.
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Conclusion
This thesis has set out to explain whether the great variation in non-state conflicts across
states can be explained by state attributes. This approach has been justified upon the promi-
nent voice of scholars claiming state attributes as the initial source of grievance and inequality
between groups. Based on this claim I have suggested a relationship where representative
institutions and bureaucratic and administrative state capacity are importance determinants
for the structural conditions non-state conflicts erupt within. A state with non-representative
institution and a weak bureaucracy provide an environment where non-state conflicts become
likely. Since state attributes solely address the contextual settings making non-state conflicts
more or less likely, I have complimented the theoretical framework with expectations regard-
ing opportunity and motivation. For non-state actors seeking to increase their leverage, a
regime change will provide both opportunity and motivation.
In the following I give a discussion of the findings and non-findings before I finally address
the limitations and implications regarding the results.
7.1 Findings and Non-Findings
Results from my analysis have led to both rejections and confirmations of the expectations
derived. In particular have bureaucratic and administrative state capacity proved to a robust
indicator of non-state conflicts. For representative institutions, the record is mixed as the
main analysis and robustness test diverge. For the set of expectations regarding regime
change, only state collapse proves to be significant. When anarchy emerges, conflict between
non-state actors increases. When incorporating direction of regime change, there is a slightly
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tendency for democratization to decrease non-state conflicts and autocratization to increase
them. These tendencies have a high degree of uncertainty attached, making conclusion only
tentative. For the conditional hypothesis regarding bureaucratic and administrative state
capacity and regime change, I fail to find a relationship.
Hypothesis H1 expected states with representative political institutions to have less non-state
conflicts because they inhabit incentives to reduce and solve grievance between groups. From
the main analysis, this relationship was rejected. When tested against other explanations,
representative institutions had little to offer. As mentioned in the summary following the
discussion of the results, I was somewhat reluctant to dismiss representative institutions as
an explanation for non-state conflicts. The relationship between economic development, in-
stitutional structures and representative institutions are known to be complex. For instance,
it is highly plausible to believe an existence of democratic hidden legacy in the indicators
of income and bureaucratic quality. While the representative institutions proved to be in-
significant, a complete rejection of its significance seemed both premature and radical. In
the robustness test, this was revisited. Depending on choice of indicators, and the sample
exposed, representative institutions might be an explanation of non-state conflicts.
Hypothesis H2 expected states with high bureaucratic and administrative state capacity to
have less non-state conflicts. Hypothesis H2 has been confirmed and proves to be robust
across all my analysis. There are two theoretical interpretation of this. The first relates
to states ability to govern, and the second relates to how groups encompass their security.
While representative institutions equip states with good intensions, intensions alone do not
translate into conflict reducing behaviors. Execution of policies hinge upon bureaucratic and
administrative state capacity. States seeking to prevent disorder and restore order have a bet-
ter chance to fulfill their missions when equipped with a functioning bureaucracy. It enables
states to acquire information about their citizens. This is not only central for detection of
rebel movements, but also to gives government information about problems and grievances
within the broader population. This makes governance dependent upon bureaucratic and
administrative state capacity.
For groups, bureaucratic and administrative state capacity relates to their interpretation of
security. Whereas a functioning bureaucracy have the ability to provide security, if the state
chooses to do so, a malfunctioning bureaucracy fails. A malfunctioning bureaucracy is defined
by the lack of political independence, the temporal stop of services during changes, lack of
day-to day routines and patrimonial procedures. In providing security, this type either fails
or it becomes a threat to security itself. When state agents no longer constitute a trustworthy
provider of security, security has to be provided from another source. Security provided by
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group belonging is then the most relevant source. This leads to the armament of multiple
non-state actors and a shift in the regulation of violence from state-based to privately-based.
For regime change, I put forth a set of hypotheses. Together they addressed regime change per
se, direction of change and a conditional relationship between regime change bureaucratic
quality. While I fail to find a general relationship between non-state conflicts and regime
change, I find a strong relationship when allowing the indicator of regime to include cases
of state collapse. Year to year changes between political regimes cannot explain non-state
conflicts, but long periods without a governing body does. This gives some support to
Hypothesis H3a, which expected a general conflict increasing effect of regime change.
Civil wars are often followed by a lack of central authority. It is a situation characterized by
chaos and disorder. The period leading up to state collapse is often recognized by conflicts
of interest. Since these conflicts do not disappear by the disintegration of an old regime, a
state collapse will be situation filled with unsolved conflicts. State collapse will often bring a
power vacuum. The implication of a state collapse is the complete absence as state agents as
providers of security. From this it follows naturally that protection must come from another
source than the state. Since power is not settled, non-state actors will fight over government
power. Together, this adds up to an increase in non-state conflicts.
The mechanism related to regime change was motivation and opportunity. Regime change
tends to temporally (or completely) set aside the state’s ability to govern. It represents
a critical conjuncture for actors seeking political leverage. When states are on the verge of
collapse, rebels groups have incentive fight each other off in order to arrive as sole victors when
a new government is constituted. For those not seeking government office, the mechanism
leading to armament is the security dilemma.
For direction of change, the relationship is not strong enough to confirm any of the hy-
potheses. Hypothesis H3b expected an increase in non-state conflicts by autocratization. For
democratization I put forth competing expectations. Hypothesis H3c expected an increase in
non-state conflicts and Hypothesis H3d a decrease. I find a tendency for non-state conflicts
to increase during autocratization and decrease during democratization. Since all these esti-
mates have a high degree of uncertainty attached, it leads to a rejection of all the directional
hypotheses. While they originally proved significance at the 10% level, the effect disappears
when exposed to robustness tests. Despite this, I will give a small elaboration based on their
direction and uncertainty.
After scrutinizing the results, a causal relation between autocratization and non-state con-
flicts is rejected. The narrowing of the political sphere does not lead to a situation where
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groups signal disloyalty to the new regime by policing another group. Most of non-state con-
flicts displayed in the wake of an autocratization existed beyond the autocratization itself.
I proposed two competing hypotheses for democratization, based on how different socio-
economic starting points would lead to more or less resistance from the governing regime.
For democratic transition I find a tendency for non-state conflicts to decrease. When looking
more thoroughly into these cases where conflict erupted in the wake of transition and when
it did not, the negative estimate might be due to the favorable conditions these countries
exhibit.
For the conditional hypothesis, Hypothesis H4, I fail to find a relationship. My explanation
for this is twofold. Firstly, the result could indicate a non-existence of conditional effect.
Secondly, bureaucratic and administrative state capacity as a concept is to broad to capture
a conditional effect concerning regime change. Since the aspect involves more dimension
than just the ability to govern through changes, a plausible explanation could be related to
leverage of each aspect. Unfortunately I do not have the ability to decompose the dimension
of bureaucratic and administrative state capacity. As for now, a conditional relationship is
rejected.
7.2 Limitations and Implications
There are some limitations in this study. While the expectations derived are universal,
the application of a global mean and the collapse of categories lead to a loss of nuances.
For instance, there are many states included here which do not inhabit the characteristics
associated with conflicts. In my analysis I have compared Sweden with Sudan. The estimates
will be the global effect, which might not reflect any of these countries. Results based on
sub-samples by region and type of non-state conflict gave different results. This is the major
drawback by an all-inclusive approach. Non-state conflicts have different dynamics depending
on regional context and type of actors involved.
My study has only looked at explanations related to the state level. This makes my approach
somewhat limited. I have not included any measures at the group level. My approach
have been entirely structural, where I have focused on the context and conditions which
makes states more or less exposed for non-state conflicts. Although I find state attributes of
importance, incorporating measures at group level would have been ideal.
The implications from this study are drawn from the findings of bureaucratic quality and
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representative institutions. Since these both decrease the risk of non-state conflicts, attempts
to improve them should be met. Improvement of representative institutions implies democ-
ratization, a process which should be taken upon with caution. While I find a tendency for
non-state conflicts to decrease by democratization, these are only in the cases where countries
exhibit favorable conditions for democratization.
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Appendix A
Additional Statistics
Table A.1 provides information about the 12 duplicated observations due to multiple state
locations.
Table A.1: Duplicated observations
Side A Side B Statenames Year
Hells Angels Rock Machine Canada, Mexico 1995
Peulh Touareg Mali, Niger 1997
Mauretanians Senegalese Mauretania, Senegal 1989
Liberia Peace Council National Patriotic Front of Liberia Liberia, Ivory Coast 1995
Pokot Turkana Kenya, Uganda 2006
Pokot Turkana Kenya, Uganda 2008
Dassanetch Turkana Kenya, Ethiopia 2005
Nyangatom Turkana Kenya, Ethiopia 2006
Borana Gabra Kenya, Ethiopia 2007
Borana Degodia Ethiopia, Kenya 1998
Kurdish Democratic Party Kurdistan Worker’s Party Iraq, Turkey 1997
Gulf Cartel Sinaloa Cartel Mexico, Guatemala 2008
Source: UCDP non-state conflict dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012)
Table A.2 provides information about the missing values on the explanatory variables.
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Table A.2: Missing values on explanatory variables
Variable NA N Share
SIP index 21.00 2993.00 0.01
State Collapse 21.00 2993.00 0.01
Regime Change 21.00 2993.00 0.01
Democratization 21.00 2993.00 0.01
Autocratization 21.00 2993.00 0.01
Bureacratic Quality 21.00 2993.00 0.01
Log GDP per cap 110.00 2904.00 0.04
Log Population total 66.00 2948.00 0.02
Relevant Groups 0.00 3014.00 0.00
Peace Years 0.00 3014.00 0.00
Source: Strand et al. (2012); Heston and Aten (2012);
Hegre and Nyg˚ard (2014); GROWup (2014)
Note: Share NA is based on a total of 3014 observations
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Table A.3: States included in analysis
Afghanistan Albania Algeria
Angola Argentina Armenia
Australia Austria Azerbaijan
Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus
Belgium Benin Bhutan
Bolivia Botswana Brazil
Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi
Cambodia Cameroon Canada
Central African Republic Chad Chile
China Colombia Congo, Rep. Of
Costa Rica Cote d‘Ivoire Croatia
Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of Congo Denmark Djibouti
Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt
El Salvador Eritrea Estonia
Ethiopia Fiji Finland
France Gabon Gambia
Georgia Germany Ghana
Greece Guatemala Guinea
Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti
Honduras Hungary India
Indonesia Iran Iraq
Ireland Israel Italy
Jamaica Japan Jordan
Kazakhstan Kenya Korea Republic of
Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos
Latvia Lebanon Lesotho
Liberia Libya Lithuania
Macedonia Madagascar Malawi
Malaysia Mali Mauritania
Mexico Moldova Mongolia
Morocco Mozambique Namibia
Nepal Netherlands New Zealand
Nicaragua Niger Nigeria
Norway Oman Pakistan
Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay
Peru Philippines Poland
Portugal Romania Russia
Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal
Serbia Sierra Leone Slovak Republic
Slovenia Somalia South Africa
Spain Sri Lanka Sudan
Swaziland Sweden Switzerland
Syria Taiwan Tajikistan
Tanzania Thailand Togo
Trinidad Tobago Tunisia Turkey
Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine
United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States
Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela
Vietnam Yemen Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Table A.5: Variance inflation factor test
Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6
Rep. Inst. 1.37 1.32 1.68
Bur. Qual. 2.34 1.95 2.07
State Collapse 2.50
Bur. Qual. * State Collapse 3.24
Regime Change 1.50
Bur. Qual. * Regime Change 1.67
Autocratization 2.05
Bur. Qual * Autocratization 2.13
Democratization 1.20
Bur. Qual * Democratization 1.26
Population (ln) 1.80 1.76 1.81
GDP per cap (ln) 1.72 1.61 1.67
Relevant Groups 1.61 1.59 1.61
Peace Years 26.82 26.83 27.02
Peace Years2 159.11 159.64 160.68
Peace Years3 71.60 71.88 72.34
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Figure A.1: Occurrences of non-state
conflicts by state collapse
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Figure A.2: Occurrences of non-state conflicts
by regime change
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Figure A.3: Occurrences of non-state
conflicts by democratization
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Figure A.4: Occurrences of non-state conflicts
by autocratization
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Appendix B
Model Robustness
Table B.1: Basemodels: poisson and negative binomial
Poisson Neg. bin.
(Intercept) 0.67 0.07
(0.42) (0.62)
Population (ln) 0.33∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.54∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Relevant Groups −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Peace years −1.00∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.10)
Peace years2 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Peace years3 −3.49∗∗∗ −3.09∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.85)
Theta θ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.09)
N 2904 2904
AIC 2045.18 1857.72
BIC 2212.44 2048.88
logL −994.59 −896.86
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01;
∗∗∗p < .001
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Table B.2: Results from Model 1 with robust standard errors
Estimate Robust SE Pr(>|z|) LL UL
(Intercept) -2.48 0.85 0.00 -4.14 -0.82
Rep. Inst. 0.02 0.24 0.93 -0.45 0.50
Bur. Qual. -0.28 0.12 0.02 -0.52 -0.04
State Collapse 0.61 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.95
Population (ln) 0.48 0.06 0.00 0.36 0.61
GDP per cap (ln) -0.38 0.09 0.00 -0.55 -0.20
Rel. Gropus -0.01 0.01 0.51 -0.03 0.02
Peace Years -0.91 0.11 0.00 -1.13 -0.69
Peace Years2 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.13
Peace Years3 -3.04 0.93 0.00 -4.86 -1.21
N 2904
AIC 1834.19
BIC 2120.93
logL -869.09
Table B.3: Results from Model 2 with robust standard errors
Estimate Robust SE Pr(>|z|) LL UL
(Intercept) -1.92 0.79 0.02 -3.47 -0.36
Rep. Inst. 0.00 0.23 0.98 -0.45 0.46
Bur. Qual. -0.36 0.13 0.00 -0.61 -0.12
Regime Change 0.06 0.20 0.76 -0.32 0.44
Population (ln) 0.45 0.07 0.00 0.32 0.59
GDP per cap (ln) -0.39 0.09 0.00 -0.56 -0.22
Rel. Groups -0.01 0.01 0.59 -0.03 0.02
Peace Years -0.93 0.11 0.00 -1.15 -0.71
Peace Years2 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.13
Peace Years3 -3.09 0.94 0.00 -4.92 -1.25
N 2904
AIC 1848.68
BIC 2111.53
logL -880.34
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Table B.4: Results from Model 3 with robust standard errors
Estimate Robust SE Pr(>|z|) LL UL
(Intercept) -1.85 0.80 0.02 -3.42 -0.28
Rep. Inst. 0.08 0.24 0.75 -0.39 0.54
Bur. Qual. -0.36 0.13 0.00 -0.61 -0.11
Autocratization 0.47 0.28 0.10 -0.09 1.02
Democratization -0.29 0.26 0.27 -0.80 0.22
Population (ln) 0.45 0.07 0.00 0.31 0.58
GDP per cap (ln) -0.40 0.09 0.00 -0.57 -0.23
Rel. Groups -0.01 0.01 0.63 -0.03 0.02
Peace Years -0.94 0.11 0.00 -1.16 -0.71
Peace Years2 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.13
Peace Years3 -3.10 0.94 0.00 -4.94 -1.26
N 2904
AIC 1846.40
BIC 2133.14
logL -875.20
Table B.5: Results from Model 4 with robust standard errors
Estimate Robust SE Pr(>|z|) LL UL
(Intercept) -2.46 0.85 0.00 -4.11 -0.80
Rep. Inst. 0.02 0.24 0.94 -0.46 0.49
Bur. Qual. -0.23 0.12 0.06 -0.46 0.01
State Collapse 0.43 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.77
Bur. Qual.* State Collapse -0.20 0.85 0.81 -1.86 1.46
Population (ln) 0.48 0.06 0.00 0.35 0.60
GDP per cap (ln) -0.37 0.09 0.00 -0.55 -0.20
Rel. Gropus -0.01 0.01 0.64 -0.03 0.02
Peace Years -0.90 0.11 0.00 -1.13 -0.68
Peace Years2 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.13
Peace Years3 -3.00 0.93 0.00 -4.82 -1.17
N 2904
AIC 1834.19
BIC 2120.93
logL -869.09
Table B.6: Likelihood ratio tests for Mod 1 and Mod 4: Uconditional vs conditional effect
of state collapse by bureaucratic quality
Model Resid. df. 2 x log-lik df. Pr.Chi.
Base 2897 -1841.72
Mod 1 2894 -1812.24 3 0.00
Mod 4 2893 -1810.95 1 0.26
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Table B.7: Likelihood ratio tests for Model 2 and Model 4: Uncondition vs conditional
effect of state collapse by bureaucratic quality
Model Resid. df. 2 x log-lik df. Pr.Chi.
Base 2897 -1841.72
Mod 2 2894 -1826.68 3 0.00
Mod 4 2893 -1826.25 1 0.51
Table B.8: Likelihood ratio tests for Model 3 and Model 6: Uncondition vs conditional
effect of democratization and autocratization by bureaucratic quality
Model Resid. df. 2 x log-lik df. Pr.Chi.
Base 2897 -1841.72
Mod 3 2893 -1822.92 4 0.00
Mod 6 2891 -1821.31 2 0.45
Table B.9: Likelihood ratio tests for Model 2 and Model 3: Regime change per se vs
direction of change
Model Resid. df. 2 x log-lik df. Pr.Chi.
Base 2897 -1841.72
Mod 2 2894 -1826.68 3 0.00
Mod 3 2893 -1822.92 1 0.05
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Table B.10: Results from hurdle estimations
Count Estimates
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
(Intercept) −1.15 (1.40) −1.18 (1.29) −1.09 (1.26)
Rep. Inst −0.61† (0.36) −0.59† (0.36) −0.59 (0.36)
Bur. Qual. −0.27† (0.15) −0.28† (0.14) −0.28† (0.14)
State Collapse 0.02 (0.22)
Regime Change −0.09 (0.26)
Democratization −0.25 (0.39)
Autocratization 0.04 (0.34)
Population (ln) 0.30∗∗ (0.10) 0.30∗∗ (0.10) 0.30∗∗ (0.09)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.18 (0.11) −0.18 (0.11) −0.18† (0.11)
Rel. Groups −0.03 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02) −0.03† (0.02)
Peace Years −0.62† (0.35) −0.63† (0.33) −0.63∗ (0.31)
Peace Years2 0.12 (0.16) 0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14)
Peace Years3 −10.24 (15.04) −11.60 (13.93) −11.40 (13.49)
Theta θ 0.49 (0.53) 0.51∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.52 (0.01)
Logit Estimates
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
(Intercept) −2.10∗ (0.99) −1.66† (0.97) −1.64† (0.97)
Rep. Inst. 0.40 (0.28) 0.36 (0.27) 0.43 (0.28)
Bur. Qual. −0.19 (0.12) −0.28∗ (0.12) −0.29∗ (0.12)
State Collapse 0.86∗∗∗ (0.20)
Regime Change 0.18 (0.24)
Democratization −0.134 (0.32)
Autocratization 0.65† (0.36)
Population (ln) 0.50∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.47∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.47∗∗∗ (0.07)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.48∗∗∗ (0.09) −0.49∗∗∗ (0.09) −0.49∗∗∗ (0.09)
Rel. Groups 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Peace Years −1.05∗∗∗ (0.12) −1.05∗∗∗ (0.12) −1.05∗∗∗ (0.12)
Peace Years2 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02)
Peace Years3 −3.85∗∗∗ (0.96) −3.87∗∗∗ (0.97) −3.85∗∗∗ (0.97)
AIC 1817.35 1833.84 1834.98
Log Likelihood -887.67 -895.92 -894.4904
Num. obs. 2904 2904 2904
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table B.11: Results for unconditional analysis with removal of outliers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −3.88∗∗∗ −3.46∗∗∗ −3.39∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.97) (0.97)
Rep. Inst. 0.27 0.18 0.28
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Bur. Qual. −0.19 −0.24† −0.24†
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
State Collapse 0.56∗∗
(0.19)
Regime Change 0.37†
(0.22)
Democratization 0.05
(0.29)
Autocratization 0.78∗∗
(0.30)
Population (ln) 0.72∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.59∗∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Rel. Groups −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years −0.71∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Peace Years2 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −2.45∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −2.51∗∗
(0.88) (0.88) (0.88)
θ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
N 2764 2764 2764
AIC 1217.92 1223.16 1222.03
BIC 1478.60 1483.83 1506.40
logL −564.96 −567.58 −563.02
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table B.12: Results for conditional analysis with removal of outliers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −3.86∗∗∗ −3.40∗∗∗ −3.32∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.98) (0.98)
Rep. Inst. 0.27 0.18 0.28
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Bur. Qual. −0.16 −0.22 −0.23
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
State Collapse 0.41
(0.29)
Bur. Qual. * State Collapse −0.17
(0.24)
Regime Change 0.29
(0.29)
Bur. Qual. * Regime Change −0.12
(0.27)
Democratization 0.16
(0.34)
Autocratization 0.52
(0.50)
Bur. Qual. * Demo. 0.17
(0.35)
Bur. Qual. * Auto. −0.27
(0.43)
Population (ln) 0.73∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.59∗∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Rel. Groups −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years −0.70∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Peace Years2 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −2.42∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −2.48∗∗
(0.88) (0.88) (0.88)
θ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
N 2764 2764 2764
AIC 1219.44 1224.98 1225.36
BIC 1503.81 1509.36 1557.13
logL −561.72 −564.49 −556.68
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.1: Results with ACLP-index as indicator of representative institutions and regime
change
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −2.55∗∗ −2.55∗∗ −2.56∗∗ −2.65∗∗
(0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81)
Rep. Inst. −0.45∗∗ −0.45∗∗ −0.45∗∗ −0.45∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Bur. Qual. −0.32∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Regime Change 0.18 0.23
(0.40) (0.46)
Bur. Qual.* Regime Change 0.11
(0.52)
Democratization 0.16 0.26
(0.49) (0.52)
Bur. Qual.* Demo. 0.25
(0.66)
Autocratization 0.25 −2.00
(0.70) (1.70)
Bur. Qual.* Auto. −2.14†
(1.19)
Population (ln) 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Rel. Groups −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peace Years −0.92∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Peace Years2 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −3.07∗∗∗ −3.06∗∗∗ −3.07∗∗∗ −2.99∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.84)
Theta θ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
N 2930 2930 2930 2930
AIC 1843.32 1845.31 1845.28 1845.98
BIC 2106.56 2132.48 2132.45 2181.02
logL −877.66 −874.65 −874.64 −866.99
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.2: Results with decay function of regime change, non state conflicts 1989-2008
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −2.51∗∗ −1.89∗ −1.81∗
(0.83) (0.81) (0.81)
Rep. Inst. −0.01 0.01 0.11
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Bur. Qual −0.29∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
State Collapseht 0.54
∗∗
(0.17)
Regime Changeht −0.03
(0.20)
Democratizationht −0.40
(0.26)
Autocratizationht 0.30
(0.27)
Population (ln) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.37∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Rel. Groups −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peace Years −0.92∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Peace Years2 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −3.06∗∗∗ −3.07∗∗∗ −3.05∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.85) (0.85)
Theta θ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
N 2904 2904 2904
AIC 1838.30 1848.75 1847.38
BIC 2101.15 2111.60 2134.12
logL −875.15 −880.37 −875.69
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
Subscriptht indicates a halftime decay function
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.3: Result from African sub-Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −7.05∗∗∗ −6.08∗∗∗ −5.99∗∗∗
(1.22) (1.19) (1.19)
Rep. Inst. 0.05 0.00 0.10
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Bur. Qual −0.29∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.41∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
State Collapse 0.74∗∗∗
(0.18)
Regime Change 0.10
(0.24)
Democratization −0.27
(0.35)
Autocratization 0.43
(0.31)
Population (ln) 0.74∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.05 −0.13 −0.14
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Relevant Groups −0.01 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years −0.85∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Peace Years2 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Peace Years3 −2.86∗ −3.29∗ −3.28∗
(1.43) (1.48) (1.49)
Theta θ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
N 913 913 913
AIC 1015.20 1028.52 1028.29
BIC 1227.14 1240.45 1259.50
logL −463.60 −470.26 −466.15
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.4: Result from Asian and Middle East sub-sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −4.46∗ −3.02 −3.01
(1.98) (1.92) (1.93)
Rep. Inst. 1.01∗ 1.04∗ 1.08∗∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42)
Bur. Qual. −0.81∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
State Collapse 0.79∗∗
(0.30)
Regime Change −0.24
(0.48)
Democratization −0.54
(0.61)
Autocratization 0.33
(0.75)
Population (ln) 0.30∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.20∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.04 −0.08 −0.08
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Rel. Groups 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years −0.72∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Peace Years2 0.07∗ 0.07∗ 0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Peace Years3 −2.54† −2.39† −2.39†
(1.37) (1.36) (1.36)
Theta θ 0.83∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.77∗∗
(0.30) (0.27) (0.27)
N 816 816 816
AIC 508.87 514.84 516.05
BIC 715.86 721.84 741.86
logL −210.43 −213.42 −210.03
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.5: Result from rebel sub-sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −6.71∗∗∗ −5.11∗∗∗ −5.02∗∗∗
(1.14) (1.10) (1.09)
Rep. Inst. 0.18 0.28 0.34
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Bur. Qual −0.77∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
State Collapse 1.17∗∗∗
(0.19)
Regime Change 0.14
(0.28)
Democratization −0.46
(0.42)
Autocratization 0.69†
(0.37)
Population (ln) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
GDP per cap (ln) 0.03 −0.07 −0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Relevant Groups −0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peace Years −0.78∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ −0.83∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Peace Years2 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −1.61∗ −1.63∗ −1.72∗
(0.80) (0.80) (0.80)
Theat θ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.17) (0.18)
N 2904 2904 2904
AIC 1050.87 1084.87 1082.67
BIC 1313.72 1347.72 1369.41
logL −481.43 −498.44 −493.33
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.6: Results from communal sub-sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −0.28 −0.24 −0.16
(1.16) (1.15) (1.16)
Rep. Inst. −0.27 −0.27 −0.19
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Bur. Qual. 0.01 −0.00 −0.00
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
State Collapse 0.06
(0.23)
Regime Change −0.03
(0.29)
Democratization −0.31
(0.39)
Autocratization 0.34
(0.40)
Population (ln) 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.91∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Relevant Groups −0.03† −0.03† −0.03†
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years −0.74∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Peace Years2 0.05∗ 0.05∗ 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −1.01 −1.01 −1.01
(0.90) (0.90) (0.90)
Theta θ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
N 2904 2904 2904
AIC 1065.84 1065.89 1066.40
BIC 1328.69 1328.74 1353.14
logL −488.92 −488.94 −485.20
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table C.7: Results from estimations including civil war as control
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −2.48∗∗ −1.89∗ −1.82∗
(0.83) (0.81) (0.81)
Rep. Inst. −0.08 −0.10 −0.03
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Bur. Qual. −0.23∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.32∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
State Collapse 0.64∗∗∗
(0.16)
Regime Change 0.12
(0.20)
Democratization −0.23
(0.28)
Autocratization 0.51†
(0.28)
Population (ln) 0.46∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP per cap (ln) −0.37∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Relevant Groups −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Civil Wart−5 0.55∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Peace Years −0.91∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Peace Years2 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peace Years3 −3.07∗∗∗ −3.16∗∗∗ −3.17∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.86) (0.86)
Theta θ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
N 2881 2881 2881
AIC 1820.87 1836.45 1834.80
BIC 2107.23 2122.81 2145.02
logL −862.43 −870.22 −865.40
Negative binomial regression
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
162
Appendix D
Dataset and Syntax-files
For all my analysis, tables and figures I have used R.
The data used in my analysis and its belonging R-scripts are all made available to the public.1
Further questions regarding the analysis, tables or figures can be provided upon request.
Contact: hannabugge@gmail.com
1https://www.dropbox.com/sh/zlc1v7mtju2x6k2/AAAE4NHN9J7WTfkvnn6Ibmy6a
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